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ABSTRACT 
Bargaining structure has traditionally been at the centre of 
Industrial Relations research, and ir,creasingly attention is being 
given to the influences upon it. This'study examines management's 
attempts to regulate union behaviov..:r in four organisations having 
different bargaining struc~ures. These are treated as case studies 
and using qualitative data they are compared to study three relation-
ships: between management structure and bargaining structure; between 
bargaining structure and union behaviour; an~ between situational 
determinants and bargaining structure. 
The background to th2 thesis is outlined in Pa,rt I. This 
introduces the study, des0ribes the research method, a~d then applies 
some of the research data available to previous hypotheses. A number 
of tentative proposals are put forward regarding bargaining structure 
and the influences upon it which are pursued in Part III. 
The four case studies are systematically analysed in the 
following four chapters. For each collective bargaining in practice 
is outlined followed by an analysis of managerial attempts to regulate 
this. 
Part III draws on this raw data and analyses managerial 
involvement in Industrial Relations in two stages. Initially a frame-
work for the study of managerial involvement is developed which puts 
bargaining structure in its context. Secondly using an established 
criterion the effectiveness of management control over union activity 
is 'examined. Finally the implications of the analysis for management, 
trade unions, and the reform of Industrial Relations are pursued. 
A number of proposals are put forward in this thesis. First 
the level of bargaining cannot be studied in isolation, but must be 
placed in the context of the other ~imensions of bargaining structure. 
Second, bargaining structure is influenced by constraints both 
internal and external to the organisation, yet management appear 
,to have a good deal of discretion in choosing a particular structure. 
Third, bargaining structure must be placed within the context of the 
control systems used by management, many of which may not immediately 
be concerned with Industrial Relations. Finally, to understand 
managerial control over union activity we must look not only at the 
control systems but also the legitimacy of managerial authority. 
Put together these proposals contribute to our understanding of likely 
future changes in bargaining structure, and the shape possible reforms 
might take. 
'/ 
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PART I THE BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
CHAPrER 01~ 
•• 
• . INTRODUCTION 
The post war development of bargaining in the workplace has 
attr~cted considerable public and academic attentiun to Industrial 
Rel~tions in general and the structure of bargaining in particular. 
At the centre of this controversy have been the trade unions and 
their ~vorkplace representatives. It is ironi c that despite being 
the other party to collective bargaining relatively little is 
~own about the part played by management. 
This is not to suggest that the role of management in Industrial 
Relations has been ignored, for·the significance of management's 
involvement has long been stressed. However the importance attributed 
to the part played by management has not been matched by research 
actually undertaken. 
This lack of research is surprising when it is recalled that 
1 the Donovan Report placed the burden of reform of bargaining 
structure on management and Boards of Directors. This lacuna is all 
the more paradoxical when recent research is considered. 2 For it 
is suggested that with the formalisation of plant bargaining 
management may be playing an increasingly active role in Industrial 
Relations. 
The neglect of management has been in terms of research 
conducted, rather than the significance attached to their role. This 
/ 
1 Royal Commission on Tra~es Unions and Employers' Associations 
hence referred to as the Donovan Report. 
2 Brown and Terry (1978) 
1 
2 
has led one influential observer to state that 'The tru~h of the 
illatter in the study of management in Industrial Relations is in a 
primitive state' (Clegg, 1979: 164). 
Information which 1S available on management's role concentrates 
upon their attempts at controlling the work force through collective 
bargaining. There is soma confusion however over the relationship 
between management and the bargaining structure. While some studies 1 
suggest that management and bargaining structure should be closely 
2 
aligned others indicate that this need not be so. 
This study therefore begins to redress this imbalance of 
research. In essence it investigates the relationship between 
bargaining structure and management control of Industrial Relations. 
1 Previous Research 
Although there are studies which stress the significance of 
management's role a relatively small amount 01 research has actually 
3 been carried out. A number of case studies have provided glimpses 
of the part played by management, but all too often this has been 
available only in piecemeal fashion. 4 
Other studies have examined management control over Industrial 
Relations~ but as Turner notes 'This has been overwhelmingly 
1 Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer (1975:197) 
2 CIR (1974:29) 
3 Research has been undertaken in the United States: Slichter, 
Healey and Livernash (1960);Chamterl~in (1967); Baker and France (1954 
Gouldner (1957) . ,/ 
4 Exarnples include: Batstone' (1977,1978); Brown (1973); Beynon (197 
Sisson (1975); Flanders (1964); Nichols and Beynon (1977) along with 
work in connection with the SSRC's Management and Industrial Relations 
Committee. Turner et al (1977) ar-d Purcell and Smith (1979) are 
possible exceptions. 
5 Hawkins (1979); from an organisational behaviour perspective 
Child (1977); from a busir-ess policy perspective Thomas (1978). 
3 
prescriptive or didactic ••••• mainly aimed to offer instruction or 
advice to managers on how to Qeal with employees.' (1977:1) 
A number of reasons have been put forward to explain this 
inadequacy. For different reasons commentators on both the Rigb~ 
and the Left have shown little interest in the subject. 
Wood and Thurley (1977:1) point out that some authors believe 
this is because management have not been defined as a 'social problem'. 
While Anthony (1977:41) suggests the emphasis on unions is a consequence 
of the initial 'interest of researchers in their development, or because 
of what he calls 'evangelistic ~ympathies'. 
Anthony (1977:41) notes that companies and managers themselves 
may playa part in this. He criticises their attitude towards research 
and notes that they are 'over inclined to prevent access for research 
and too sensitive to reports which have not entirely reflected their 
own judgement s • ' 
Research into manageoent's Industrial Relations role In multi-
plant organisations has been limited. 1 This is surprising for two 
reasons. 
First, although it is likely that there are a number of 
characteristics which are unique to multi-plant organisations they 
are commonly treated as being no different to other organisations. 
They have not, for example, received the specialist attention lavished 
on multi-national corporations. 
Second, and perhaps more important multi-plant organisations 
account for the majority of plants in this country. The Bullock 
1 It should be stressed that this study is not concerned with 
all kinds of multi-plant organisation, which range from botels to 
the Civil Service, but to large multi-plant groups in th~ Engineering 
Industry. 
4 
Report (1977:6) notes that most large companies 'are in fact 
groups of companies organised in pyramids of holding and subSidiary 
companies'. Evidence 1 indicates that multi-plcnt organisations 
account for 83% of employees generally, and nearly 86% in the 
Engineering Industry. This growth appears to be continuing. Prais 
(1976) suggests the median establishment oTN.ned 6 plants in 1958 and 20 
in 1968. For companies waking up the first quarter of UK output 
the figures are 33 plants in 1958 and 192 in 1968 (1976:63). 
2 The Focus of the Study 
Within the recent research2 which· has stressed the role of 
management in Industrial Relations the predominant Vlew lS as 
follows. 
First, the foremost influence on union behaviour is· bargaining 
structure, and in particular the level at which this bargaining takes 
place, e~g. whether at plant, group or an intermediate level. 3 
Second, the most important influences on bargaining structure 
are the structure and attitudes of management and employers' 
associations. Differing patterns of union behaviour are related 
firstly to bargaining structure &'1.d secondly to management structure. 
Finally management's choice of bargaining structure is influenced 
by a number of determinants. Some of these ar8 internal to the 
organisation such as size and technology, while others such as 
product market are external. Bargaining structure should be equated 
... /
1. eIR (1973:3); Marsh, Evans and Garcia· (1971:82) 
2 See Clegg (1976); Bain and Clegg (1975) 
3 'Group' level bargainirlg covers ali plants in an organisation, 
while an intermediate level may cover only a number of plants (referre 
to here as Division). McCarthy (1971) also recognises bargaining 
scope; unit, and form as possible dimensions. See Chapter Three. 
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with the demands of these determinants in order to achieve the 'best 
buy' for management. 
In the light of this research four case studies of large multi-
plant organisations ha~ng different bargaining structures were 
undertaken. Data from these cases is compared and contrasted in 
order to investigate, the following pr.oposed relationships: 
(1) Between bargaining structure and union behaviour 
(2) Between management structure and bargaining structure 
(3)' Between situational determinants and bargaining structure. 
The fieldwork covered some eighteen months and involved around 
a total of two hundred interviews with management and union 
representatives' together with a study of agreements and other 
I written material. 1 
3 Plan 
The following chapter looks at the research method used in 
this study. It describes in some detail the method of data collection 
and some of the problems er-countered. Also included are thumbnail 
sketches of the cases. 
Chapter Three has two aims. First to review the relevant 
research in detail in the context of this study. Second to 
/ 
systematically apply the research data available to the concepts 
and hypotheses put forward. The findings are briefly summarised 
towards the end of the chapter for future reference. 
1 See Chapter Two for further details 
6 
Chapters Four to Seven constitute Part II and describe and 
analyse each of the four case studies in turn. Chapter Four provides 
a bench mark for comparison with observations in other cases. It 
also suggests a number of ~entative concepts and hypotheses which 
are reviewed in Part III in the light of the following cases. 
Each case is examined systematically in a uniform manner. 
First the bargaining in p~actice is described. Second the control 
. . 
systems used by management to regulate this bargaining are analysed. 
Part III gathers together the disparate case studies and 
provides a concise analysis which is in two stages. 
Chapter Eight provides a framework for analysing the process 
of management control. It places the bargaining structure in the 
context of the other control systems operated by management, as well 
as .some of the influences upon management. 
Chapter Nine considbrs the impact of the control process on 
union behaviour. It looks at the varying effectiveness of management 
control over one aspect of union activity. In turn it then analyses 
the factors which influence this effectiveness. 
Chapter Ten is devoted to the implications of the research. 
The possible consequences for management trade unions and the reform 
of Industrial Relations are examined, together with some future 
areas of study in the field. 
CHAPI'ER TWO . 
• 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
RESEARCH METHOD A1TTI INTRODUCTION TO THE CASES 
----- : == ..-:;-- - --- ---
This chapter describss in detail the method of research used in 
this .. study. In th~ following pages the rationale for using case studies, 
. ',- :.: .; 
the criterion used to select the cases, and the means of gathering the 
data are outlined. 
Towards the end of the chapter the cases themselves are 
introduced. These 'thumb-nail sketches' are designed to provide some 
much-needed .back~ound information. 
1 Case Studies 
The research for this thesis is based upon data collected from 
four large multi-plant groups. These are treated as case studies. 
The information available is compared in order to highlight the 
differences between the cases. 
The case study methodology has long been established as an 
analytical tool in the social sciences. In this work it allows 
organisations to be studied in great depth. From these observations 
inferences can be made about organiso.tions having similar characterJ.sti< 
/' 
Case studies do llot represent reali.ty as a. whole, but rather may 
provide. significant illustrative examples. 
Case studies are being increasingly used in Industrial Relations; 
1 Eg. Batstone et al (1977,1978); Brown (1973); Sisson (1975); Borast 
et al (1975). See Batstone (ibid) for a discussion of the merits of 
7 
8 
Although Bain and Clegg (1975:108) have emphasised the need for the 
development of theory they note that 'There are still areas about which 
so little is kno~ that case studies and fact finding must precede 
analY3,is. ' 
As noted previously there have been only a small number of c~ses 
concerned with role of management in Industrial Relations. Certainly 
there have been very few studies which have examined management In 
.' 1 Industrial Relations from a comparative perspective. 
Below the benefits and drawbacks of the case study are discussed. 
First, the case study allows a great deal of information to be 
collected about the internal characteristics of each multi-plant 
group. It was the lack of this kind of information which Deaton 
and Beaumont (1979) had noted in their study of the determinants of 
bargaini~g structure. 
They attributed their lack of success in explaining the 
company-plant distinction to the nature of their survey. They suggest 
that tbecause it was a plant-based survey, the amount and quality of 
the information about the company was often unsatisfactory for our 
purposes' (1979:2D). Further the authors noted that 'some improvement 
in the ability to explain the plant level/company level distinction 
would seem possible if one had direct information about the company 
such as the number and relative size of plants, the degree of 
product diversification ~d occupational homogeneity' (1979:21). 
The case studies 'in this thesis contain just such data. Information 
is available concerning characteristics relating to size, technology, 
/ 
products, markets, e'conowic performance, geo.graphical concentration 
and union activity. 
1 Except Child (1977) Dalton (1954) Slichter Healy ~~d Livernash (196C 
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Detailed in-depth case studies provide information that may be 
impossible or difficult to get from second-hand sources. 
Second, case studies allow qualitative analysis to be undertaken. 
Many of the factors important in iilfluencing bargaining structure may 
not be amenable to quantitative analysis. Deaton and Beaumont (1979:4) 
have noted the importance of such factors in.limiting the success 
of their multi-variate analysis. 'The undoubted relevance of such 
intangible factors (eg 'style of management') must again necessarily 
limit the overall explanatory power that one might expect to obtain 
. from a study such as this and poiLts to the need for our work to be 
complemented by the carrying out of a series of detailed qualitative 
case studies'. A case study can refer in detail to history and 
traditions, management policies and philosophies, and attitudes and 
beliefs for example'~ 
In general the case study allows one to guage the atmosphere 
and 'feel' of an organisation, characteristics immune from 
quantitative analysis, yet all the more important because of their 
elusive qualities. 
2 Some problems and criticisms 
It would be misleading to suggest that the case study has no 
drawbacks. Critics have tended to concentrate on two problems in 
particular. First the limited coverage of a small number of CaSe!3, 
and second the subjective and impressior-istic nature of the material 
collected. 
10 
In a previous section the extreme diversity of mul~i-plant 
organisations was noted. Groups may range in size from those having 
two or three plants to those having over one hundred. Similarly a 
great range of activities from service organisations to manufacturir.g 
concerns is possible. Two points can be made here. 
First it is impossible for any single study to cover the great 
diversity of possible organisations. Some selection is inevitable. 
No claim for comprehensive coverage is made by this study. The cases 
investigated represent only one type of multi-plant group: the very 
large, engineering organisation. Some of the concepts and genere,l-
isations contained in this study may be applicable elsewhere, but 
by no means all. The limited scope of this study merely points to 
the pressing need for more research in this area. 
Second if it is accepted that some kind of selection is 
necessary this can be turned into an advantage. If only a small 
number of cases can be stadied these should at least be comparable. 
For this reason all the cases are drawn from the Engineering Industry. 
This means that a number of back~£vund facto~s can be kept constant. 
For example the cases often have similar technologies ~~d trade 
unions. This allows comparisons to be made more easily. 
Therefore this study makes comparability a virtue when it 
is accepted that some form of selection is a necessity. 
A second criticism concerns the subjective and i~pressionistic 
nature of the evidence that is gathered. Comparisons are often made 
with supposedly objective quantitative based studies. This criticism 
is based upon the false assumption that any methodology can be value 
free. 
For example quantitative studies also have a subjective element. 
The variables that are measured, and the method of evaluating and 
interpreting their ir:lpact are likely to oe value laden. This is 
particularly true. when 'proxy' variables are used to measure variables 
which are themselves resistant to measurement. Similarly assigning 
significance to 'dummy' variables also involves the use of valueR. 
Thus no methodology can be truly objective, the question is rather 
to what degree it is subjective. 
Values are perhaps more signii'icant in qualitative. as compared 
to quantitative studies. They will influence what issues are selected 
for study., and:how these issues are analysed once selected. However 
case studies cannot be rejected on ~hese grounds alone. Such analysis 
provides an essential complement to the quantitative studies. Certain 
influences and characteristics can only be investigated by means of 
case studies. Once qualitative studies are regarded as an integral 
part of social science research one can only seek to accept the 
importance of ones values and alert the reader's attention to their 
impact. 
3 Chronology of the Research 
Research was initially carried out in a single case study. 
Information was gathered from two plants and at Divisional level in 
1 
Tubes. Part of this research was presented for an earlier degree, 
and forms the basis of Chapter Four. 
Having written up the results of this first case proposals were 
drawn up for extending the research. A number of options were 
available. First the initial plants i~ 'rubes could have been returned 
1 Dissertation presented for M.A. Ind~strial Relations, 
of Warwick 1977 : 'Plant Aut0Domy or Parent Autocracy? 
of Multi-Plant IVlanagement .Decision Making. ' 
University 
Case studies 
12 
to, or other plants in Tubes could have been investigated. Second an 
organisation outside the manufacturing industry would have provided a 
contrast with Tubes. These and a number of oth2r options were 
considered in a series of working ~apers. During this time the 
previC~ls literature was also examined. 
Eventually it was decided to replicate the original Tubes case 
in a number of other large engineering groups. The cases would 
therefore have a cornreon background which would facilitate comparisons. 
Since only a small number of cases could be carried out it was felt 
that these should be comparable. The limited time available meant 
that it would not be possible to carry out a large number of cases in 
the same degree of depth as the original case. 
4 Criterion for Choosing Cases 
Another problem remained since some consistent criterion was 
needed as the basis for selecting the cases. Eventually it was 
decided to use the bargaining structure of each case as the common 
denominator. This was chosen for two reasons. Primarily because it 
has been at the centre of much of the previous research and allowed a 
number of topics to be analysed. 
First the impact of bargaining structure on union behaviour 
1n e~ch case could be com~ared. Clegg (1976) has suggested that 
the dimensions of bargaining structure explain union behaviour:i 
This theory coula. be tested by inves·~igating the impact of different 
bargaining structures in comparable groups on union benaviour. Could 
a consistent relationship between the dimensionR of bargai:'uing structure 
and union behaviour be identified? A series cf in-depth cases might 
1 See footnote p.13 
13 
provide some evidence to support or throw doubt upon th~ theory put 
forward. 
Second the relationship between management structure and 
bargaining structure coulc_ be stud;.ed. As noted above there 1S some 
doubt over the link between these two. Some studies suggest that 
management and bargaining structures should 0e similar, while others 
indicate that this need r..0t be so. A comparison betv.reen cases with 
different structures might yield some insights into this relationship. 
Finally the influences upon management's choice of bargaining 
structure could be analysed. Previous research1 had suggested th~t 
certain variables were determining influences upon bargaining etructure. 
A comparative study could test for the existence of any consistent 
relationship between bargaining structure and the identifi~d 
variables. 
Bargaining structure has one further benefit. It is one of the 
few internal characteristics of a group" s industrial Relations 'LoJhich is 
visible to the 'outsider'. In othe:.r words cases 'could be· selected 
deliberately, in the knowledge that they had a certain bargaining 
structure. The cases to be studied could be consciously chosen 
because they were characterised by different dimensions of bargaining 
structure. 
All four cases were 8ngaged i~ the Engine8ring I~iustry. This 
had a number of benefits for the study, which allowed comparisons to 
be undertaken. First there is a li~ited range of technologies 
. /' 
1 Research cOllcerning both of these h;yp'otheses has bee~ briefly 
noted in Chapter One, and is examined in much greater detail in 
the following chapter. 
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which enableQ this variab:3 to be held almost cons~ant. Second the 
same restricted number of unions were faced by management in all the 
cases. Third all the cases had a long history of union representation. 
It W8S possible that their Industrial Relations policies may have 
been slightly more sophisticated than "Was the norm. Finally the .. :ide 
range of organ~satioL3 within this category meant that many of the 
major types of multi-plant organisation were represented. 
5 Collection of Data 
Within each case information was collected from a variety of 
sources. Data was gathered from the plant level and from either 
Division or Group level depending upon the organisation structure. 
Two plants were studied in each of the four groups m~~ing a 
total of eight in all. This was the only possible course of action 
bearing in mind the size of the group involved. Some of the cases 
had ever one hundred separate plants -and it was clearly impracticable 
to study even a proportion of these in any depth. No attempt was 
made to collect information regarding all the plants in one group. 
The purpose of the plant studies was to provide examples of 
Industrial Relations activity within the group. In order to achieve 
the greatest possible diversity the plants chosen often represented 
extr€illeS wi thin 8.. single group. For example one large and one small 
plant were often' studied, or plants that were in different parts 
of the country. 
The obvious criticism to make here is tlJ.at these plants may 
not have been typical of the case as a whole. T1;v() plants ion 8 group 
including over one hundred could provide totally misleading informatio~. 
15 
when compared with the 'average' plant for the group. Two points 
need to be made in this connection. 
First it must be recalled that it is the group as a whole rather 
than the plants which forms the case. Information concerning the 
-group was drawn from a variety of sources, not just the plants. The 
• plant based material was used for illustrative purposes. Evidence 
from the plants was used to support observations of the more general 
characteristics of the group as a whole. The plants therefore 
demonstrate some of the main traits of each group, rather than 
reveal all' the possible features. 
Second the enlarged project was designed to replicate the 
original Tubes study. It was felt that looking at two plants in 
each case would again provide sufficient empirical evidence for each 
group. Als'o it was thought that eight plants was the maximum number 
that could be covered in sufficient depth in the time available. 
6 Fieldwork 
Each of the plants studied involved a period of intensive field-
work spread over several weeks. In total the empirical research 
covered 'eighteen months. 
The method of collecting data evolved during the research itself. 
When the first two plants were studied the interviews were only very 
loosely structured. The only guides I used were an article by 
Thomson and Hunter (1975) and the Report by the eIR (1974). Initially 
./ 
information was sought on almost every aspect of the plant and its 
Industrial Relations. Each plant was researrhed with few preconcept-
ions as ~o what might be important. 
Sources included interviews with managere~nt and a~ion representatives 
16 
agreements, minutes of meetings, and published material. 
After the Tubes case was completed certain concepts and hypotheses 
emerged. During the remaining plant studies these were tested, along 
with the original hypotheses from the previous research. Therefore 
as the cases were completed ideas became more clearly identified. 
The result was that the interviews became increasingly structured. 
By the time the final case was carried out a number of specific 
questions were relevant. However at no time was a questionnaire 
of any kind used. 
This may be criticised by some people. Without a questionnaire 
the material may not be strictly comparable, because the same 
questions were not always asked. A number of points are relevant 
here. 
First the research method used allowed the issues that seemed 
important in each case to emerge. For most of the plants there was 
little selection of data. Thus those issues which were most significant 
to each plant were studied. 
Second it must be remembered that the plants were used only for 
illustrative purposes. There was no attempt to produce a compre-
hensive picture or a statistically valid sample. Hence the aim was 
to discover what was important to each case, rather than to achieve 
strict uniformity of data. 
Finally a number of the plants were returned to. In particular 
the Tubes pl~~ts were studied after a gap of just over a year. This 
allowed new questions to be asked, and enabled changes in the 
intervening period to be discussed. 
Approxima~ely fifty interviews were carried out with management 
and union representatives i~ each case. These were both inside and 
outside the pl~~ts. 
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Interviews with the management included: Managing Directors, 
Works Directors, Production Managers, Supervisors and Foremen. Also 
a number of specialist Personnel and Industrial Relations managers 
were interviewed including Personnel Directors, PersoLnel and 
Industrial Relations Managers and Personnel Officers. These inter-
views were usually at least an hour and sometimes much longer. 
Managers outside the plant were also interviewed. These were 
employed either at division or group level depending upon the 
organisation~tructure. In the main these managers were concerned 
specifically with either Personnel or Industrial Relations. On a 
number of occasions representatives from the Local Engineering 
Employers' Association were interviewed to gather further background 
information. 
In general few problems of access were encountered. In fact 
in some cases management were willing for me to visit any plant 
in their group. Shortage of time frustratingly prevented advantage 
being taken of these opportunities. 
Within the plant a wide range of union representatives was 
interviewed. In the plants all the Senior Representatives from 
manual and staff unions were interviewed. Additionally shop 
stewards and staff representatives were also interviewed. Again 
these interviews lasted a minimum of an hour, and were frequently 
much longer. 
Outside the plant full time officers of manual and staff 
unions were interviewed where appropriate. In general these 
interviews provided much useful background information. 
Additionally information l"laS gathered from. a number of other 
sources. These included internal management memoranda and reports, 
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minutes of meetings, management handbooks, and a close study of 
all relevant agreements. Not all of these were available ln all the 
plants studied. Therefore the quality of the data varied from one 
plant to the next. 
Material from outside the plant came ln a number of forms. 
In all the. cases management at group or division level provided a 
considerable amount of written material. This was usually company 
prepared data referring to management structpre and company history. 
Published material was also available in a variety of forms. 
Some of the cases had well documented histories, while others had 
a certain amount of current information in published form. Finally 
newspaper reports of the groups were c~osely studied. These were 
particularly useful for followi~g through a particular issue or 
event. For example the development of a strike could often be 
followed through either local or national newspapers. Such 
information was very useful for seeing Industrial Relations in 
practice in the cases. 
In the following section the four case studies are briefly 
introduced. These 'thumb-nail' sketches are designed only to 
provide background information. A table summarising the main 
points is contained at the end of this chapter • 
. / 
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The Case Studies 
1 TUBE INVESTMENTS ( 'TUBES' ) 
Tubes is a large privately owned engineering group. It is 
placed in the top 50 of the "Times 1 ,000' and had total sales of 
almost £800m in 1977 
It is an old established group founded around the time of the 
First World War. Since then it has grown both by internal expansion 
and by taking over smaller plants. 
Tubes manufacturrea very wide range of products. These include 
Domestic Appliances; Cycles; Steel Tubes; and Sporting Goods. Some 
well-known brand names are included amongst these products. 
ThG group includes approximately 130 separate plants scattered 
throughout the country on over 150 sites. (One plant may have a 
number of geographically separate sites). Total emploJ~ent in the 
United Kingdom is around 51,500. The group also has an overseas 
division which boosts this figure to 64,700. 
Most of the UK plants are small, and are scattered across the 
country. Figures from the company suggest that half the sites have 
less than 250 workers, and a further quarter have between 250 and 500. 
The remainder have less than 1,500, except for five which have less 
than 2,500 and cne havil"lg' 6,500 , although some of these sites have 
separate management and workforces. 
There are a number of centralised supporting services including 
/' 
research and development, personne,l and computer facilities 
employing around 1,000 people. The stated policy of the group 
has been to 'encourage maximum delegation of operation th~ough 
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Divisions to individual and company managements and aims at close 
identification of employees interests with their places of work.' 1 
The group has been engaged in an advertising campaign recently. 
This stresses the combined advantages of a large organi3ation m~de 
up from small plants. The slogan 'We made it big by staying small' 
is employed for public relations purposes. 
The group is organised int 0 a number of Divisions. Each of 
these has a formal Board of Directors who co-ordinate the activities 
of their plants. Often there is a homogeneity of product within the 
divisions with interdependent plants. 
The position for 1977 is given below: 
NO.OF RET.ON 
DIVISION PLANTS EMPLOYMENT SALES CAPITAL INVEST 
£. m £. m % 
STEEL TUBE 28 16,200 262 108 16.2 
CYCLE 4 11,000 117 41 12.1 
DOMESTIC APPLIANCE 24 11,600 134 4B 9.3 
ENGINEERING 11 5,700 71 30 20.0 
MACHINE 18 4,700 52 26 7·7 
INDUSTRIAL ELECTRI C 11 5,000 52 22 22·5 
STEEL 2 2,900 
OVERSEAS 101 51 11 .1 
Research was carried out within the Steel Tube Division (STD). 
/" 
Two plants within this Division - Accles and Pollock CAP) and 
TI Weldless(WL) were examined in detail. 
1 • Company Annual Report 1977 
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Steel Tube Division is by far the largest Divisior ... in Tubes. In 
most years it has the highest rate of return but has recently had 
poor results. 
STEEL 'l'UEE DIVISION 
Sub-groups 
A - Primary Seamless Tubp 
B. - Welded Tube 
C Secondary Tube 
D Vehicle Exhausts 
E Stockholding 
F - Services 
No of plant: 
4 
4 
6 
5 
6 
4 
Weldl$sispart of sub-group A and produces basic steel tubes 
which are either used in other Tubes nl~~ts or are sold e13ewhere. 
Accles and Pollock b~longsto sub-group C. It prciuces both 
finished and semi-finished goods. 
Weldessemploys around 1,400 peop~e on one main site. It is an 
old established firm and has close associations with the local town. 
Located in the 'Black Country' it appears physically as a typical 
engineering plant. 
Around 40% of its steel tube output goes to other Tubes plants 
some of this going to Accles and Pollock. There are t~o separate 
factories on site having quite different te8hnologies. One is an 
older process requiring a high labollr content and is relatively 
inefficient. The second is a much nevler 'mill' (as i~ is referred to) 
and virtually produces steel tube by means of mass production. This 
new mill has required considerable investment supplied by the parent 
company. 
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Collective agreements are negotiated separately between all 
the unions. However the manual agreements are virtuallY,identical. 
In addition to the basic wage all employees receive a supplement 
based upon the output of +'he plant as a whole. This bonus 
system has been the cause of much conflict in Weldlass with the 
manual unions taking industrial action on a ilumber of occasions. 
"-~'-Accles and Pollock employs around 2,000 peoJ)le and was one of 
the founder members of Tubes. It is located in the West Midlands 
and is well known in the local town of Oldbury. In the past it was 
dominated by one family and was run on paternalist lines, however 
it is now increasingly under the control of the parent group. 
Although a much respected name in the industry it is undergoing 
a period of poor financial performance which has led to recent 
redundancies. 
The plant has three aites. Two of these are clos9 and another 
about 3-4 miles away. A wide range of goods are produced including 
sporting-goods, plain tubes, and tabe based products. The technology 
employed varles enormously from man-production to highly skilled 
labour intensive activities. 
Agreements are negotiated jointly by the manual unlons and 
separately by the white collar unions.- Payment is dependent upon a 
basic and individually based bonus. Relations between management and 
unions are generally harmonious despite the recent reoundancies. 
- / 
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2 GEe 
GEG is the largest privately owned company ln this country. 
It also has perhaps the most complex internal structure. 
The present organisation was formed just over ten years ago 
when three close competitors in the electrical engineering industry 
merged. Employment at the time of the merger was around 260,000, 
-.. : 
although this figure is now approximately 156,000. Within the UK 
GEG has 87 subsidiary plants which between them own 164 separate 
factories. Overseas there are a further 46 plants employing 36,000 
people. GEG also has interests in a further 22 companies at home 
and abroad. 
Besides being one of the largest organisations in the country 
it is also one of the most profitable. Sales for 1978 were 
£2,-343 millions with a pre-tax profit of £325 millions. GEG has an 
extremely varied product range including consumer products, tele-
communications equipment, electric machines, lighting, and equipment 
for power stations. Many of its products are household names. 
GEG probably has an organisation structure unlike that of any 
other company of its size. It has a very small central group staff 
of only a·few hundred people. Below this are a series of loosely 
defined divisions. There are no formal divisional boards here as 
in T~bes. Five major divisions are however recognised for accounting 
purposes. Some of these divisions have plants T~!hose business 
activities are closely related e.g. Power Engineering. Other 
'/ 
divisions are highly diversified and may have separate sub-groupings. 
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Accounting Divisions : 1978 
Plants Sales Exports Profits 
Power engineering 12 393 164 26.8 
Industrial 16 / 294 116 28.2 
Electronic, Automation and 
TelecoIDIDlmication 22 672 244 26.7 
Component s. cables wires 25 298 93 15·5 
Consumer 8 245 30 5.6 
Overseas 46 608 28.2 
Two plants were studied. One (Telecommunications - 'Telecoms') 
is in the Electronic, Automatic and Telecommunications division. The 
other (Machines) is ln the Industrial division!' 
Telecoms is the majur organisation lid thin its division. It is 
a management company controlling 15 factories, 7 of which are in the 
Midlands. Telecoms. employs in tctal 17,000 people, with 9,000 of 
these in the Midlands factories. Research was carried out in four 
of the Midlands factories. 
The Telecoms. organisation as a whole produces telephone 
equip~ent and associated produces of all kinds. It has four sub-
divisions based upon the different stages of manufacture. Many of 
the plants produce components which are shipped to another Telecoms 
factory for final assembly. Most of the work involved is highly 
labour intensive and often skilled. 
Telecoms. has a rather unusual market in that do~estically it 
only has one buyer - the GPO. There are many foreign buyers. In the 
domestic market however, there are only two co~peting firrus. This 
industry is undergoing something of a technical revolution at present. 
1 Referred to as TC and MC 
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New electronic based techniques a~e poised to replace many of the 
mechanical devices at present produced. These new product~ would 
require much smaller numbers of people in order to manufacture them. 
Collective bargaining in Telecoms. takes place between factories 
that are geographically concentrated. Thus the four factories t~~t 
were in Coventry bargained together. Relatively few issues are 
formally negotiated at this level. The payment system is a money based 
piecework structure. It is confused and somewhat chaotic. Relations 
between management and trade unions have not always been good. 
Machines is at the head of the Industrial Division, It has two 
I _ , 
sites - one in Bradford and the other in Rugby. Research was 
carried out on the Rugby site. This is a site which Machines shares 
with three' other GEC plants which are ~n different divisions. 
The Rugby site produces large machines (i.e. electric motors) 
and some 2,500 are employed. If the total employment of all the 
factories on site is counted this figure rises to nearer 5,500. The 
technology employed varies greatly from mass-production to single 
unit production. Some of the largest machines take over a year to 
manufacture. Despite this the payment system is based on piecework, 
with many anomalies. Bargaining includes all the factories on the 
site, but has few formally negotiated elements. 
The Machines company is long established on the site and well 
known in the town. The site itself covers some 180 acres. 
3 
\ . 
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ROLLS-ROYCE ('ROLLS' ) 
The present day Rolls structure was formed in 1967 when two 
previously competing companies in the same industry me~ged. Rc~ls 
is now a publicly owned company follov.7ing its bankruptcy in 1971. 
It has a long and famous tradition for engineering excellence. 
Rolls is this country's only producer of aero-en6ines. These 
engines are adapted for a wide variety of uses. The market for 
these products is world \eJide , although particular importance is 
attached to the North American market. The aero-engine itself is 
highly complex with literally tholl!3ands of components going into 
each. Much of the technology is highly a~vanced, with a considerable 
amount relying on new research and development. One particular 
engine design may last for 25 years, although continuous development 
will mean a number of different marks, of each engine will appear. 
The high level of expenditure on research and development can only 
be recouped once the engine has been in full scale production for 
a number of years. There is a considerable time lag before a l'eturn 
is seen on investment. 
Rolls is organised into two divisions. The Aero Division and 
the Industrial and Marine Division. Research was carried out in 
two plants in the Aero Di "rision. 
Some figures: 
Employment % of Employment % of S~ 
Group h.q 
Aero 
Industrial and Marine 
Overseas 
Total 
345 
51 ,878, 
2,270 
2,600 
57,093 
90 
3.9 
4·5 
85 
11 
4.3 
, . 
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Within the Aero Division there are eleven different production 
areas. These are spread throughout the country. As is evident from 
the table below, some of these areas are very large indeed. 
Only three of these areas having the ability to design and 
manufacture a new engine. However all the plants are interrelated 
with specialised production of components. 
Employment . June . 
DERBY 
SCOTLAND 
BRISTOL 
COVENTRY 
LEAVESDEN 
BARNOLDSWICK 
SUNTIERLANJ) 
INDUSI'RIAL AND 
MARINE 
1976 
Union 
Workers Density 
% 
11,000 80 
5,509 99 
5,800 99 
4,110 100 
1,886 98 
1,786 100 
537 89 
470 100 
Union 
Staff Density 
% 
8,515 76·5 
3,242 90.2 
7,300 80.8 
2,445 98.5 
1,990 64 
560 95 
179 90 
1,356 86 
The Bargaining structure is complicated. Some of the sites 
~ 
bargain at plant level, while other sites negotiate together if they 
are closely located. 
Research was carried out in Derby and Leavesden. 
The Derby site is in fact a whole complex ~f factories. There 
is one main site and two others around twenty miles away. All three 
comprise a single bargainine unit. 
Derby is the headquarters of the group as a whole and was th€ 
Tota 
19,515 
8',751 
13,100 
6,555 
3,876 
2,346 
706 
1,826 
\ . 
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original site when Rolls was founded. It produces some of the 
largest of the Aero engines. The technology involved varies 
considerably and can best be described as large batch. Large 
numbers of people are employed in the Research and Devtlopment ~ield. 
Bargaining is highly formalised, with many committees and 
detailed comprehensive agreements. 
Leavesden is a much smaller site producing helicopter engines. 
Although the p~oduct is different many of the skills and techniques 
employed are much the same. 
Rolls has only recently been 1he owner of this plant, since it 
was originally a Bristol Sidderley factory, the company taken over 
by Rolls in 1967. Again large numbers of staff are employed because 
of the amount of research and development. Two markets are faced: 
the larger comprising of defence contracts; the smaller civil airl~nes. 
Bargaining is formalised at plant level with detailed 
comprehensive agreements. Management-union relations are often far 
from peaceful. 
29 
4 FORD 
Ford 1S a wholly owned subsidiary of a multi-national organ-
isation based in the United States. World wide the whole group 
employs some 480,000 people and either manufactures or sells its 
products in over one hundred countries. 1 It is estimated that some 
two million jobs are dependent upon the company. Formed in America 
in 1903 it is now the world's third largest company. There are 
five main groupings world wide-: North American Operations; Ford of 
Europe; Ford Asia Pacific; The Latin American Group; Ford Mid-East 
and Africa. 
Ford of Europe employs 135,000 people in 15 separate national 
companies. These companies are co-ordinated by a central organisaUon 
based in Essex. This organisation provides specialised services such 
as-Finance, Sales and Marketing, Production Development, long term 
planning, Manufacturing and Personnel. There are 23 separate 
operating areas across Europe, many of these including a number of 
plants and sites. 
Ford produces a wide range of motor vehicles for commercial, 
industrial and private use and has the second largest sales in Europe. 
All the European plants are integrated. They produce either 
components or finished goods. Ford has perhaps the highest level 
of vertical integration of any European producer. 
There are four Divisions. Power Train is based in England and 
includes both plants studied (Dagenham Engine Plant and Leamington). 
The Bod~l and Assembly Division is based in Germany. The third anQ 
fourth Divisions are the agricultural products and commercial vehicles, 
based in this country, but with plants abroad. 
1 These and a number of other details contained in this brief outline a~e 
taken from figures supplied by Ford. 
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The Britsh company is the largest of all the subsidiaries of the 
American parent. It employs some 57,000 manual workers and 15,000 
staff. It was founded in 1911 and has expanded largely through 
internal growth to become the dominant producer in all of its m~rkets. 
In 1977 and 1978 it was the market leader for cars, commercial and 
agricultural vehicles. 
There are 15 major centres 01' production scattered. throughout 
the country. These make up a total of 23 plants. Over half of the 
total employees work on two of the major centres. 
Nearly all these plants have mas::rproduction technologies of 
some kind. They are also highly interdependent and specialised. 
Five plants assemble the finished product while the remaining plants 
produce components. Transport links between the plants are very good. 
The overall philosophy is to try and treat the plants as if they were 
all under one roof. 
Employment figures: 
Manual Staff Total 
DAGENHAM (6 plants) 24,700 3,300 28,000 
HALEWOOD (3 plants) 12,600 1,400 14,000 
LANGLEY 2,000 500 2,500 
SOurHAMPrON 4,100 200 4,300 
BASILDON 3,500 1,200 4,700 
SWANSEA 2,000 400 2,400 
LEAMINGTON 1,200 200 1,400 
, 
. ENFIELD 1,400 200 1,600 
DUNTON 950 2,350 3,300 
BELFAST 1,070 30 1,200 
BASILDON 830 120 950 
./ 
AVELEY 380 620 1,000 
WOOLWICH 530 70 600 
DAVENTRY 1,160 440 1,600 
CROYDON 320 30 350 
TREFOREST 270 80 350 
TTa ,-,."T T"\. TT~ , , 
Im __ ..: _..: __ \ 600 
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Bargaining .for manual and staff workers is at group level. A 
group wide job evaluation system is used. Payment is by m~asured day 
work with no bonuses of any kind. 
The two plants studied within Ford contrasted greatly. The 
Dagenham Engine Plant is one of six plants on the Dagenham Estate. 
It employs 5,450 manual workers and 600 staff and manufactures 
engines. The Da.gehham estate covers some 500 acres, i.e. some 9t 
million square feet. The Engine Plant was the original factory on 
the site. It is old, crampeci, dirty and noisy. The future of the 
plant was in doubt because of Ford's plan to build a new Engine 
Plant in Wales. Although regarded as one of the less militant 
plants, the Engine plant nev8rtheless had its fair share of disputes. 
Often it would b9come involved in disputes in other plants on the 
Dagenham Estate. 
The Leamington plant is quite different in a number of ways. 
It is much smaller employing 1,350 including 1,170 manual workers and 
180 staff • Situated in the rural Midlands it seems a long ~vay from 
the industrial wasteland of the Dagenham Estate. 
The plant lS a foundry producing a number of vital components. 
It has a floor area of 284,000 square feet, so it is very small in 
comparison with other Ford plants. 
Working conditions are very poor. Much of the plant is v8ry 
old, and in common with other foundries it is very hot and dusty 
within the working area. Although the work is physically demanding 
,/ 
relations between the management and workforce are good. This may 
be a consequence of the small plant size and the nature of the 
workforce, which is largely non-militant. 
TABLE 1 BACKGROUTID CHARACTERISTICS 
EMPLOYMENT PLAl-l"'TS OWNERSHIP MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
FORD 72,000 27 U.S. FOUR 
SUBSIDIARY DIVISIONS 
ROLLS 56,000 11 
TUBES 66,000 130 
CEC 181,000 164 
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BARGAINING STRUCTURE AN]) ITS DETERMINA1~S 
.=-- - ----
INTRODUCTION 
In this ch~pter data from the case studies is systematically 
applied to the hypotheses and concepts contained in the relevant 
previous literature. This allows two acti,nties to be undertaken. 
First to review in detail preceding research in the subject area. 
Second to introduce the case studies which are examined further in 
lat er chapters. 
~owards the end of this chapter conclusions will be reached 
regarding the usefulness of the literature for the purposes of this 
study. 
The dual aims of analysing previous resedrch and introducing 
the case studies serve to lengthen and complicate this chapter. For 
this reason a highly structured approach has been adopted. It has 
three sections. 
First, the previous literature is reviewed without any criticisms 
being made. Rather the aim is to set up a framework of analysis 
which is then used throughout the chapter. 
Two areas of research are studied: ~hat concerned with 
Collecti ve Bargaining S-~l"'uctures; and that dealing wi ~h the situational 
determinants of that structure. Research within each of these ~reas 
is reviewed by breaking them do~~ into a number of specific hypotheses 
and conc8pts. The ambiguities and contradictions witnin the existing 
research are highlighted. 
Second, the case studies are introduced. They are described 
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by means of the framework of analysis constructed ~n the first 
section. That is to say bargaining structure and situational 
determinants of the cases are outlined using th~ same headings as in 
the first section. 
At each stage judgements are made concerning the support for 
or conflicts with existing literature. 
, . i ~-
Finally there ~s an evaluation of the adequacy and influences 
of the existing literature for the current research. Various lacunae 
in previous research are identified. Also a number of useful 
hypotheses and concepts are highlighted which are thought to be 
worth pursuing. The basic aim of this section is to provide a link 
between the first part of this study, and the second part looking at 
the case studies. 
./ 
35 
~ PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
1 Collective Bargaining Structure 
Since the publication of the Donovan Report bargaining structure 
has 'come to assume a central position in both academic and practitioners 
discussions of the performance of the British Industrial Relations 
systems' (Deaton and Beaumont 1979:1). 
Both McCarthy (1971) and Clegg (1976) recognise a number of 
dimensions of bargaining structure. By far the greatest significance 
is attached to the level at which bargaining takes place. This study 
reflects this emphasis on bargaining level for two reasons. First 
the majority of hypotheses in previous literature are concerned with 
. 
this dimension. Second the level of bargaining is the most important 
dimenslon of bargaining structure in multi-plan~ organisations. 
La) Bargaining Level 
Bargaining level is defined by McCarthy (1971:3) as the 
'points witl1in a system at which collective bargaining is conducted.' 
Within multi-plant groups a nlli~ber of levels have been 
recognised. Thomson and Hunter (1975:25-6) identify five possible 
levels: completely local bargaining; budgeted plant bargaining; 
co-ordinated plant bargaining; two-tier ba~gaining; and completely 
central bargaining. The CIR (1974:13) recognises three broad 
'stru0tural and organisational approaches'. First where each plant 
is treated as a 'separ~te profit centre and Industrial Relations 
unit and management policy ~s to avoid company wide bargaining or 
any kind of parity claims between plants.' The second approach 
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involves plant bargaining with common job and work standards 'so that 
variations in pay and conditions can be mitigated'. Finally there 
are centralised negotiations with common agree~3nts covering all 
plants and offices. 
These two studies therefore recognise a range of options between 
two extremes, or a contirluum between 'centralisation' and 'decentral-
"':~' ~. ", 
isation' of bargaining structure. However they point out that it 
is the options lying between the extremes that should be stressed. 
Thomson and Hunter (1975:25) note that 'it is misleading to pose 
the choice in purely polar terms. There are several options lying 
between the extremes of complete centralisation and outright plant 
autonomy'. Gill (J-974:26) also notes that 'in practice many multi-
plant companies occupy a position around the middle of the central-
isation-decentralisation spectrum an~ may well over a period of time 
move in one direction to achieve one purpose and move back again to 
achieve another'. Anthony notes simply that (1977:51) 'maLagement 
organisation frequently tries to achieve the advantages of both 
centralisation and devolution'. Gill notes that (1974:25) 'whatever 
system is adopted, the levels of collective bargaining assume great 
importance. ' 
Although emphasis has generally been on the level of bargaining 
a number of other dimensions have been recognised. 
(b) Bargaining Scope 
. / 
McCarthy notes (1971:4) that this term is 'used to i~dicate the 
range of subjects covered by collective agre8ments~' 
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Generally speaking there has been an expansion in the scope of 
pargaining. Various pressures, including union persuasion have 
gradually increased the numbers of issu6s that ~re bargained over. 
This expansion in th6 scope o~ bargaining has consequences for 
multi~plant groups. As the number of issues expands it is unlikely 
that they will all be bargained over at the same level. Different 
issues may be bargained over at different levels. 
',- ~: .: : 
Thomson and Hunter note (1975:25) that 'the position on the 
bargaining continuum may often depend upon the issue in question.' 
Anthony (1977:47) notes that 'large employers may find themselves 
operating within several systems' of Industrial Relations at the same 
time. 
Potentially therefore the level of bargaining can vary 
depending upon the issue in questbn. This creates problems for 
those who attempt to classify bargaining structure on the criterion 
of level of bargaining. With a variety of levels to cnoose from 
which is the most important? 
Thomson and Hunter solve this problem (1975:25) by classifying 
the most important bargaining level as that where the 'basic financial 
issues comprising the predominance of earnings' are settled. They 
admit that their focus is somewhat narrow, and state that they are 
'primarily concerned with wage agreements and structures'. They do 
however (1975:37) evaluate a whole series of secondary issues by 
means of a separate questionnaire. The Ruthora state that their 
emphasis upon financial issues means that they are not concerned 
with the 'implementation of policies and agreements' even though they 
admit that 'there comes a stage when the latter becomes more 
important than the former through the continuous process cf 
fractional bargaining' (1975: 25). 
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(c) Bargaining Unit 
This is defined as the 'specific group or category of workers 
that are covered by a particular agreement.' (McCarthy 1971:4). 
It is noted that units and levels ~re clearly linked, but that units 
are more concerned with the role of unions as representatives. 
Representatives of these units are referred to as baroaining agents. 
. . 
One characteristic of bargaining structure noted by the 
Donovan Commi~sion was the extensive fragmentation of bargaining 
units. This again has consequences for multi-plant groups. Within 
large organisations there may be h1lndreds of separate bargaining 
units. These units may be based upon skill differences, e.g. craft 
and semi-skilled, or simply the manual against f,taff division. It 
is common to have manual negotiations at one level and staff 
bargaining at another. 
Although it is rarely stated explicitly it appears that most 
studies base their analysis on manual workers. This may be because 
not all staff engage in collective bargaining and more informa~n 
is available for manual workers. 
(d) Bargaining forms 
This dimension distinguishes between the various forms th~c an 
agreement can take. Whether it is 'written or un1rlri tten, formally 
signed or accepted by mutual understanding' (McCa~thy: 1971:4). 
Such a classification only tells· us about the types of agreements 
that are negotiated. This could be broadened to includp the degree 
of formality or informality within bargaining as a whole. A move 
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away from agreements would allow issues settled by custom and 
practice to be identified. ~t may be for example that formal 
bargaining on some issues takes place at one level, while informal 
bargaining takes place at another. In fact this concl~3ion wa~ at 
the heart of Donovan's analysis of the 'two systems of Industrial 
Relations. ' 
(e) Bargaining Depth 
According to Clegg (1976:8)this measures 'the involvement of 
local union officers and shop stewards in the administration of 
agreements. ' 
This dimension has been much neglected in research, yet it may 
prove very useful in the multi-plant context. For example it may 
give some indication of the degree of Industrial Relations 
activity that takes place at various levels within a group. To an 
extent this may be only loosely connected with the formal level of 
bargaining. For example formal bargaining may take place at plant 
level, but with a high level of shop floor involvement in interpreting 
and administering agreements. 
(f) 1 'Best BUl' 
The argument which predominates within the literature can be 
summarised as follows. When dealing with bargaining structure 
management are faced with a number of options between the extremes 
of centralisation and decentralisation. These are commonly de fine O. 
in terms of levels of pay bargaining for manual workerR. 
~~ ___ ::: ::' __ . .-. ;J' ... n~1 r.:;orl "hy Lupton. and Gowler (1969: 7) when referrii1g 
••• ••••••• H. =C;':':':~'~mQ ; 1'1 t.hp 1; p"ht of' a firm'S circumstances 
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The second stage of the ar~ent involves recognising a r~nge 
of factors which will influence the bargaining structure. These 
are termed 'situational determinants' and are ~zarnined in much 
greater detail in the following section. 
Articles such as that by Thomson and Hunter attempt to present 
'a more systematic way of taking into account the various factors 
bearing on bargaining structure in a multi-plant company' (1975:25). 
In other words they construct a model with which a company can undertake 
self analysis. This will indicate which factors bear most heavily 
upon their own bargaining structure. 
?inally having recognised its own unique situational determinants 
management must consider the impact that these will have upon their 
bargaining structure. This 'description of relevant variRbles 
within a company as a whole' is then interpreted via a series of 
, 
hypotheses concerning each variable ru1d the optimum 'locus of bargaining' 
it produces (1975:27). These hypotheses are attached to the impact 
of each variable which suggests a particular desirable bargaining 
structure. These are then built up to produG8 an 'overall tendencyf. 
This posi tion can be modified by the attachment of weightings to 
the different variables by the parties themselves. 
Thomson and Hunter articulate the general view of the literature 
with a novel attention to detail. Put simply they suggest that the~e 
is a bargaining structure which is 'appropriate' to the situational 
determin~~ts faced by each organisation. In o~her words the structure 
of bargaining is contingent upon the environment surrounding the 
. . 1 
organ~satl.()n. 
1 This analysis is explored in much greater detail in the following 
section. 
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Once the situational determinants have been identified and 
evaluated a 'best buy' position on the.continuum of bargaining levels 
is then recognised. However Thomson and Hunter (1975:25) state 
'it would be unrealistic to suppose that there is some ideal position'. 
But this 'does not preclude the need for consideration of the optimal 
locus for either party'. Having identified this optimum position 
management should then compare this with the bargaining structure that 
." --
actUally exists. They should, bearing in mind tactical and strategic 
considerations, attempt to move towards this identified position. 
The eIR (1974:55-8) provides a checklist of advantages and dis-
advanta.ges attached to various bargaining levels for both management 
and unions. They feel that this may enable management to Qecide upon 
the optimum structure of bargaining. 
. These advantages and disadvantages exist for both management and 
unions. It appears that each group should take account of the benefits 
and drawbacks of each position and settle for the best compromise 
available. Thomson and Hunter (1975:25) note that this optimum locus 
is 'not properly a choice but will depend· upon the mutual reconciliation 
of their (management and unions) preferences, basically through 
bargaining, or at least through gradual adaption and adjustments of 
attitudes and machinery.' 
The eIR (1974: 55-8) notes that this optimum posiUon is not fixed 
and can easily change because of a change in the situational determinants. 
For they say that 'in deciding to take up these matters we were, 
however, very conscious of what was being done in one company today 
might well need to be done differently at some time in the future 
because of changes in its circumstances'. This is a welcome and much 
needed note of caution. 
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2 Situational Determinants 
This section concentrates on the hypotheses put forward 
concerning the relationship between bargaining structur~ and a 8eries 
of situational determinants. As previously noted many of these relate 
to the level at which bargaining takes place. 
Discussion will concentrate on a relatively small number of 
1 
articles which are central to the research. In the main these 
articles propose a relationship between a whole range of variables and 
th 1 1 f b .. 2 e eve 0 argalnlng. 
Reference will also be made to other studies conducted via a 
series of footnotes which have also investigated the effect of these 
variables, but which are peripheral to this study. 
There is no attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to all the 
research in the field. Rather the aim is to give a concise synopsis 
of the main lines of ar~ent. The objective is to highlight the 
agreements and conflicts of view within the literature. 
In order to deal with the material systematically and to provide 
a framework which can be easily applied to the case material the 
situational determinants are dealt with under ten headings. 
-
1 These include: Thomson and Hunter (1975) :Deaton and Beaumont (1979) 
CIR (1974); Gill and Concannon (1977); Ramsay (1971); Gill (1975); 
Weber (1961); Shi ster (1958) 
2 These approaches can be traced back to the 'contingency approach' 
of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Pugh (1976) see Child (1973;1977) 
for a discussion of this app~oach. 
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1. Growth 
1.1. Size 
iii Technology 
lV Product market 
v Economic Performance 
vi Geographical location 
Vl.1. cr.·mership 
Vlll Management structure 
. 
1.X Payment structure 
x Trade Union activity. 
1. Growth 
There is general agreement between the articles that the 
pattern of growth has an influence upon the present day structure. 
However the eIR (1974:10) and Ramsay (1971:44) lay particular 
emphasis upon this variable. 
Two patterns of growth are suggested by the eIR: internal and 
external. The former is 'characteristed by the building of new 
geographically separate plants within the company'. The latter 
'takes the form of mergers with or acquisitions of existing companies.' 
According to the eIR these two patterns have important 
implications for the form of management control. Internal growth 
'clearly facilitates a strong group level control over all aspects 
of policy.' External growth makes such control difficult because 
of the variation between Industrial RelationE policies of companies 
taken over. Ramsay (1971:44) has also noted this point of the 
difficulties associated with external growth 'Established plants come 
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together under one control but each has its own history with which it 
has learned to Ii e t' v over ne years ••••••• each plant has its own 
ethos - its own history of relationships - its own style of 
management. ' 
Thomson and Hunter (1975:28) therefore suggest that where there 
are differences within the group of history and management style 
then plant bargaining is indicated. However the crR (1974:11) notes 
that this is uot inevitable. Faced with this situation management 
can'introduce a long t~rm harmonisation programme. Alternatively 
acquisitions can be kept separate until they are brought into line 
with the group policy. 
ii. Size 
There is some disagreement over the impact of plant size on the 
level of bargaining. Some studies suggest that increases in plant 
size may lead to plant bargaining. Other studies suggest that if 
plant size is correlated with company size, then an increase in size 
will lead to company (i.e. group level ~argainiLg). The impact of 
size has also been investigated by a number of other ·studies which 
are not directly relevant to the research.1 
Thomson and Hunter represent the former argument (1975:30). 
They suggest that the larger the average size of plant, the more 
suitable plant bargaining will be. In larger establishments 
problems must be dealt with locally. 
Ramsay (1971: 44) sums up this position: 'By and large small 
units have an easier Industrial Relations passage than large ur.its. 
1 Eg. Boraston, C~egg and Rimmer (1975); Brmvn, Ebsworth and Terry 
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In the small plant personal relationships mean much more and 
informal aspects of Industrial Relations will loom large. Factories 
with upwards of say, 1,000 employees start having major problems of 
communications and control.' 
Deaton and Beaumont (1979:11) take a different view. They 
suggest if it is assumed that large establishment size is highly 
correlated with large company size then 'the larger the establishment 
the more likely that there will be company bargaining.' 
. Ramsay (1971:44) looks at the variation in plant size. He 
suggests it is the size of this variation, not the absolute size of 
plant which may determine partly the appropriate level of bargaining. 
This hypotheses is based upon the argument that if there is one large 
plant in a group, others will tend to follow its lead. Whereas if 
plants are of similar size there may be no 'leader'. The implication 
of this is that plant bargaining may be possible even if establishments 
are large, so long as there is a low variation in size within the 
group. 
iii Technology 
A great many studies 1 have investigated the impact of technology 
as a determining variable. Two aspects are of interest in the multi-
plant context. 
1· See Woodward (1965, 1970); Blauner (1964); Burns and Stalker 
(1961) 
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Deaton and Beaumont (1979:9) suggest that the degre~ of labour 
tntensity resulting from the technology employed can influence the 
level of bargaining. They suggest that plant bargaining is likely 
when there is a high elemen~ of labour costs in overall costs. 
Other studies have looked at the interdependency of plants in 
the same group. The CIR (1974:7-8) note with the growth of multi-
plant organisations there is a greater tendency for plants to be 
dependent upon one another. In particular plants are often vertically 
integrated. That is each plant produces goods that are improved upon 
by the next. This may mean that raw mat erials or component s for final 
assembly are produced in a number of plants. 
Consequently 'there are a number of work groups with a power 
to interrupt the production cycle of many plants within the company' 
(1974:8). Thus if production stops in one plant it is possible that 
other plants dependent on the first plant will also be affected. 
However the CIR do note that some companies, arrange their production 
so they are not dependent on any o~e plant. Despite this the hypothesis 
of Thomson and Hunter is that the more inter dependent the plants the 
greater the desirability of group bargaining. 
iv Product Markets 
Variations in technology are also ofter. linked with the type of 
product. Two distinct themes can be recognised within the literature. 
Each stresses a different aspect of this variabie. 
The first concerns the range of product markets faced by one 
group. Thomson and Hunter suggest (1975:33) that the greater the 
range of markets faced the more likely will be plant bargaining. 
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An alternative Vlew lS taken by Weber (1967) and E~own (1973). 
These studies examine the actual nature of the product market faced, 
rather than the numbers of markets. Weber (19n7:15) suggests that 
bargaining structure will be strorgly influenced by the market within 
which negotiations take place. He suggests that unions will attempt 
to take wages out of competition by making the bargaining structure 
co-extensive with the relevant market. Brown (1973:172-5) stresses 
the "impact ""of product market particularly under conditions of full 
employment. Under these circumstances he hypothesises that it is the 
product market rather than the labour market which has the bigge~t 
impact on the management control systems operated. 
v Economic Performance 
This is a relatively neglected variable in the literature. 
Only Thomson and Hunter (1975:34) attach any real significa~ce to 
this. They suggest that a high level of profits will focus 
attention upon the organisation as a whole and hence lead to group 
wide bargaining. 
Vl Geographical factors 
Two aspects are dealt with in the literature: the geographical 
concentration of plants, and the impact of local labour markets. 
Analysis indicates that these two sets of hypotheses ~ay conflict 
in their prescriptions. 
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Gill and Concannon (1976:15) suggest that geographical proximity 
of plants appeared to be a determining factor on bargaining structure. 
They observed that where plants were in the same location they would 
ofteTl bargain, or at least meet together. Thomson and Hunter support 
this view and hypothesise that a small radius of plants indicates 
group bargainilJ.g (1975:34). 
Ramsay however (1971:43) takes a more qualitative Vl8W of t~e 
impact of location. Where plants are highly dispersed he suggests 
that a wide range of attitudes and cultures will be encountered. 
This will -also affect the local labour market conditions. If a 
. group has a plant in a high paying location it is virtually 
inevitable that other more lowly paid areas will be affected by this. 
Demands for parity with the high paying location may therefore 
result. Hence there is some element of ambiguity present here. 
While highly dispersed plants may point to plant bargaining, such a 
situation may lead to payity demands which can only be settled by 
group level bargaining. 
Vl1 Ownership 
The influence of this variable has only been noted by Deaton 
and Beaumont (1979:12). It concerns whether the group is owned by 
a fo~eign based company or not. They suggest that foreign owned 
establishments are often associated with group level rather than 
plant level bargaining. 
They note that falt.hough not all foreign owned establishments 
bargain at company (i.e. g~oup) level it is among the foreign owned 
establishments that the most well known moves, or attempted moves, 
in this direction have occurred.' Hence they state that 'we 
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hypothesise that foreign owned establishments are more ~ikely to 
be involved in company rather than plant bargaining.' 
viii ~~nagement structure 
'rhere appears to be something of a conflict of views on this 
sub Je"ct • Some studies suggest that management and bargaining 
structure need not be the same, while others suggest that any major 
incongruency is unsatisfactory. 
These views can be placed against a background of increasing 
attention being focussed on the role of management structure. 
Bain and Clegg (1975) and Clegg (1976) have stressed the impact 
of management structure on bargaining structure. Clegg (1976:10) 
notes that the 'structure and attitudes of employers' asso~iations 
and management' are the foremost influences on bargaining structure. 
Yet neither article gives any detail of the exact relationship. 
The CIR (1974:29) appear to adopt the former of these two views. 
They state that 'the level at which collective bargaining takes place 
may not only be different from different subjects, but may not 
necessarily coincide with the level at which effective management 
decisions are made, in that a company with well developed plant 
bargaining may not only restrict t~e scope of bargaini~g at plant 
level, but may impose limitations from the group.' 
Thomson and Hunter (1975:38) have also noted how misleading 
management structure may be. They state that 'the ce~tre may appear 
not to control or initiate ~ecisions at all, but rather to act as a 
clearing house for information flows between plants'. However in 
reality 'the centre is in such cases exercising a significant 
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degree of control, although its form may be indirect! 
Despite this Thomson and Hunter also say at another point 
(1975: 27-8) that 'the greater the degree of centralisation in oiher 
functional areas, the greater the advisability for centralised 
bargaining to parallel the general decision making pattern.' They 
also state that (1975:39) 'Although locus of decision making need 
not be the same as that of bargaining, if they are too far different, 
frustrations will arise.' They fear that plant mffi1agement will lose 
credibility if they are continually referring matters to group 
management even though plant bargaining exists. Anthony (1977:59) 
has noted that this may be a deliberate policy. In this case 'plant 
management may serve as an obstacle which the unions must strive 
to overcome by getting through to those in control.' 
Ramsay (1971:44) refers simply to management control. He 
suggests that of all the variables 'this is often the most telling 
factor of all ln determining how negotiations are structured.' 
Although Ramsay is correct when he says that 'management controls 
must be applied to industrial relations in the same way as any of 
the other management functions'. This is a simplification, for as 
Anthony (1977:49) suggests levels of bargaining are '.likely to be 
neither uniform or the result of policy decisions.' 
Anthony here is devaluing the role that management policy may 
play in Industrial Relations. Instead he suggests that a more ad hoc 
haphazard approach is common. This conflicts with the CIRTs (1973) 
view of t~e role that policy can play. They suggest that a 'well 
defined policy promotes consistency in management and enables all 
employees and their representatives to lmow where they stand in 
relation to the company's' intentions and objectives'(1973:10). 
" 
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For this reason they sugg88t that 'a company's Industrial Relations 
policy should form an integral part of the total strategy wtth which 
it pursues its business objectives' (1973:4). Gill has also stressed 
the i~portance of an Industrial Relations policy. 'The policy which 
a firm may adopt in the ~rea of collective bargaining and negotiating 
procedure is thus of crucial'importance. It provides the key stance 
upon which other Industrial Relations policies within the large 
firm are built.' (1974:30). 
Brown, Ebsworth and Terry take a broader view of the role of 
management'. They place emphasis upon the att i tude taken by management 
towards unions (1978: 155). While Deaton and Beaumont (1979: 13) 
suggest that the existence of Persormel Managers in the plant 
suggests company rather than plant bargaining. 
1X PaJ~ent structures 
This influence has been noted by both Thomson and Hunter (1975:33) 
and Deaton and Beaumont (1979:9). The studies are in agreement as 
to the impact of this variable. 
Both suggest that where payment by results systems exist 
plant bargaining is likely. Hence the more that plants are linked 
via job evaluation or similar schemes then group bargaining is more 
likely. 
./ 
x Trade Union activity 
At least three differing themes can be identified und~r this 
heading. There are those studies which stress the impact of union 
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structure within the plant. Second some research stresses the impact 
of union acti vi.ty on bargaini.ng structure. Finally other studies 
stress trade union inter-plant activity. 
Brown, Ebsworth and Terry (1979:149-154) stress the impact of 
union structure. They lay particular emphasis upon the influence 
of multi-unionism. Multi-unionism, it is sug~ested, has been an 
important force behind the growth of workplace bargaining. The need 
to achieve a common front in the plant has spurred the development 
of Joint committees. Hence where multi-unionism exists there is 
likely to be pressure towards plant bargaining. 
There is something of a conflict of opinion regarding the 
impact of union activity on bargaining structure. Authors such as 
Clegg (1976) have, as shown above, viewed union activity as a 
consequence rather than a cause of bargaining structure. Similarly 
Ramsay (1971:44) has noted when speaking of union activity that 'by 
and large they seem to have fallen in with the various patterns 
determined by management except where there has been a preference 
among manual unions for plant bargaining.' Although Ramsay notes that 
with the development of larger staff unions this may change. 
American authors (Weber 1961 and Livernash 1963) have taken a 
different view. They'suggest tha~ ~anagement have relatively little 
impact on bargaining structure. Bargaining structure is largely 
attributable according to this analysis to union pressure. Such d 
/' 
view may be a consequence of the nature of bargaining in the United 
States. The legislative framework and the greater emphasis given to 
bargaining structure by uniohs p~obably accounts for this. 
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The final way in which union .activity may influence bargaining 
structure is note·d by the eIR (1974:12) and Thomson and Hunter (1975:· 
29-30). This concerns the degree of inter-plant activity by unions 
within the same group. The eIR suggests that where inter-plant 
links are strong d.ifferentials between plants should be minimised. 
As an extension of this Thomson and Hunter suggest that where 
unions represent similar grades across plants then centralised 
". - ., ..•.. -
bargaining should be used in an attempt to eliminate 'leap-frogging', 
that is the comparison of terms and conditions between plants. 
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B THE CASES 
Two themes are central to the previous research in the field. 
First that bargaining structure and bargaining level in particular 
J • 
provides an adequate framework for understanding the nature of 
Industrial Relations in each case. Second that there is a consistent 
relationship between bargaining structure and a series of situational 
determinants. 
In order to test the validity of these two theories current 
research is applied to the previous literature. Data from the cabe 
studies is systematically applied to the framework developed in the 
previous section. Each of the hypotheses relevant to multi-plant 
groups is tested by examining information available from the case 
-
studies. Data relevant to each hypothesis is discussed and presented 
in the form of a table. These tables are collected together at the 
end of the chapter for ease of reference. 
The method of analysis used here also provides an introduction 
to the case studies themselves. This information should be read in 
conjunction with the descriptive material (or 'thumb-nail sketches') 
given in Chapter Two. 
1 Collective BargaiLing Structure 
~ 
Four dimensions of bargaining structure have been stressed in 
the literature: bargaining level, unit, scope and form. This 
framework is now used to analyse bargaining in each of the four cases 
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in turn. Reference shoula be made to Tables 2, 3 and 4 at the 
end of this chapter for further details. 
(a) FORD 
The group 1S the most important level of bargaining in this 
case. Ford 1S not federated and is not influenced by the Nat ional 
Engineering Agreement. 
Management representatives are drawn from group staffs, while 
union representatives come from each of the plants and officials of 
the unions. 
Two units are engaged 1n collective bargaining. Manual workers 
are dealt with as a whole. Their representatives are plant convenors 
and national officers who meet management approximately every two 
months in a National Joint Negotiating Committee. 
Clerical and supervisory staff also engage in collective 
bargaining. Their meetings with management are somewhat less formal 
and regular than the manuals. 
AgFeements for manual workers in Ford are very comprehensive 
and highly detailed. Issues covered include the wage structure, wage 
rates, overtime and shift rates, lay-off pay, pensions, and grievance 
and work standaras procedures. Payment is by measured day work, ~Ti th 
no bon~ses of any kind, using a standard job evaluation structure. 
The present agreement does not cover matters concerning discipline 
and shop steward movement. 
The agreements are written and signed and distributed to every 
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employee. They are negotiated by perhaps the most formalised 
bargaining procedure in the engineering industry. 
Despite these formal group wide agreements, there is considerable 
informal bargaining in the plants. This is concerned with issues 
occurring on a day-to-day basis for example discipline, manning, shop 
steward movement and facilities. This takes place within the 
constraints of the group wide agreement and under the gaze of group 
" 
management. 
• 
Ford therefore has perhaps the simplest of all four bargaining 
, 
structures. Yet even here bargaining takes place at two levels 
depending upon issue and form. Formal group wide bargaining does 
not preclude bargaining in the plant from day-to-day. 
The manual trade unions have formed a combine involving all 
the plants. This is formally recognised by management. 
FORD 
LEVEL Group 
UNIT Manual : Staff 
SCOPE Very comprehensive and detailed 
FORM Formal group bargaining, informal day-to-day 
(b) ROLLS 
d ""ld abl'des 'oy the Industry Rolls is a federate company ~ 
=' . g The most imu .. ortant level of oargaining Agreement for ~nglneerln • 
is in the plant. However"for certain issues and units this differs. 
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Pensions for all employees are settled at group level. Nurses a)1d 
overseas representatives negotiate at group level. 
In the plant the maj~r manual unions usually negotiate together 
and form a Joint Shop Stewards Committee. The Staff unions (including 
a unionised management group) usually negotiate separately. 
Occasionally the 'plant' ba~gaining unit actually covers a 
number of physically separate sites in the same geographical locatiDn. 
Under this situation of 'location bargaining' similar terms and condition:::: 
apply to all of these sites. However bargaining may take place on 
these separate sites on day-to-day issues. 
Agreements arE usually very comprehensive and detailed. One 
agreement for manual workers in one plant runs to over 150 pages. 
These agreements cover all the major substantive and procedural 
issues, including a discipline procedure. 
Payment is based on MDW, although there is a bonus system 
in addition. Pay rates are not uniform throughout the group. 
Agreements are usually written and sometimes signed. Negotiating 
procedures are highly formalised with a whole variety of committees. 
Informal bargaining takes place on the separate sites with a 
plant agreement, or at department level. Line management have a 
good deal of autonomy and this has led to inconsistencies within 
a single plant. 
The formal level of bargaining depends on the is~ue and unit 
in question. For most employees and issues the plant is the most 
important level. However there is a ~ood deal of site and shop floor 
bargaining which takes place informally. 
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Also there is some inter-plant union activity. Both manual 
and staff unions have formed c(jIl.bines. These are not reccenised by 
management and at moment attempt to co-ordinate activity on specific 
occaGions rather than push for group level bargaining. 
ROLLS 
LEVEL Plant with variation depending on,issue and unit 
UNIT Manual;' Staff + 'location bargaining' 
SCOPE Wide ranging and detailed 
FORM Formal plant level; informal department and shop floor 
(c) TTJBES 
>". 
The majority of issTIes are negotiated at plant level, although 
Tubes is a federated company and adheres to the Industry agreement. 
Pensions are negotiated at group level for manual and staff 
workers. Fringe (non-salary) issues are often settled at Divisional 
level for staff employees. 
Manual and staff workers are dealt with separately. In one 
plant manual unions bargain separate, but identical agreements, 
although this is not the norm. Staff workers usually bargain in 
often very framgented groups. 
Negotiations for one plant can cover a number of separate sites. 
Although major terms and conditions were much thJ same day-to-day 
bargaining on these sites often meant many inconsistencies within 
the plant. 
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Although comprehensive and detailed agreements are usually 
negotiated separately, they are not kept together in the same way 
that they are in Rolls and Ford. 
Issues covered are the normal substantive and procp-dural items, 
although usually ~li thout a disciplinary agreement. 
Payment is based on some form of PBR - often resulting 1n very 
detailed and complicated agreementcl. 
Negotiati~ns are formalised at plant level, and agreements are 
usually written and signed. 
There 1S a considerable amount of factory or shop floor 
bargaining within each plant. Many of the departments, although 
operating the same agreement, are often a 'law unto themselves.' 
The style or culture of industrial relations differs markedly 
resulting in many inconsistencies across the plant. 
The formal level of bargaining again depends on the issue and 
unit in question. Also formal and informal bargaining takes pl~ce at 
different levels. 
Inter-plant activity also exists in Tubes. Manual workers have 
formed a combine designed to influence investment decisions, while 
staff workers co-ordinate and compare terms and conditions between 
plant. 
TUBES 
LEVEL 
UNIT 
SCOPE 
. FORM 
Mainly plant; some Divisional bargaining 
Manual; staff; 'location bargaining' 
Wide ranging : some detailed 
Formal plant b~rgaining; informal shop floor and depart~ent 
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Cd) GEC 
There is a limited amount of bargaining at plant level. Many 
issues are settled at department or shop floor level. GEC is a , 
federated company operating the Industry agreement. 
Pensions for manual and staff workers negotiated at group level • 
. , -.:":':" 
There are usually highly fragmented bargaining structures, often 
with many subdivisions within manual and staff groups. 
Where sites are closely located they will negotiate common 
agreements covering the basic terms and conditions. All other matters 
are settled below this level. 
Formal bargaining is neither comprehensive nor detailed. Often 
it" may cover only the size of annual increase. Each site tends then 
to operate its own informal agreements. 
Formal bargaining is very limited. Agr8ements are rarely written, 
and are usually only recorded as management memoranda. 
The majority of bargaining is conducted informally either at 
site or shop floor level. There is often a great deal of 
inconsistency between the various sites. 
Bargaining in GEC is highly informal and fragmented. Sites 
within a plant bargaining structure often have a great deal of 
autonomy. 
Although there are large pay differentials between different 
plants, inter-plant union activity is negligible. 
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GEC 
LEVEL Plant; site; shop floor 
UNIT Highly fragmented; , location bargaining' 
SCOPE Limi ted range 
FORM Limited formal; wide-ranging informal 
2 Situational Determinants 
In this section case study material is applied to the frame\oTork 
of situation~l determinants outlined earlier in the chapter. Specific 
hypotheses are tested systematically by reviewing t~e data available 
from curre~t research. Again because of the significance and emphasis 
on the level of oargaining attention is focussed on this dimension 
of bargaining structure. 
Irhese judgement s are not concl usi ve be cause of the limited 
research base. However they tend either to lend some support for, or 
throw doubt upon the hypotheses put forward. Those variables which 
it is felt can be more fruitfully followed up are identified towards 
the end of this chapter. Table 5 summarises the features described 
here. '- ' ...... 
1. Growth 
Two patterns of growth were recognised in the literature. 
Internal growth ~nvolved building geographically separate plants 
within the group, while external growth involved mergers with or 
acquisitions of existing companies. 
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According to the literature i~ternal growth facilitated group 
level bargaining, while external growth made plant level bargaining 
likely. 
CASE GROWTH PATTERN BARGAINING LEVEL 
FORD Internal Group 
ROLLS. Inte:i:>nal 
--
and External Plant 
"-
- ~. . 
. -.": .~ :'.-.. .... 
TUBES Internal and Ext ernal Plant 
GEC Internal and External Plant 
It is immediately evident that the pattern of growth is not as 
simple as suggested. With the exception of Ford all the cases 
displayed both inte~nal and external growth. The differences were 
only ones of emphasis. 
. Even Ford is not quite so straightforward as it appears. 
Although growth has been predominately internal Ford has in recent 
years taken over a number of small separate companies. Despite this 
the pattern of growth does appear to have made group level bargaining 
"possible. However this is not purely by accident. Management have 
had a deliberate policy of standardising all terms and conditions 
in all new plants before they are accepted into the group structure. 
Evidence from the other cases lS more confused. All one can say 
is that the mixture of patterns of growth, rather than external growth 
alone, appears to be associated with plant bargaining. 
The impact of mergers has not been stressed by the literature 
yet appears to be significant in both Rolls and GEC. Both are 
~/ 
conglomerate organisations the result of mergers in the late 1960's. 
Deep divisions still exist \":i thin these groups. These hav8 a profound 
effect on Industrial Relations in a WRy that c:annot be analysed as a 
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separat e variable, but can be underst ood only in the case study 
context. For this and other,reasons the impact of growth appears 
to be worthy of f~ther study. 
l.l. Size 
Two Vl.ews were recognised on the impact of plant size. The 
first suggested that increasing plant size would lead to plant bargaining. 
The second' hypothesised that if correlated to group size, increased plant 
sl.ze could lead to group bargaining. 
A second factor considered was the impact of variation in size. 
A high variation would lead to group bargaining, ~Thile a low variation 
would imply' plant bargaining. 
CASE A WRAGE PLANT SIZE VARIATION IN PLANT SIZE BARGAINTI'JG IE") .:..I.: 
FORD 2 , 500 High Group 
ROLLS 5, 000 High Plant 
TUBES 500 Low Plant 
GEC 1,000 High Plant 
The fi~~res given for average plant size are confusing. 
Evidence from Rolls would seem to support the hypothesis that 
large plant size demands plant bargaining. However the figure given 
is slightly misleaQing since it represents often 'site' or 'location' 
bargaining units. These are separate units which bargain together, /' 
but for day-to-day matters are effectively autonomous. The- same 
applies to the figure given f0r GEe. 
The figure given for Ford may also be misleading. Since this is 
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a simple mathematical mea~ it conceals Gome very large plants. One 
plant has over 25,000 employees. Yet Ford bargains at group level, 
although as seen above day-to-day matters are dealt with at plant 
level. 
Ford lends support to the hypothesis that if plant size is connected 
with company s::'ze group leve'l bargaining is possible. Certainly large 
plant size is not an insurmountable .barrier to group bargaining. 
Within Tubes a quite different logic t'J that discussed in the 
hypothesis is present. Here it is suggested that only if plants are 
kept small will local management have the ability and facilities to 
deal with plant problems. Once the plant grows above a certain size 
then intervention from outside may be required. This may not mean 
that bargaining takes place outside the plant, but rather than manage-
. ment advice and assistance is required from group or divisional level. 
Thus Tubes distinguish between the level of bargaining and the 
involvement of management from outside the plant. 
Ford has the largest variation in plant size and has group 
bargaining lending support to the original hypothesis. However with 
the exception of Tubes the other cases have large variations of 
plant size, yet have plant level bargaining. Tubes have had a 
deliberate policy of keeping variations low to enable plant bargaining. 
Thus while Tubes and Ford provide some support for this hypothesis 
the other two cases throw doubt upon it. 
In conclusion it appears that the average size of plant can be 
misleading. Also it can be hypothesised that there may be three 
factors affected by size. The level of bargaining, the level at 
which day-to-day issues are settled, and the intervention of 
management from outside the plant. 
iii Technology 
The predominant hypothesis within the literature concerned the 
degree to which plants were integrated. It 1· ... as suggest~d that the 
higher the degree of integration, the greater would be the need for 
group bargaining. The rationale here was that interdependency would 
render the whole group vulnerable to a stoppage in a single plant. 
CASE INTEGRATION OF PRODUCTION BARGAINING LEVEL 
FORD High Group 
ROLLS High Plant 
TUBES Medium Plant 
GEC Medium Plant 
Since these are all large multi-plant groups some degree of 
integration ~s virtually inevitable. Those cases with the least 
integration of production, Tubes and GEC, have plant bargaining. 
However, Rolls with a very high level of integration also has plant 
bargaining. The evidence for these cases is conflicting. 
At first sight Ford appears to support the hypothesis. However 
two points must be noted. Firstly group level bargaining does not 
prevent disputes from emerging in the plants. There have been 
occasions when a number of plants have had to layoff workers because 
of a dispute in a single plant. This has led Ford to arrange for dual 
sourcing of vital components wherever possible. SecondlY7 production 
in Ford is integrated on a European basis. Therefore if all 
production in this country is stopped because of a national strike 
supplies of components to European plants is affected. 
There is therefore little clear cut support'for this hypothes13. 
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iv Product Market 
The literature asserts that groups having ~ighly diverse 
product ranges will have l;lant bargaining. The rationale here is 
that the different markets faced will make group bargaining difficult. 
These cases appear to provide evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. 
Tubes and GEe have extremely diverse product ranges and both 
have plant bargaining. In these cases group bargaining would be 
difficult because of the range of markets faced. 
Ford produces relatively few products and faces few markets • 
. It also has group bargaining which is expected from the literature. 
Rolls however raises some doubts. It is a highly integrated 
group manufacturing a small number of products. Yet it bargains at 
the level of the plant. This case therefore directly contradicts 
both the data from the other cases and the hypothesis. 
Thus while there is some support for the impact of this variable, 
the Rolls example, because it directly contradicts expectations, leaves 
room for doubt. . ./ 
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v Economic Performance 
The hypothesis puts forward a relationship between the profitability 
and the level of bargaining. A high level of profit, it is suggested, 
will focus attention on the group and may lead to bargaining at this 
level. 
CASE PROFITS BARGAINING LEVEL 
FORD High Group 
ROLLS (Losses) Plant 
TUBES Moderate Plant 
GEC High Plant 
Apart 'from the Ford case there is little evidence to support this 
assertion. Ford has a high level of profitability and bargains at 
group level. 
However GEe and Tubes have either moderate or high profits, but 
bargain at plant level. Although attention may be focussed on the 
group because of this plant level bargaining is not prevented. In 
fact Tubes goes to some lengths to assert its corporate strength in 
its advertising. It deliberately focusses attention on the group 
level, yet still has plant level bargaining. 
It could be hypothesised that a loss as well as a high level of 
profits could dr:l.w atten~ion to the group as a whole. Rolls has 
recently been consistently making losses, and indeed went bankrupt 
in 1971. This has served to focus attention on the group as a whole, 
while still maintaining plant bargaining. 
Thus an extreme financial performance may concentrate attention 
on the group, although this does not necessarily preclude plant 
bargaining. 
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Vl GeoE,Eaphical factors 
The main argument concerning this' variable is as follows. 
Within a group having pla~ts which were highly concentrated in one 
area group level bargaining was likely. Conversely groups having 
highly scattered plants would have bargaining at plant level. This 
assertion was largely on the basis of observation. 
CASE GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION BARGAINING LEVEL 
FORD Low Group 
ROLLS Low Plant 
TUBES Low Plant 
GEC Low Plant 
Ford appears to directly contradict the hypothesis. Its plants 
are scattered throughout the country, yet it has group bargaining. 
The explanation here may be the management have excellent communications 
between the plants. They attempt to deal with the plants as if they 
'were all under one roof'. Therefore geographical location has little 
impact from this point of view. 
Evidence from the other cases would appear to give some limited 
support. Plant bargaining is associated with highly dispersed plants. 
However the position is not quite as simple as this. In Rolls and 
GEC there is some 'location bargaining'. Plants in the local area 
bargain together and adhere to the same agreement. Therefore the 
same principle is involved here as in the hypothesis. Sites in the 
. /' 
same area will bargain together, although this may not necessarily 
take the form of group level bargaining. 
The impact of the locality appea~s to influence the quality of 
.. 
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Industrial Relations. It itJas· commonly suggested by management 
that each plant had its own atmosphere and culture, often nependent 
upon the local co~~unity traditions. Influences such as these can 
only be adequately dealt with in case studies. Therefore this 
variable will be examined in greater detail in the cases which follow. 
V11 Ownership 
The suggested impact of this variable 1S quite clear. Groups 
who are based overseas will tend towards group level bargaining. The 
implication being that they will 'import' their domestic practices 
to this country. Most commonly American firms were·quoted in support 
of this assertion. 
CASE OWNERSHIP BARGAINING LEVEL 
'. 
FORD U.S. Subsidiary Group 
ROLLS U.K. Public Plant 
TUBES U.K. Private Plant 
GEC U.K. Private Plant 
On the basis of the evidence glven above Ford would appear to 
support the proposed relationship. In fact it would not be unfair 
to say that some American structures and practices have been used in 
this country. But it would be a mistake to assume that the British 
set up is a simple copy of the American. An analysis of various 
European Ford subsidiaries shows some variation in structu~e and 
practice. Each subsidiary has had to change in order to accommodate 
the prautices unique to each country. The result is a compromise. 
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The basic American principles remain unchanged, while tne detail 
reflects the traditions of each country. 
The three other cases are all UK based and either publicly or 
privately owned. As such they reflect the tradition of plant 
bargaining in the Engineering Industry in this country. 
TIll Management Stlructure 
There was a degree of ambiguity present in the literature 
conc€rning the impact of this variable. Some studies suggested 
there ought to be a close lir~ between management and bargaining 
structure, while o-lJhers considered this was not necessarily the case. 
CASE MANAG~lT STRUCTURE BARGAINII~G LEVEL 
FORD Group Group 
ROLLS Group Plant 
TUBES Division Plant 
GEC Plant Plant 
Ford and GEC show a consistency between management and bargaining 
structure not present in the other two cases. 
However even in Fora and GEC the situation is not as straight-
forward as it appears. Ford lS part of a European organisatio~ 
designed to co-ordinate the activities of subsidiary companies. 
Al though based in this country this organisation covers subsidiarj.8s 
in Germany, Spain and France. If. this E"!lropean management structure 
is copsidered, then the group ba~gaining structure is not consistent 
with it. To be consistent there would nee~ to be bargaining between 
countries. 
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Similarly although GEG's management structure is based on the 
plant considerable control is exercised from the centre on investment 
and rationalisation decisions. The impact of such controls carillot 
be adequately evaluated at this ~oint and is dealt with at greater 
length in the case studies. 
In both Rolls and Tubes the management and bargaining structures 
are incongruent. The activities of the organisation are controlled 
'from group level in Rolls and from Divisional levGl in Tubes. 
This structure is based upon product diversity to an extent. Rolls 
has few products and highly integrated plants. Tubes has a wide 
rang3 of products which are organised into divisions covering 
similar products. 
From the evidence given above management structure and bargaining 
structure are linked but not necessarily in such a way that one mirrors 
the other. Again the impact of this variable deserves a more detailed 
qualitative approach possible only in a case study. 
ix Payment Structure 
The hypothesis concerning wage structure suggested that PER 
based systems could only be operated at plant level. The complexity 
of problems emanating from such schemes could only be dealt with at 
plant level. 
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CASE PAYMENT SYSTEM BARGAINING UliEL 
FORD MDW Group 
ROLLS MDW Plant 
TUBES PBR Plant 
GEC PBR Plant 
The limited data available appears t~ support the hypothesis 
Tubes and GEC are the only cases having PBR based payment systems 
and they have plant bargaining. In fact it is quite probable t~~t 
if there was a move to group level bargaining there would have to be 
a change in the payment systems. The complexities involved with 
administering PBR in each case are very great. Any move away from 
the piant would have to involve a change to !-IDW. 
x Trade Union Activity 
Two hypothesis were put forward concerning this variable. The 
first suggested that any group facing a large number of unions shoulQ 
have plant bargaining. The second suggested that where unions had 
good contacts between plants group bargaining was advisable. ~v:=" thout 
this the plants may either compete between each other in bargaining, 
or would co-ordinate activity in order to frustrate management. 
CASE NUMBER OF UNIONS TU INTER-PLANT LINKS 3ARGAINING LEVEL 
FORD Large Strong Group 
ROLLS Large Moderate Pl8l:.t 
TUBES Large Moderate Plant 
GEe Large Weak Plant 
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The first point to note here is that there is no consistent 
relationship between the numbers of unions faced and the level of 
bargaining. All the groups faced a large numt2r of unions, yet had 
different bargaining structures. 
The hypothesis concerning the union links between plants is not 
easily evaluated from the data so far presented. 
Both !ord and GEC seem to support the assertion, albeit in 
.. ".-:':.:' 
different ways. In Ford links between plants were very strong. A 
combine of manual unions from all the plants had been formed and 
was formally recognised by the management. And as suggested by' the 
Ii tei.'ature Ford has group bargaining. Unions in GEC had very poor 
links between plants, hence allowing plant bargaining. 
Evidence from 'rubes and Rolls s~msto dispute the hypothesis. 
In Tubes the manual unions have formed a combine based upon the 
Division in order to influence inves-~ment decisions • White collar 
unions compare terms and conditions between all plants in the group. 
Claims are often made for fringe benefits on the basis of what other 
Tubes plants are receiving. Unions in Rolls (both manual and staff) 
have strong links between the plants. This has resulted in co-
ordinated action between the plants in the past. However as yet 
there are few demands for group wide bargai~tng. 
Thus despite these links between plants bargaining .in Tubes 
and Rolls is at plant level. 
The evidence here not only contradicts the existing literature, 
but also conflicts between itself. One may ask how and why do 
, /' 
Tubes and Roll~ manage to maintain plant bargaining in the face of 
this level of inter-plant activity. 
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When reviewing the preceding analysis a number of points 
are evident. 
First the data from the cases in some instances supports, and 
1n others throws doubt upon the hypotheses put forwara. The 
evidence in most cases was sufficient to warrant further study. 
Second many of the variables appeared to ba linked. It seemed 
unrealistic for example to separate out the influence of product 
diversity and treat it in isolation. Quite obviously it was 
closely connected with technical differences. 
Finally many of the variables could not be adequately dealt 
with in the manner adopted. The ~ffect of growth, management 
structure and union activity could not be fully appreciated without 
in depth study. 
The case studies which follow present the opport1illi ty to answer 
some of these problems. 
/' 
/' 
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C CONCLUSIONS 
At this stage it is useful to review the progress mad~ so far in 
this chapter. Data derived from four emnirical case studies has 
... 
been used to test a number of specific hypoiheses drawn from previous 
research. Initially the research Has outlined and a framework for 
analysis developed. Second this frameitJork was then a:9plied 
systematically to the research data. 
This third section provides the opportunity to stand back from 
the detail. An evaluation is made of the usefulness of previous 
research in the context of this siudy. In practice this involves 
two activities. First, highlighting gaps that exist in the literature, 
and posing a number of questions relev~~t to these. Second picking 
out a number of guidelines from the research which may usefully oe 
pursued in the case studies which follow. 
The objective of this chapter has not been simply to make 
l 
criticisms, but to ask a number of constructive questions suggested by 
the literature. These questions provide a link between the 
introduction to the thesis and the case studies. 
As previously two areas of research are discussed. First 
collective bargaining structure with particular emphasis for the 
first time on the importance of the depth of bargaining. Second 
the influence of situational determinants stressing a number of 
varlables which may usefully be investigated further. 
Collective Bargaining Structure 
Bargaining level has been recognised as the "most illiportant 
76 
dimension of bargaiLing structure. Yet two problems exist with this. 
First it was not possible to treat the level of bargaining ln 
isolation from other dimensions of bargaining. Second it was difficult 
to discuss differences in Industrial Relations between ~he case~ 
simply by referring to the level of bargaining. The focus therefore 
needs to be expanded. 
A number of examples can be quoted. 
(a)" Bargaining Level and other Dimensions of structure 
The most important level of bargaining varied in some cases with 
the unit of employees being considered. One unit may be dealt with at 
one level, while another unit at a quite different level. In Rolls 
for example certain units of employees who moved throughout the 
group bargaining at group level. 
Bargaining level could also be dependent upon the issue in 
question. In virtually all cases pensions were negotiated (if this is 
the correct phrase) at group level, irrespective of where bargaining 
took place for other issues. As noted previously this is because of 
the need to have a large group of employees when dealing with }!ensions. 
Thomson and Hunter (1975:25) solve this problem by concentrating 
on a narrow r~nge of issues. However their emphasis u~on the lsvel 
of wage settlements appears difficult to justify particularly 
during a period of incomes policy. Wage negotiations may have been 
a typical not only of negotiations, bu~ also of the conduct of Industrial 
J 
Relations as a whole. Thomson and Hunter (1975:35) acknowledge this 
problem. They suggest that OeC2.use of -che 't~vo-tiert system \"')f 
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bargaining in the country there is a need for a seconda~y questior~ai~e 
which gathers information concerning non-wage issues. 
Variations in formality are a serious problem for as Terry (1977) 
argues, some degree of informality in bargaining is virtually 
inevitable. 
According to Terry formal ba~gaining alone is very unlikely. 
The pressu=es and stresses of day-to-day Industrial Relations mean 
that custom and practice is likely to figure on most occasions. 
When a formal structure of bargaining is introduced, Terry (1977:85) 
argues that either the informal practices never disappear completely 
or will soon re-emerge agaln. This is because such practices are 
closely bound up with individuals behaviour and expectatio~s and 
this is not easily changed. 
This concept is ~vell demonstrated in all the cases. In the 
group with the simplest b~rgaining structure, Ford, this phenomenon 
was very much in evidence • Although formal bargaining took place 
at group-level, there was a considsrable amo~t of bargaining 
within the plants. This was not acknowledged by group management even 
though it dominated the day-to-day lives of those engaged in plant 
Industrial Relations. Bargaining took place ~n at least two levels, 
although formally only at group level. 
Emphasis upon the formal level of bargaining can therefore be 
misleading. It may result in an i~complete picture of Industrial 
Relations within a group. The problem is that if informal bargaining 
is included in a classification the picture becomes confused and unclear. 
Any move away from the criterion of formal bargaining levels means 
- . 
that a single classification is no longer possible. 
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(b) Level and Changes over time 
The analysis is also essentially static. 'llwo aspects of this 
are import ant. 
First the concentration upon a few supposedly significant issues 
may mean that certain apparently minor chang0s havi~g a major 
impact will be neglected. For example consider a change in the 
... 
method of calculating piecework earnings, such as a move from money 
to time based values. Such a change may appear as trivial from the 
outside but may have profound implications within the plant. This is 
because over time a whole series of customs and practices may have 
grown up around a system of payment. Any attempt to change this 
payment system may require a change in the custom and prac:,ice as 
well. Hence it may be vigorously resisted. 
Second the level of bargaining may be changed for no ~pparent 
reason other than it bein6 fashionable to do so. For example in the 
past there have been swings towards one level of bargaining or another. 
This maybe because such a change :'8 seen as a way of solving a 
particular set of problems. As these problems change, then the level 
of bargaining may alter in turn. 
Thus at any time the level of bargaining observed may merely 
be a temporary halt in an ever changing pattern. Also the levp.l 
of bargaining may be unchanged on other occasions even though 
significant changes in Industrial Relations ac+,ivity h~ve taken place. 
(c) Continuum of Bargaining Levels 
Tbe concept of a continuum 0:;:' range of bargaining leve;ls is a...YJ. 
extension of the notion of a bargaini~g level itself. Two areas of 
criticiBill are particularly worthy of mention here. 
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It has been shown thet the level of bargaining is not independent 
of the other dimensions of bargain"ing structure. A single :evel of 
bargaining will o£ten apply only to one issue, ~~it of employees and 
period of time. Hence to gain an overall picture of an organisaticL 
the result will be a number of levels of bargaining. Consequently 
an organisation cannot be said to occupy a single clearly defined 
position on a continuum of levels of bargaining. In practice it 
will occupy a number of positions dependi~g upon the dimensions of 
its bargaining structure. 
The second point concerns the use of the terms 'centralised' 
and 'decentralised' with the continuum of levels of bargaining. 
Thomson and Hunter tend to use these terms in an unproblematic man~er. 
It is argue~ below that these terms are purely relative, and can be 
applied differently depending upon ones persepctive. 
Terry (1977: 79) has made this point we 11. He not es that a move 
from industry level to plant level bargaining may be ~een as de-
centralisation from management's point of view. However from the 
shop floor perspective this same change may be seen as centralisation 
if informal custom and practice regulation is replaced by formal 
plant bargaining. The terms centralisation and decentralisation are 
purely r~lative, their meanlng depending very much on where one is 
standing. 
A good example of this was seen in Tubes. In one factory formal 
plant level bargaining was introduced in an attempt to eliminate the 
previously high level of fractional bargaining. Along with this 
plant management was strengthened as the plant was separated from a 
sub-group of which it was p~eviously a member. From the point of ""T.Leil 
of Divisional Management this was a change in the level of bargaining 
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constituting a move towar~s decentralisation. Frc~ the shop floor 
perspective this same move was seen as centralisation of bargaining. 
Issues formerly d8alt with on the shop floor were now being raised 
to t~e level of the plant. Previous custom and practice regulation 
was replaced by formal plant bargaining. 
The main point -which emerges here is that a change in the level 
of bargaining can be seen in a variety of ways depending upon oJ. .. es 
perspe ct i ve • , A single change in level can be seen as either 
centralisation or decentralisation dependin6 on one's position. 
These terms cannot be used in an absolute mruL~er, but must be 
associated with a particular point of view. 
Cd) Optimum Level of Bargaining 
The initial point made regarding the continuum of bargaining 
levels is relevant here. If, as has been argued, it is not possible 
to classify bargaining by reference to a single level then the notion 
of an optimum level is thrown into doubt. 
First this concept assumes that a single level of bargaining 
is not only possible, but also desirable. It has been shc~~ that 
at leas~ with large multi-plant groups this is simply not possiole. 
The variety and complexity of bargaining units and issues makes 
a number of levels of oQrgaining virtually inevitable. However it 
could be argued"that there could be a number of optimum levels for 
each unit and issue. 
This suggestion i&10res the fact that 'optimum' is in most 
cases defined by management. Thomson and Hunter suggest that this 
optimum level is defiYled jointly by managemellt and unions. As 
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Deaton and Beaumont recognise (1979:8) management have been 
seen as the main authors of bargaining structure. 
Finally the notion 0: an opti~um level of bargaining seriously 
underestimates the problems concerning a change in bargaining 
structure. A number of points are relevant nere. 
First management may not perceive the need for change. They 
may be unaware of the influence of particular varia~les. Alternatively 
management may be aware of these variables but may interpret their 
impact in a different way to that ~!hich would have been expected. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly management may fina it 
difficult to bring about change. The status quo often represents a 
variety of vested interests and a' particular balance of puvler. 
Any attempt at change may be seen as a threat to the established 
position of either side, and hence w~ll be refuted. Also illanagement 
may be able to make changes, but find them too expenSlve. For 
example in Rolls management would have preferred to make a change 
in the level of bargaining. However the cos~s of moving from plant 
to group bargaining would have involved a levelling up of pay rates. 
This proved too expensive for Rolls to contemplate. 
(e) Collective Bargaining Depth 
An analysis of bargaining within an organisation based largely 
upon the formal level of bargaining has been sho~m to be unrealisti.c 
and incomplete. 
It is unrealistic bec2.use the level of bargaining ca~-::not be 
isolated-from-the other dimensions of bargaining structure. It 
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cannot be singled out for study on its own since it lS often 
dependent upon the bargaining issue, unit and form. The result is 
that rather than having a single levei of bargeining most organisations 
will have a variety of le~els. 
An analysis based ~pon formal level as well as crucially 
simplifying bargaining structure is also an incom.plete guide to the 
actual character of bargQining activity in a group. For example 
Rolls and GEC both bargain formally at plant level. HOvlever in 
practice Industrial Relations in each group is completely different. 
Rolls is far more of a single group with much activity between as well 
as within the plant. While in GEC the focus of activity is belmv, 
not above the level of the plant. Often it is the shop floor, not 
the plant, at whi ch most act i vi ty -takes place. Thus from the 
outside both groups have plant bargaining, but in practice this 
tells us very little about the nature and activity involvea in 
bargaining. 
. What is lacking is some feeling for the depth of barga~ning. 
It will be recalled that this is a concept introduced by Clegg 
(1976:8) and concerns the 'involvement of local union officers and 
shop stewards in the administration of agreements'. This concept 
can be adapted for our purposes. Here it is taken to be a measurs 
of the bargaining activity at various levels within the bargaining 
structure. It is argued that it is not good enough simply to see 
where bargaining takes place but a~so to evaluate the activity 
surrounding that bargaining. If this dimension is added to those 
already outlined a more accurate and. comprehensive picture of barg:::.ining 
. ./ 
in an organisation may be gained. 
To summarise the points made in t.his chapter so far. Briefly 
it has been argued that triO main problems exist with the concept of 
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levels of bargaining. First, the notion of each group having a single 
level of bargaining is unre&~istic. It is more likely that an 
organisation will have a variety of levels of bargaining depending 
upon the issue, unit of bargaining and time in questio~. Seco~~ even 
if a single level of bargaining cO'l.lc1 be identified this is still 
likely to be inadequate. Usually there is little information 
concerning the depth of bargaining. This is taken to ~ean the actual 
activity at various points within the bargaining structure. Only 
when this is examined wi11 a full picture emerge. In this l.'lay it 
may then. be possible to distinguish more accurately between the 
character of bargaining in each of the cases. It is not possible 
to gain an accurate and comprehensive picture of Industrial Relations 
in each case by relying on the level of bargaining alone. The 
analysis must be expanded to include other dimensions of bargaining 
structure. In order to do this the case studies are examined in clch 
greater depth in following chapters. 
2 Situation Determinants 
This section re"';Tiews the findings of the analysis into the 
relationship betwean bargaining level and its situational dete~minants. 
Initially it recalls the findings from the cases. Following this it 
attempts to evaluate the usefuln~ss of the approach as a whole and 
put it 'within the context of other theories. 
(a) Evaluation of Determinants 
The impact of ten situational determinants on bargaining leve1-
was considered in the light of the available research. For some 
hypotheses there was a good deal of support, while doubt was thrown 
on the validity of others. 
Considerable evidence was fo~~d in support of a number of 
variables. These included growth; geographical concentration; 
ownership; management 8ontrol; and union activity. 
For example the pattern of growth was seen as an important 
" " " 
constraint over present managerial action. In particular the 
consequences of mergers seemed significant. A concentration of 
plants in "a local area belonging to the same group often resulted 
in 'location bargaining'. Also the culture of a local community 
could influence plant bargaining. The im~act of foreign ownership 
was seen in one caS8. Many of the structures and attitude~ in this 
organisation appeared to be 'imported' from overseas. Management 
control appeared significant not just via management structure, in 
particular the level of management, but also 'outside' the structure. 
For example when issues designated as the concern of plant level 
management were dealt with by management above this level. Finally 
union activity appeared to be a big influence, in particular the 
inter-plant activities which were engaged in. 
There was limited support for a number or other variables. 
But in general doubts were r8.ised about the impact of these factors. 
For example the hypothesis concerning the impact of size 
appeared to have little fcundation. The organ:'sation ~Jith the largest 
size of plant had group bargaining, rather than plant bargaining as 
hypothesised. ~ereas the group wit~ the smallest plants had plant 
bargaining. Technical interdependence between plants 6ave conflicting 
results. Of the two highly interdependent groups one had ~oup 
bargaining and the other plant bargaining. Whereas group bargaining 
had been suggested. Similarly conflicting evidence was available 
for the impact of payment systems. Wh~reas measured day work was 
hypothetically related to group bargaining, in ~ractice this was 
connected with group or pldnt barg~ining. 
This mixed bag of results is not conclusive one, way or ~~other. 
Even if the results were ~n agreem8nt with the hypotheses, the 
. , 
........ 
narrow source of data would still demand a note of caution. Generally 
the results either confirm, support or throw doubt upon the suggested 
relationship. This is only to be expected. 
However one conclusion can be noted. An argument which suggests 
that bargaining structure is solely detercined by situational 
determinants is almost certainly erroneous. Such factors cp:'e only 
a partial explanation. These hypotheses and theories must be used 
in conjunction with other variables to produce a more complete picture. 
This view is supported by the fact that many of the variations in 
bargaining structure appeared unrelated to the proposed variables. 
Rather they seemed to be influenced by more elusive influences which 
could not be pin pointed and were difficult to measure. 
(b) Interdependency cf Determinants 
It appears that a number of the determinants studied were inter-
dependent. Two or more variables may be so closely related in 
practice that it ~s unrealistic to aSb8SS their influence in isolation. 
In a :number of cases product range and technology were highly 
interdependent. A change in ~ne would almost ce~tainly require a 
chanee in the other. Their influence also is likely to be very similar. 
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A more complex example inv~lves management structure and the pattern 
of growth. These two variables may virtually be inseparable. For 
instance an internal patternof growth may be very closely related 
with a centralised management structure. 
A case study approach will enable these closely related 
determinants tc be disentangled. It is also important to note that 
all these variables will be influencing management at the same time. 
Moreover these variables may be pull~ng the different directions. 
Management may well be faced with a number cf pressures which conflict. 1 
(c) Cause and Effect 
Much of the literature reviewed contains an implicit 
assumption concerning the rel9.tionship between situational determin-
ants and bargaining struc~ure. It is assumed that the structure of 
bargaining is determined, at least in part, by certain identifiable 
situational variables. That is to say a one way causal relationship 
exists. This hypothesis has two faults. 
First, it is very difficult in cases such as this to prove that 
a causal. relationship exists. It may be possible by means of multi-
variate analysis, such as that conducted by Deaton and Beaumont (1979) 
to show that there is a consistent association having predictive 
value between 8ertain situational characteristics and types of 
bargaining structure. But one cannot infer that this association 
is in fact a causal .rela+.ionship. This is a consistent association 
and nothing more. 
1 Child (1977:167f) calls these multiple cc~tingencies 
• 
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In fact these consistent associations are In themselves limited. 
'[,he fact ors th "d t" f" d ey l en l le were found to be relevant only to the 
distinction between multi-employer and" single employer bargaining 
(1979:21). Indeed they no+;e (1979~4) that 'there is likely to be a 
very definite upper limit to the extent of overall explanatory 
power that one can reasonably expect to obta:n froe any cross-section 
studyt. In practice this meant that their variables had very little 
predictive value for the distinction between company and plant 
bargaining. 
They attribute this lack of success to their method of gathering 
data. Multi-variate analysis of the kind they undertake is 'simply 
not capable of adequately identifying the forces of historical 
determination, inst:i.tutional inertia and qualitative facto:::-s very 
specific to a particular company structure that are, at least, 
potentially relevant to an explanation of bargaining structure (1979: 2l). 
With this statement tney acknowledge how partial ~n explanation 
theirs is. They note (1979:4) that there are cert~in 'historical' 
and 'intangible' factors 'relevant to the determination of bargaining 
structure that one cannot hope to ade~~ately proxy, much less 
measure, in any essentially large scale, statistical examination of 
the subject.' 
Amongst these 'int angi ble' fact ors Deat on and Beaumont include 
the role of management. This suggests that if some kind of 
relationship does exist between situational vaT>iables 3.nd bargaining 
structure then it is not simply in one direction, but in two. 
Management may well be constrained by variables m~king up the situation 
they face. But they can also influence these variables themselves. 
Management have some element of choice, albeit often minimal, when 
confronted by their environment. This agency of choice must be 
included in any realistic model of the relationship between bargaining 
structural and situational variable5. 
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Cd) The Role of Management 
If management is to be studied as an 'intangible' influence 
it may be considered important in two ways. First its direct impact 
on Industrial rtelations. Second its more indirect effect, via 
'non-IR decisions.' 
It will be recalled that the evidence regarding the relationship 
between management and bargaining structure was conflicting. In some 
cases the two structures were consistent in others not. This is worthy 
of further study. 
However the impact of management 'outside' of its formal 
structure must also be studied. This may be simply referred to as 
the exercise of management control. For example the structure of 
management implies that there are a number of levels which designate 
i~._ 
particular responsibiliti8s. It may be that in anyone case plant 
management controls a certain number of issues. For other matters he 
must consult with management outside the plant. However this is only 
the formal blueprint of what is supposed to happen. In practice 
group or divisional management may interfere in matters which 
nominally at least are plant management's reeponsibility. Similarly 
the advice that is given to plant management may not be advice at 
all.' Since if it is disregarded there may be a number of personal 
repurcussions. 
·These are therefore examples of the way in which managemen~ may 
attempt to control Industrial Relations in a way which is 'outside' 
or in addition to the formal management structure. 
Another example can be quoted. Wher'e plant bargaining exists 
there ~ay formally be little contact between the plants. Yet in 
practice the senior managers of plants are likely to be in close 
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contact. This I?ay be because of a past associati0~-: or friendship. 
Such contacts are highly informal and outside the m8..Ylageme Y1.-t structure 
yet may influence Industrial Relations directly. 
In other cases management may use controls and procedures 
which are not directly connected with Industrial Relations but wjll 
certainly affect employment matters. For example management may 
attempt to alter the selection procedures In order to change Ghe 
type of manQal worker they employ. They may seek workers with many 
financial commitments who they feel may not take strike action readily. 
These and other examples give an idea of the way in which 
management can influence Industrial Relations directly. However such 
controls and procedures are 'outside' of the management structure. 
These will be studied in grea.terdetail in the cases TtIhich follow, 
, 
8.."1.d may provide eventually a more comprehensive and accurate frarneTtlork 
of· anal~Tsis for understanding the differences in Industrial Relations 
practice and activity between the four cases. 
A second way management can influence bargaining indirectly is 
through decisions it makes on 'non-IR' matters. 
When ~ organisat~on is being set up management make a number 
of decisions regarding products to be made, location of sites, size 
of plants and technology eP.lployecl. There is evident ly an element of 
choice here. Also in the long run there are occasions when these 
choices again appear. For example following a merger. 
Therefore on certain occasions management will have some control 
over SClme situational factors. Altho11gh, of course, in the mal!1 
,-
these factors do act as 00nstraints on managerial action. 
It is important to real~se who is making these decisions and 
the implications that this may have for Industrial Relatic~s, Child 
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notes (1973:101) that the8e strategic decisions be made by may 
relatively small groups within the organisation who effectively hold 
power. These he refers to as 'dominant coalitions'. 
The significance for Industrial Relations of this analysis is as 
follows. When these strategic de'cisions are made by this 'dominant 
coalition' it is likely that, Industrial Relations will have a very 
low priority. Decisions will be taken on issues which are likely to 
seriously 'affect Industrial Relations, yet commonly little thought 
is glven to these consequences. 
The interdependency of plants is a good example. Management 
may decide to concentrate production of one component on a single 
site. Economies of scale may mean that this is a financially sound 
decision. However the Industrial Relations implications may be 
profound. .A stoppage in this one plant may soon halt all production. 
other examples could be quoted concerning other situational 
constraints. But the basic argument remains unchanged. Management 
are constrained by, but are also able to influence the environment 
they face. These decisions are often in the hands of a small number 
of people. Usually such decisions pay very little regard to the 
Industrial Relations implications. Therefore Industrial Relations 
can be said to he highly derivative. 
Th~se 'non-IR' decisions may therefore set the constraints within 
which a decision to produce less of one product may mean that manpower 
has to be reduced. This is likely to have severe Industrial Relations 
consequences. If for marketing reasons a new plant is built overseas 
rather than at horne the background against which Industrial Relations 
takes place may be affected. 
Management are contin~ally making decisions regarding production, 
investment, sales and marketing which will set the constraints 
within which Industrial Relations takes place. Management decides, 
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after taking into c0nsideration the ccnstraints they are faced with, 
what to produce, how ruld whe~e to produce it and when to stop 
producing. These decisions vitally affect Industrie,l Relations. 
Thus many of the constraints affecting Industrial Rela~ions are 
internally generated rather than externally determined. Bargaining 
structure, as just one part of Industrial Relations as a whole, is 
likely to be largely under the control of management, ~t least in 
large multl-plant organisations such as this; 
Management are not therefore at the mercy Df a hostile determining 
environment, but are able to make certain choices over particular 
variables on specific occaSbns. Also in the short term they are able 
to interpret the influence of certain of these f~ctors. They may not 
be able to change them, but they can perceive and interpret them in 
a variety of ways. 
For example management can stress the influence Ol particular 
aspe ct s of their own envi~onment to suit their mV"n needs. I f the 
importance of a particular variable is exaggerated this may giv~ an 
' ... 
air of inevitability about a certain structure or actions. Manageffi2nt i s 
position is strengthened and given greater legitimacy since 
decisiornmay be rationalised more easily. 
It may appear that management have 'no choice' but to make their 
decision because of the influence of a specific variable. Similarly 
an organisation structure may be rationalised by refersnce to c~rtain 
external pressures on management. In Ford m~~agement argus that the 
interdependency of production between plants ~akesgroup bargaini~g 
inevitable. What they do not mention is that the group have chosen 
to organise their production in this way. The fact that other 
. th l-ndust ..... _y organise in different ways sho~iS that companies In e same 
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this interdependency is not inevitable. In this case the method of 
production stems from the desire of the founder of the gro~p to 
maintain over con~rol of the group. 
This example shows how management are. substituting their m-rn 
logic into the relationship bet\veen bargaining structure and 
situational deterrninElnts. This point is pursued in much greater 
detail in the case studies, and when the issue of effectiveness of 
control is considered. It must be ?tressed that this process is not 
inevitable. In fact it will be shown that this ability is a useful 
resource which management c~~ use to bolster their legitimacy. It 
is significant that such a process does not always take place. 
TC9 true function of qusstionnaires such as that used by Thomso~ 
. 
and Hunter is n011'[ evident. They are not evaluating the external 
determinants in any objective sense. Rather they are discovering 
the subjective perception that management holds of its enviror~ent. 
Thomson and Hunter are actually highlighting and demonstrating this 
process of legitimation in action. They provide the means for self-
analysis in which management stress the variables \-Thich legitimate 
existing structures and actions. The subjective perceptions of 
situational determinants are revealed, rather than the variables 
which are 'actually' or 'objectively' important. 
(e) Implications 
Two points must be stressed about the foregoing section on 
the role of management. First the analysis ~pplies to the cases 
being dealt with here. That is to say large fiul ti-plant orgallisatio~l;: 
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ln the engineering industl'Y. Many more extreme e~3lIlples could be 
quoted where this analysis does not apply, for instance hi~hly 
centralised or hjghly fragmented industries. 
Second the impression m~y have been given that Industrial Relations 
and bargaining structure is all simply a matter of choice. This is 
not the case. The analysis 'above has aimed at restoring the balance 
of view. The result is that there is a need to combine the theuries. 
Management is faced by a number of constraints, but is also able to 
have some influence on its environment~ 
Multi-variate analysis such as that carried out by Deaton and 
Beaumont provides only a partial explanation as they themselves 
acknowledge. The 'intangible factors' which they point to cannot be 
analysed adequately by their method of analysis. Such factors they 
point c~t are likely to be relevant to the company - plant distinction 
which they had little success. Therefore they suggest that their 
approach needs to be 'complemented by a series of detailed in depth 
case studies which are capable of picking up these sorts of idiosyncratic 
factors that could further enhance our understanding of the determi~2nts 
of bargaining structure.' (1979:21) 
The four cases presented below attempt just such a task. The 
remainder of this chapter examines the leads provided by this chapter 
which help to shape the analysis of the cases. 
The implications of this chapter for the rest of the study are 
as follows. 
First the bargaining s~ructure was examined in detail. The 
interdenendencv of the dimensions of bargaining structure mea':lt that 
_  
the level of bargaining could not be studied in isolation. The ~esult 
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1S that an organisation s~J.ould be seen as occupyir..g a number of levels 
of bargaining. It is therefore both impractical and misleaJing to 
characterise Industrial Relations in a multi-plant organisation by 
refe~ence to bargaining level alone. 
However this expanded analysis of bargaining structure may 
, 
itself not be 8ufficient for" understanding the different characteristics 
""-
of bargaining in the four cases. The emphasis on bargaining it~elf 
may still mask some of the crucial differences in the actual nature 
and atmosphere of Industrial Relations. 
Second therefore the study must look outside the Collective 
Bargaining structure to evaluate the ro19 that management play. 
The impact of management on bargaining structure and Industrial 
Relations generally has been noted by a number of authors (e.g. Bain 
and Clegg 1975; Clegg 1976; 3rown 1973). These authors stress the 
importance of management structure. In this case this means the 
rolffiof the various levels of management. But one must ask is this 
itself adequate? Management structure may be important but it is 
not the complete answer. For example there have been instances where 
management above plant level have intervened in issues which should 
formally be exclusively dealt with by plant management. It appsars 
that management can use controls which are not congruent or consistent 
with their structure. Often these controls are of a very subtle or 
covert nature and can or.ly be studied by me~s of case studies. 
Work on the impact of management control systems was begun by 
Woodward (1970). Her researches indicated that control systems were 
an intervening variable between the technology of a plant and the 
resulting behaviour. This cnalysis was not completed and will be 
returned to below. Recent work on control systems has alRo beer. 
carried out by Purcell and Smith (1979) and ~urcell and Earl (1978. 
This will also be pursued in later analysis. 
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A number of questionb can be asked concerning management's 
I 
involvement in Industrial Relations. What is the relationship 
between management structure and bargaining structure? Are the 
cont!'ols which management use outside tts structure widespread? 
Can the study of management's involvement in Industrial Relations 
lead to a more complete understanding of bargaining in each case? 
Is there any way of classifying the controls which management U8e 
and of judging their effectiveness? 
The final area of interest concerns the influences upon 
bargaining structure. It has been shown that cross-sectional 
statistical analysis is of little use when trying to distinguish 
between company and plant bargaining. This may point to a greater 
role for mgnagement. But the question to ask is what are the factors 
which i~fluence management in their attempts to control Industrial 
Relations. Deaton and Beaumont pointed to the influence of such 
intangibles as histcry and management style. The cases below give 
an opportunity to assess the influence of such factors, and in 
particular the extent to which they are interdependent. An additional 
factor to be considered is the influence of unions. In particular 
union activity "between plants within the same group seemed important. 
~. 
This must be systematically analysed to consider its impact on 
management. It is possible to consider whether union activity is 
purely reactive to management and bargaining structure or if they 
can actually eause management to change their actions and structures. 
These are just· a fsw of the questions which/suggest themselves 
at this point. Many others ~lIJill emerge in the case studies which 
follow. As suggested above the main aim of ihe cases whic.h follow 
is to provide some qualitative data on the d6terminants of bargaining 
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structure and the role of management in Industrial Relations. 
It is. intended that this will tell the other side of the story 
to that given 'by the quantitative studies. As such it will complement 
the statistical data, as well as providing information availablt only 
from detailed case study research. 
. 
BARGAINING LE~~ 
GROur 
DIVISION 
PLANT 
BARGAINING UNIT 
MANUAL 
STAFF 
LOCATION 
BARGAINING SCOPE 
COMPREHENSIVE 
DErAILED 
BARGAINING FORM 
AGREEMENT S: 
WRITTEN 
SIGNED 
OPEN-ENDED 
FIXED TERM 
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TABLE 2 : DIMENSIONS OF BARGAINING STR0CTURE 
FO,RD 
.j 
.; 
/ 
/ 
v' 
ROLLS 
'" / 
V 
./ 
~ 
TUBES 
~ 
/ 
./ 
/ 
J 
~ 
. /'. 
GEC 
oJ 
j 
J 
. SUESI' ANTI VE 
WAGE STRUCTURE 
WAGE INCREASES 
SHIFTS 
OVERTIME 
SICKNESS 
LAYOFFS 
PENSIONS 
CONDITIONS 
EXPENSES 
PROCEDURAL 
DISCIPLINE 
GRIEVANCES 
DISPUTES 
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
APPOINTMENT OF 
SHOP STEWARDS 
SHOP STEWARD 
FACILITIES 
GROUP 
PLANT 
NO AGREEMENT 
TABLE 3 : SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
* X 
NA 
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.. 
* 
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NA 
NA 
x 
X 
x 
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>c 
X 
x 
x 
x 
x: 
x 
TUBES 
)( 
)( 
x 
)( 
x 
NA 
x 
>< 
)( 
x 
GE;C 
x 
)( 
x 
X 
X 
NA 
x 
x 
X 
X 
x 
.. 
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. 1 TABLE 4 : COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CHARACTERISTICS 
PAYMENT SYSTEIVI 
JOB EVALUATION 
MDW 
PIECEWORK 
INCENTIVE BONUS 
PROCEDURES 
NATIONAL AGREEMENT 
DISPUTES PROCEDURE 
DISCIPLINE 
GRIEVANCE 
OTHER 
NEGOTIATIONS 
FORMAL 
COMPREHENSIVE 
I1"'TRA -PLANT 
DIFFERENTIALS 
PAY 
CONDITIONS 
DAY-TO-DAY ISSUES 
INTER-PLANT 
DIFFERENTIALS 
PAY 
CONDITIONS 
FORD 
" I 
,; 
V 
.; 
ROLLS 
I 
J 
.; 
.f j 
j 
~ 
TUB~S 
,f 
V 
j 
.j 
~ 
./ 
~ 
j 
GEC 
J 
/ 
J 
v' 
J 
v' 
/ 
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'''V .-''' . 
.' i.: • TABLE 5 : SITUATIONAL DETERMINA1\JTS 
FORD ROLLS TUBES 
GROWTH 
INTERNAL 
EXTERNAL 
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL J 
SIZE 
AVERAGE PLANT 2,500 5,000 500 
HIGH VARIATION IN V / 
PLANT SIZE 
TECHNOLOGY 
HIGH INTEGRATION ./ 
PRODUCTS 
HIGH DIVERSITY 
ECONOMIC PERFORMP~CE 
PROFITS HIGH ./ 
GEOGRAPHY 
HIGHLY CONCENTRATED 
OWNERSHIP 
FOREIGN ~ 
PUBLIC ./ 
. PRIVATE 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
GROUP / 
DIVISION 
PLANT 
WAGE STRUCTURE 
./ 
PBR 
MDW 
TRADE UNIONS / ~ / LARGE NUMBER / ./ STRONG INTER-PLP~ LINKS / 
GEC 
1,000 
/ 
./ 
/ 
PART II THE CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
The following four chapters are case studies of large mul ti-· 
plant organisations. They provide the data which is analysed in 
Part III. 
Research in each case was carried out at two levels. First the 
group or division, and second at plant level. Two plants within each 
case were studied. 
The first chapter in this section is a case study of Tube 
Invest~ents (henceforth refe~red to as Tubes). Towards the end of 
. 
this chapter a series of tentative hypotheses are put forward. These 
are used as a model for comparison with the following three chapters. 
Each of the cases has a different bargaining structure. In 
fact following the first case the bargaining structures become 
progressively ~ore centralised and formalised. This enables a 
comparative analysis to be made of the impact of bargaining structure 
on union behaviour. 
Two other areaS of comparisons are developed. Firstly the 
influen'ces on the management control process. And secondly the 
impact of management structure on bargaining structure. 
All three of these themes' have been drawn from the nreVlOUS 
Ii terFl,ture and are investigated In this se ctione 
./ 
The cases a=e examined systematically. First the nature of 
collect3_ve bargaining in practice is discussed. This attempts to 
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highlight what actually takes pla~e, rather than simply what should. 
Second the control process used by management is studied. This is 
broken down into the various control systems that are employed. 1 
1 In order to standardise references the following terms are 
employed: Control process: the collection of control systems used 
by m~nagement; control systems: these are either formal and permanent 
(control structures) or informal and. temporary (controls). The 
use of the word 'systems' is purely as an heuristic dAvice, and 
implies no attachment to 'systems .theory' .• 
CHAPrER FOUR : TUJ3ES 
Research in Tubes was carried out at Divisional and plant level. 
Two plants were studied (referred to as AP ana. ~'lL). Both of these 
were in the same Division (referred -Co as STD). Further details 
regarding the background to this group are included in the thumb-nail 
sketches in Chapter Two. 
It is necessary initially to develop in slightly greater detail 
than previously the structure of bargaining in the two plants. This 
provides a background for the discussion which follows. 
1 Collective Bargaining in Practice 
It will be recallea that within Tubes the vast majority of 
issues are formally negotiated at plant level. Only pensions were 
settled at group level. 
Within AP negotiations covering all five business areas are 
conducted at plant level. These negotiations are formalised for 
both manual and staff employees, with detailed written agreements 
coverl.ng most pay and terms and conditions issues. As a federated 
plant AP operates the national procedure agreement for manual vJorkers. 
On most issues the manual unions negotiate together via a plant 
negotiating committee. This committee is at the top of a whole series 
of similar committees designed to deal with many day-to-day lssue2 • 
. / 
The committee system for \oJhit e collar "toJorkers is somewhaJ;j less 1:1e11 
organised. Negotiations with these groups tend to take place O~ 
. an individual union basis •. 
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Bargaining in WL is also formally based at plant level. In this 
c.ase both manual and staff unions negotiate separately. However for 
. manual unions the agreements tend to be' virtualJ y identical. The 
agreements themselves tend to be wr~tten up and comprehensive. There 
is a tendency for many issues to reach plant level very quickly. Hence 
convenors and senior representatives often become iilvolved with plant 
directors in quite trivial lssues. The white collar unions are 
somewhat fragmented with a whole series of groups oft~n within one 
union. This particularly applies to ASTMS. 
H~ving briefly set the scene by recalling the bargaining st~ucture 
in each 'plant it is now necessary to consider hmv this operates in 
. practice. Two features seem to be-of particular importanc8. First 
the variations in Industrial Relations practice that exist below the 
level of ::the plant. This \vas particul3.rly evident in AP arJ..l results 
in an over estimate of the significanc8 of the plant level for day-to-
day Industrial Relations. Second the effect of managerial influence 
from outside the plant is examined A number of examples are given 
which point to a much more important role for Division than is 
immediately apparent. 
As previously noted above man~gement structure in AP is ~ividcd 
into five 'business areas' depending upon the market faced. The 
rationale for this is that specialipt skills (~3.inly D~~keting and sellin~) 
are required for each area. Accounts are prepared separately for each 
area so that individual financial pe~formance can easily be mea8ureri. 
In practice this means that profits and losses C2n be offset against 
each other for the different areas. 
Each business area has its own general menager, and a sep~rate 
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management structure beneath him. There are a numoer of central 
functions which provide a service to each of these areas. ~hese include 
Personnel, Finance and Engineering. Even with these centralised 
functlons there is still a degree of duplication in the different areas. 
It is important to note at this point that the organisation 
described above WC),S set up from outside • Consultants and experts 
were brought in by Tubes to reorganise management structure. This 
point will be returned to below in the discussions of Divisional 
involvement in plant affairs. 
A number of differences exist between the areas In the way 
Industrial Relations is conducted. In fact to all intents and 
purposes the business area is the most significant level for day-to-
day issues. The vast majority of problems are settled within each 
area. Only'rarely would a shop floor issue be taken to the plant 
negotiating committee. Therefore although each of the business areas 
operates the same set of agreements each area has developed its own 
customs and practices. Some of these variations are examined below. 
One would expect some differences in practice because of the variations 
in product. However the actual differences observed are over and 
above those that would be expected. 
First, the operation of the bonus scheme. Although this is a 
site wide scheme there is ·a variation in the amount of 'slackness' 
between the areas. This is partly due to the fact that the bC:0..'_lS 
scheme was not introduced in a uniform manner. When it was originally 
set up two separate investigating tea~s were used and some of their 
standards differed. However aside from these historical explanation~ 
present day attitudes are a180 important. Individual managers had a 
good deal of discretion on this issue. For example a mana6er ~ould 
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turn a 'blind eye' tc practices which were against the spirit of the 
scheme so that earnings were kept artificially high. In some cases 
advancements in technology were not notified to work study. The 
result is that the same level of earnings does not corrp.8pond to 
equality of effort across the business areas. 
Management attitude was also important in the second issue of 
discipline. There is a considerable variation In the epplication of the 
formal discipline procedure. Often this involved junior management 
and supervisors... Some of these may prefer to take a more personal 
approach while others may deal with these issues in a more formal 
manner. However within a single department there was often a common 
line. This may be because lower level managers may, perhaps only uncon-
sciously, adopt the attitudes and individual management styles of their 
superiors • 
. Thirdly the committee system tended to operate in a very uneven 
fashion. Some of the cornmi ttees in certain business areb.S would meet 
regularly and perform a us~ful function. Others seemed to have fallen 
into disuse, or become 'bogged down' in what appeared to the o~~sider 
to be very trivial issues. This variation in activity between the 
areas was often closely connected with the individual management style 
existing. Some managers encouraged these committees and thought them 
worthwhile, others took a more pessimistic Vlew of the-ir usefulness. 
However in many instances these committees were to an extent bypassed 
by informal and ad hoc meetings designed to short-circu:i_t the prc:cedure 
and deal with specific problems. 
It is apparent from the above analysis that individual styles of 
management had a big influence on Industrial Relations in any business 
area. However .i. t is importaTlt to note that these are only impo.J..'tant 
because they hav9 been allowed to be so. Management structure in AP 
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encourages differences between the business areas to emv~ge. Considerable 
emphasis is put on the line manager to. solve his own problems. The 
Personnel Department plays a relatively minor role in day-to-day 
Industrial Relations. Its role is confined to dealing with issues 
that go through procedure, any major disputes that emerge, and conducting 
annual negotiations. Because of this indivi~ual styles of management 
have been allowed to emer~e. Overtime a manager can run his department 
or a::h:~a in largely the way he chooses. It is almost as if he is rurmi:i.lg 
his own business. This glves the opportunity for long established 
managers to build up their own 'empires' often enjoying substantial 
autonomy. 
The result of this division of respor..sibility is a great deal of 
inconsistency in Industriai Relati.ons practice between the business 
areas. For .-the majority of issues Personnel ~!ill not be aware of 
the actual decisions that are being m~de. They will only learn of 
these if a dispute arises, or if therp. is a grievance c0ncerning 
inconsistency of treatment. 
The emphasis on line management i~ AP contrasts with the 
situation in WL. Here as previously noted negotiations ooth formal 
and informal tend to take place at a high level. It was suggested to 
me that this was a deliberate policy followed by management. It ap~ears 
that management at plant and Divisior~l level have taken steps to 
remove the variations below plant ~~vel as experiencec in AP. Two 
changes have been made. First there was a reform of the pa~~ent 
system. This now covers the whole plant, and involved a common job 
evaluation programme. Second there has been an attemp~ to take away 
some of junior line management's discretion and raise this up to the 
level of more senior management. The result of this is to centralise 
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even day-to-day issues at plant level in an attempt to achieve 
consistency across the plant. One consequence of this lS ttlat there 
has been a change in the role of the Personnel Department. In 
particular the Personnel Director plays a much more important role 
in day-to-day Industrial Relations than was the case in AP. He is 
regularly invo: ved net only with his colleagues, but also vIi th convenors 
and senior representatives on even routine matters. 
The result of these changes is that a relatively . small number 
of people in WL are in virtual control of tee business. For Industrial 
Relations this has meant a separation between the shop floor wher~ 
most issues emerge, and the plant level where effective decisior-s are 
made. This has caused some ill-feeling especially among junicr line 
managers and shop stewards who are not involved in the decision making. 
It should again be no~ed that this reorganisation was instigated by 
Divisional intervention, and will be referred to below. 
It is evident that in AP the plant is not the most important level 
for routine Industrial Relations. The focus of activity tends to be 
below this leading to variations and inconsistency of practice across 
the business areaS. In WL deliberate steps have been taken to avoid 
this with the result that virtually all issues have to be referred to 
plant leyel management. 
The result in both AP and WL is that much union activity tends 
to be based at or below the level of the plant - something which 
management are very keen to emphasise and entrench. Shop Jstewards 
almost inevitably become embroiled in the minute details of everyday 
events. This is a consequence not only of the present day problems, 
but also of the historical development of tht two plants. 
In the past the two plants enjoyed considerably more ~utonomy 
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than they now possess. Both are old established companies. AP was 
established in 1899 and was one of the founder companies of Tubes in 
1919. In the early days it was joked that Tube~ was a part of AP 
rather than the other way around o 'VfL has a similarly long history, 
and boLh plants have been well known in the locality and the industry from 
an early time. Each plant has been dom~nated in the past by a single 
family. In the past the plants we~e run in an autocratic and paternalist 
manner. This meant that from the earliest times the employees have come 
to identify strongly with the particular plant which they worked for. 
In recent years Tubes has corne to assert its control over the 
plants far more than in the past. However this does not appear to 
have had much influence on employee attitudes. In the main they have 
maintained a plant based parochial point of view. This applies 
particularly to those employees who worked during the time of greater 
autonomy. Often these employees look back on this time with reverence 
and now resent the interference from Tubes. This feeling is accentuated 
by the fact that many employees are still drawn froill the immediate 
locality. In AP for example it is estimated that some 80% of emplo:vees 
live within five miles of town. 
Thus in both plants the inward looking attitudes are at least 
partly a consequence of their own histories. Many shop floor employees 
may resent Tubes interference, but may", be unwilling to do anything liO 
challenge this. In both plants shop floor employees tend to be 
dominated by their own department or business area. Very few will 
identify with the plant as a whole. Identification with Division 
and Tubes was even weaker. One cynical viewpoint suggested that 
belonging to the Tubes grOD.p was only important ;'Jhen i you want a 
cheap push bike or cooker.' 
Parochial views of this kind were much loss widespread with 
senior managers. Movemen~ between plants had tended to weaken 
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attachment to anyone plant, and increased identification with 
Division or Tubes as a whole. This is in marked contrast to the 
manual worker who may spend the whole of his working life in a single 
plant. Some managers, us~ally the older one~ may have staye~ with one 
plant and worked their way up. The contrast of individual management 
styles and attitudes between these older managers and younger more 
mobile gr'aduates was very marked. 
A second factor which must be considered is the effect on 
Industrial Relations of interference from above the level of the 
plant. In Tubes it is the Division which has the biggest impact. 
Two examples are quoted below which demonstrate this influence well. 
First, Division has intervened to reorganise management 
structure in both plants. Both AP and WL have experienced changes 
in the last fifteen years. The setti~g up of the business area 
structure in AP in 1964 slgnalled the beginning of much greater 
interference from Division. This increased intervention has 
accompanied a decline in the financial performance of AP. 
Divisional involvement in WL came slightly later and took a 
more concrete form. Around twelve years ago a new mill was built 
on the present site. This involved expenditure of around £10 million 
much of which came from Divisional resources. Not only did Division 
provide much of the money, but they also sent in a management team 
for the commissioning phase. This event is often referred to as a 
watershed in the history of WL. Many recent 6"lents are almost 
automatically related to the coming of the 'new mill'. This is of 
./ 
course net necessarily the case since many of the cha:uges may have 
taken place anyway. 
However as noted above there werp. other changes. For example 
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site level bargaining was strengthened when the Comprehensive Agreement 
"'~as reached in 1971. From the shop floor point of view this change 
represented a centralisation of previously fragmented bargaining. 
For manageme~t this was sepn as a policy of decentralisation as this 
was combined with the move away from a sub-group of which WL was 
previously a part. 
These examples demonstrate two important points. First changes 
in management structure seem to make changes in bargaining structure 
inevitable. Second these plant based changes must be seen in the 
context of greater Tubes involvement in plant affairs. To appreciate 
the significance of this a brief historical explanation is required. 
Tubes was formed around sixty years ago as a protective organis-
ation. From that time it has expanded both internally a..Yld externally. 
Until relatively recently neither the Group or Division has had much 
influence over the plants. In many cases, as shown in AP and WL, 
the running of the plants was left largely ln the hands of a single 
family, v.~o may well have founded the company. However by the early 
1960s the control of the original families began to weaken and many 
of the plants had poor financial performance. At this point Tubes 
began to move in and assert greater central influence over the plants. 
This may have been either by reorganising management structure, or by 
providing additional investment funds. The increased cost of 
investment meant that there were many benefits to be gained from a 
central pool of funds. This was then alloc~ted to the various plants 
depending upon their requirements. 
A minor but significant point concerns the" building of a 
. . 
corporate image by Tubes. This has been supported by an expensive 
advertising campaign. All the plants have been renamed with the 
'TI' initials preceding the company title. This appears to be primarily 
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a marketing and public relations exercise. For example a product 
which is well lmown abroad viill be associated ~vith other products 
which are less well lmown simply by having at least part of a name 
which is common. 
Tubes has therefore been forcv.d to centralise its control over 
its subsidiaries as competitive pressures have increased and managerial 
expertise in the plants has declined. In th~ past when plants 1-Jere 
taken over no attempt was made to harmonise rates of pay and other 
terms and conditions. Thus over time many differences have emerged 
and become enlarged between plants. This has happened at the s~~e 
time as plant bargaining has beco~8 more formalised. The combination 
of greater centralisation of control and more emphasis on plant 
bargaining has brought the inter-plant disparities into sharper foous. 
This means that comparisons between plants on pay and oonditions are 
not only encouraged but made easier. 
Second, Tubes may intervene directly but covertly in the affairs 
of plants. This is especially the case when events in one plant may 
have repurcussions for other plants. For example immediately prior to 
the research there was a strike in WL. Since this pl~~t was a 
producer of material used in other Tubes plants the production loss 
was exaggerated. It was suggested to me by the plrult convenors that 
for a ti~e plant management was in control of the situation. During 
this early period other plants were not being seriously affected. 
However when the strike went into the sixth week Division was forced 
to put pressure on WL management to settle as quickly as possible. 
However it is unlikely that WL manegeuient would h3.ve been made to 
settle for fec:n" of setting"a precedent in the future. 
As ,will be shown below this is only one of ·a number of ways i~ 
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which Division intervenes in pla.nt Industrial Relations. A similar 
situation exists where concessions made in plant negotiations could 
have implications for other plants. 
This increased Divisional involvement has not gone unnoticed by 
. 
the trade unions. The effect has been to encourage inter-plant activity 
of various kinds. In some ways this is a questioning of the legitimacy 
. "':.:' 
of plant management authority. Manual and white collar Ul1ions have 
responded in different ways as shown below. 
The manual unions have attempt8d to form a Combine Committee 
based upon the Product Division of which both plants are a part. 
The strength of this combine varies, but it covers most of the plants 
in the Division. It was emphasised by the Convenors that this Comcine 
does not seek division or group level bargaining on all issues, its 
aims are far more modest. It is att6:lpting to influence sume decisions 
not directly connected with Industrial Relations, e.g. investment 
decisions, but which set the constraints within wLich Industrial 
Relations operates. This combine is based upon 1J!TL, a fact not 
unconnected with the high level of Divisional involvement in that 
plant. The combine began on a highly informal basis in the intervening 
time between the two periods of research in 1'ubes • Although nearly 
all the plant convenors from the TIivislon are involved, the Combine 
does not enjoy the support oOf the AUEW.. Management in all the plant s 
havo consistently refused to recognise the COllicine fOl' any issue. 
However this policy may actually strengthen the combine: the 
participants may feel that they are important enough to be ignored. 
The combine is still in a highly informal stage, and~his may actually 
aid its effectiveness. All the convenors are in contact 1y telephone, 
and may hear of developments before pJ.ant mar..3.gement. Because of this 
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plant management may use the convenors as informa~ion sources, although 
not of course acknowledging the existence of the combinet 
The combine ha.s organised picketing of a number of Divisional 
plants when there was a dispute in a single plant. On the first 
occasion this took nearly six weeks to organise. The feeling amongst 
management in the plants was that this would take SlX days next time. 
Despite this example inter-plant contacts were used in the main 
to 1mprove the plant bargaining position. This 1S for a variety 
of reasons. Most of the problems that stewards face are at plant 
level. The majority of employees have an inward looking and parochial 
view: they have little concern for what happens outside their own 
plant. Also there may be a distinct lack of common feeling between 
plants in the same division - something which management 1/IJill 
exaggerate' if they can. Contacts may only be between convenors and 
they m8Y not necessarily represent the views of the plant as a whole. 
The result of these obstacles to inter-plant co-operation is that 
management are able to maintain existing inter-plant differentials, 
.. , 
at least for manual workers. 
For white collar workers there is a slightly different picture. 
Much of this inter-plant activity is deliberately aimed at comparing. 
terms and conditions between plants. Certain staff unions, eg. 
ASTMS and TASS have a high level of communication and contact 
between the plants. This is usually in the form of circulating 
information concerning Legotiations and present pay and terms and 
conditions. Such information allows coercive comparisons to be made 
between plants on a wide range of issues. In the main these are 
confined to non-salary issues. Unlike manual jobs many white collar 
jobs are not easily compared because no universal job descriptions 
apply. Therefore comparisons tend to be on issues such a~ holidays, 
sick pay ~~d expenses allowances. This is either via straightforward 
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comparisons, or Vla the provisions of Schedule 11 of the Employment 
Protection Act. It will be shown below that as a consequence of these 
comparisons Division employs a number 'of strict guidelines on issues 
which are easily compared 0etween plants. 
This inter-plant activity stems largely from the union officers. 
For example in ASTMS there is one Divisional Officer who has 
responsibility for Tubes in the West Midlands. Also there is a 
National Advisory Committee which is designed to arrange meetings 
to improve communications throughout the whole of Tubes. This 
situation can be compared with manual unions. Here inter-plant 
activity was dependent largely upon the activities of a small n~ber 
of plant convenors. This may explain why white collar representatives 
in the plant do not make the best'use of the information tney have 
available. They too are preoccupied with plant bargaining and have 
little time for inter-plant issues. Sowever potentially white collar 
employees as a consequence of their better sources of information may 
be able to improve their ability to make comparisons in the future. 
As a consequence of divisional interference employee attitudes 
are in something of a confused state. Firstly they have a plant 
based loyalty resulting partly from their historical independence and 
present day problems. But secondly they have suspicions about the 
extent of Divisional interference leading to doubts about the 
authority of plant manag<::mept. This combinati0n lead;: to inter-plant 
activity as unions attempt to challenge managerial authority. 
,/ 
This discussion of manual and white collar unioL activity has 
been included to demonstrate the recognition at least of ~he role played 
by Division. 'Up until noW this role has bee!1 described only in 
piecemeal fashion with isolated examples. In the section \vhicr. follows 
a more systematic investigation is carried out. 
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2 Management Control of Indu3trial Relations 
The previous section analysed and described collective bargaining 
as it takes place in practice. What follows is an outline of the 
various ways in which Tubes management seeks to regulate Industrial 
Relations. Mo~t of the control systems analysed are demonstrated by 
reference to specific examples, many of ~lhich were mentioned in the 
, 
preceding discussion. Additionally tHo further aims are included. 
First to show the relationship between 'unioli activity and the process 
of management control. Second to explain how the various control 
systems used have evolved over time. 
Initially a description of the management structure in Tubes is 
built up. (Further details of which are given in Chapter Twc.) 
This is then followed by an outline of the various control systems 
used by management, including those not directly concerned with 
Industrial Relations. Many of these control systems are supplements 
to the bargaining structure, and are designed to support it, and cope 
1.-
with the union reaction to it. 
There are three effective levels of management structure in Tubes. 
Group level management includes the main board directors who have 
overall.respons~bility for the long run performance of the business. 
They have executive authority and are unlikely to be involved in short 
run ~ssues. Below them are a series of Divisions based upon similarity 
of product. At this level there is functional responsibility for areas 
such as investment, finance and personnel. Again this level is unlikely 
to be concerned with da;7-to-day matters. Formally it provides a aer·-lice 
for the plant s within the lJi vi si on and co-oruinat es their act i vi ties 
where necessary. The third level is plant management with each plant 
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having a slightly different structure. In AP there a:re five business 
areas with various central services. Personnel here plays a relatively 
minor role in day-to-day matters, these being left in the ~ain to line 
management. Management ~tructure is far more centralised within ~L. 
There is a small group of directors who effectively run the plant. 
The Personnel Director is included amongst these and he plays a 
significant role in the overall control of plant activities. 
This des0ription only really provides a skeleton of the management 
control systems employed by Tubes. It is essential to look at 
management control in action so that some flesh can be added to these 
bones. Beneath the structural surface the influence cf the various 
levels of control is in reality quite different to that expected • 
. 
Particular attention w\ll be given to the influence of Division over 
_L 
plant Industrial Relations. However before looking at these control 
systems in detail their development can briefly be des0ribed. 
The management structure described above has developed ove~ time 
in response to a number of pressures. The growth in size of Tubes 
in terms of number of plants and diversification meant that no single 
control system was feasible. It was essential that some division of 
labour and specialisation took place; this led to the setting up of 
the product ~ivisions. These developments can be discerned by 
looking at the shape of the organisation chart in Annual Reports 
from Tubes. However no sooner had this specialised structure been 
set up than centralised control over investment became necessary 
because of the cost of finance. Previously autonomous plants came 
more and more under the control of Divisional Boards. 
Trade unions were not '_maware of these developments. Two 
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changes in their behaviour were evident which together produced an 
increase in inter- plant activity. First the disparaties between 
plants became more evident, and this encouraged coercive comparisons 
or 'leap-frogging'. Seco~d doubts were expressed about plant managements 
authority, particularly when investments decisions were bein~ obviously 
made at Divisional level. Manual unions have displayed the latter 
form of behaviour and white collar the former. 
Tubes management responded to this activity In a number of ways 
which are explored below. Basically they attempted to reduce the 
potential for leap frogging and to protect the autonomy of plant 
management. Inter-plant activity threatened to undermin~ the 'sacred 
cow' of plant autonomy and management were not prepared to allow this. 
Many of the control systems described below were purely ad hoc 
and reactive to union activity. It would be wrong to attach too 
much forethought or planning to management's actions. Ofte~ the 
controls are short lived 8imply to regulate a certain ~ion activity 
which may last only several weeks. Each change of activity being 
referred·to by management as the 'flavour of the month.' Other more 
long run changes may result in structural changes by management. 
(a) Industrial Relations Control Systems 
Divisional management operates a number of control systems which 
support the plant bargaining structure. 
First Division provides a number of services to the plants. 
These include the provision of specialised informatio~, advice on 
various matters and technical assistance, for example on legal 
problems. 
Of particular importance during the pe~~od of research was the 
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help glven by Division to plants when preparing submission to the CAC 
under the Schedule 11 provisjons of the Employment Protection Act. 
Tubes had been subject to a barrage of these claims from ASTMS and TASS 
\, 
I . 1 on non-sa ary lssues. Each claim was presented for a ppecific ~roup 
'> 
of workers in different plants. Plant management often became engaged 
in the time consuming process of gathering information concerning terms 
and conditions in the local areas. The Divisional Per~orulel Department 
provided a good deal of help and advice. In fact because of the 
number of clai$s faced by Tubes Divisional management became very 
experienced in presenting their clalms. Often they were particularly 
concerned about the repercussions for other Tubes plaLts when using 
a certain set of arguments in support of a claim. They were wary of 
settiytg a precedent that could be llsed elsewhere" 
The second Divisional influence in this area was very much a 
consequence of the Schedule 11 claims noted above. In a number of 
specific areas Division lays down policies and guidelir~cs. Policy 
statements tended to be concerned with minima. For example there 
was a requirement that worker participation committees were set ~p 
in all plants by a specific date. Although this was apparently a 
new departure for Tubes, this could signal the beginning of a trend. 
Of greater significance to the present discussions are the 
guidelines that are laid down. Some of these guidelines were very 
restrictive with very little room for plant management to manoeuvre, 
while others v!ere much looser. It appeared that it was those 
issues which were most easily compared between plant s which vlere the 
most highly restricted. For example holiday pntitlerr:ent, sick :pay 
and expenses are easily compared betweEn plants. These are of course 
1 TASS and ASTMS had used this tactic because of Tubes'refusal 
to negotiate formally over trJ.8se issues at divisional level. 
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the very lssues which the white collar Ulllons were comparing with 
Schedule 11 claims. Eventually as a result of these guidelines and 
union activity these conditions became uniform throughout the 
Division. For other issues which were much more diffic-Qlt to ccmpare 
the guidetines were much weaker. For example the level of annual 
settlement was often left to plant management. It is true to say 
that with pay policy being enforced during th~ research period strict 
guidelines from Division were not required. Plant management would 
simply negotiate the best figure it could given its own particular 
circumstances. This practice tended to emphasise to e~ployees that 
as far as the major terms and conditions were concerned each plant 
was autonomous. These issues provided management with an opportunity 
to display their freedom from restrictions, something which they 
rarely failed to take advantage of. In some respects this autonomy 
was quite genuine. However in other respects this was nothing mor~ 
than an illusion. The exercise of selective guidelines was accurately 
summed up by one Industrial Relations manager. He said that he could 
negotiate a phoney productivity deal in his plant at considerable 
expense., However he dare not add one penny to the mileage allowance 
of his sales representatives. One issue waS specific to his plant, 
whereas the other would have repurcussive effects on other plants. 
Third, Division maintains very close contact with all of its 
plants. Information, statistics and gossip are continually being 
exchanged between the plants and Division. Regular contact is 
maintained by telephone. Industrial Relations matters will be 
discussed along with a whole variety of issues, some concerned with 
// 
the performance of the plant, others ~ot. There may also be visits 
to and from Division and a whole variety of meetings and conferences 
will be arranged. 
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A good example of this exchange of information was provided by 
the strike at WL. Divisional management were kept in constant touch 
with the developments in the plant. Similarly ,lant management were 
kept informed of the effecG the st~ike was having on other plants. 
The three control systems described above are to an extent ad hoc 
in nature. They are essentially reactive, designed to regulate short 
'.'.,. 
rUn trade union activity. Because of this they are likely to change 
in response to changes in union activity. However although they may 
alter in detail it is likely that they will not change in principle. 
~ 
Their basic function is to support the bargaining structure by 
, 
regulating reactions to that structure. ·Controls such as these are 
required because of management's insistence on plant bargaining, 
despite having increasingly centralised control in other areas. 
(b) Personnel Control Systems 
The control systems now examined are somewhat less of an 
immediate reaction to union activity. Rather they appear to be 
part of a deliberate policy on the part of Division of attempting 
to control the activity of individual managers in the plants. These 
control systems are often in addition to those described above and 
may be used in combination with them. In the main th8y tend to be 
covert, and subtle, but norethe less effective. 
These control systems will be termed 'functional' cr 'Persor~el' 
. / 
control systems. They involve primarily control which Division 
exercises over the recruitre8nt, selection, training, promotion and 
movement of managers. The increased resources devoted to these 
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controls are a good indic~tor of the expanded significance attached 
to Industrial Relations in Tubes. 
Recruitment and selection of senior managers and graduates is 
controlled by Division. The 'best' candidates as defined by Tubes 
can be selected against a common scale. Graduates in particular are 
carefully chosen, and then placed on the management development 
programme. 
Tubes also has a central training establishment which serves all 
the plants ln the group. A variety of courees are offered from 
short courses for foremen to more sophistl?ated execut~ye developillent 
programmes. While these did not take the form of attempts to 
'brainwash' managers, these courses were designed to improve 
management skills and to improve identification with the group or 
division. 
Division also maintains control over the promotion of managers. 
This control exists because Divisions have a series of rewards and 
sanctions which are essentially individually based. It must be 
emphasised that these are only attempts to influence managerial 
behaviour. While some managers may wish to tow the line, others may 
choose to ignore these controls. However any manager who did this 
and broke Divisional policy would be severely dealt with. In order 
to preserve the effect of this control Division maintained a record 
of the performance and personal characteristics of senior managers. 
~ 
This was often used in conjunction with the policy of encouraging 
mobility of management between the plants. 
This policy was most marked with Directors. Since they were 
employed centrally by Tubes it was relatively easy to move them from 
one plant to another. For example if a vac~~cy should occur in a 
plarrt which demanded special qualities then it is likely that Division 
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would have a man ready to fit that role. If a plant wa6 performing 
badly additional finance and marketing directors may be brought in. 
This movement not only created a"reserve of widely experienced 
specialised directors, bu~ also en~ouraged the development of personal 
links between these directors. These would form the basis of an 
informal network of contacts which is useful for ailvice and gaining 
information. Company figures relating to the movement of managers 
revealed the following trends. The mobility of directors into and 
out of one plant doubled to 14% between the periods 1965-70 and 1?70-75, 
whereas those promot ed int ernally remained_. st eady at 12%. 
Movement among senior managers was also quite common. In both 
plants frequent references were made to the high 'labour turnover' of 
these manager~. This would often· contrast sharply with tha long term 
attachment of shop floor employees to a single plant. Management 
generally were in fact seen as a ' Divisional resource.' 1 Al'~hough 
m~nagers could not be forced to move all kinds of tmoral suasion' 
could be applied. In some cases the only way to gain promotion lias 
to move between plants. Some managers, especially graduates would 
move quite regularly between plants. Each plant presenting an 
opportunity to broaden their experience. h~en asked which plants 
they had worked for some graduates would rattle off a whole list of 
• 
plants often in different divisions. Often they had some elem9nt cf 
choice as to where they worked. 
Company figures shm'! that for one plant b9tv-Ieen 2.965-70 and 
1970-75 the number of senior managers promoGed internally fell by 
around a quarter, whereas the numbe~ promoted from within Tubes 
increased from 1% to 5%. These figures demonstrate a Tubes policy 
1 The consequences of this for managerial unionisation ~re considered 
in Part III. 
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statement on this subject, this stated that 'companies bhould be 
encouraged to look for al t ernat i ve appli cant s using the sources 
indicated unless there is an outstanding candinate internally'. 
These sources include a c8ntral register of managers giving details 
of those suitable for promotion derived from a management audit. 
It should be stressed that only rarely would -~hese highly mobile 
managers be employed in Industrial Relations. This was usually left 
to someone with considerable experience of the plant itself. However 
this did not mean that those employed in line management failed to 
corne into contact with shop stewards. In fact the Tubes graduate 
became notorious in his dealings with union representatives. 
Three important points need to be made concerning these control 
sy~tems. 
First it is important to note th~t these two sets of control 
systems can be used in combination. For example the I:i1dustrial 
Relations controls could be strengthened by the potential use of 
Personnel control systems. If a manager failed to adhere to a 
k 
guideline and this resulted in leap-frogging across the plants then 
his· promotion prospects may suffer. Alternatively if a plant manager 
~ 
broke with Divisional policy causing a dispute he may not be given 
similar responsi bili ty in the future, and be 'put out to grass.' 
Second this combination of control systems may mean that an 
individual manager may have two b03ses. He will be r8sponsible to 
his immediate superior in the plant, as well as being subject to 
some form of Divisional control. If there is a clash of interest 
between these two bosses the manager may have to/choo::e between which 
of the two he keeps satisfied. In the extreme the manager may serve 
t.he manager whom he feels has the biggest influence over his future 
career prospects. 
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Finally there is the concern for individual management style by 
Tubes. It appears that Tubes have recognised the potential influence 
of this and atterr.pt to achieve some consistency of styles via its 
training programmes. This will of course only be an attempt, for 
J 
there are many obstacles ,to achieving this. However the impact of 
a new manager joining an established structure can be quite marked. 
This would not only influence day-to~day events, but also more generally 
affect the style, pace qnd atmosphere which he created around him. 
This may be especially important where there are a relatively small 
number of'Directors as in WL. A change of management such as this 
may take place if financial results are poor (as in AP) or if there 
is new investment (as in WL). 
(c) Non-IR Control Systems 
This term refers to control systems which are not directly 
concerned with I~dustrial Relations such as finance and production. 
However these control systems may influence Industrial Relations by 
setting a series of internal constraints which must be operated 
within. It appears that these control systems are becoming increas-
ingly c'entralised in Tubes. For example the benefits of economies 
of scale mean that there is an increasing integration of productio~. 
l. 
Also the increasing cost of capital means that investment funds are 
centrally pooled. A number of specific control systems are recognised. 
?irst there are financial control systems. Accounts are kept 
for each of the Tubes plants allowing Divisional'manageme~t to keep 
a close watch on performance. Figures for each separate plant are 
• 
not published. It appears that the extent of Divisional interferenc~ 
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1.S connected with the financial performance of the plant _' Thus Hhen 
fl. plant was performing poorly the degree of interference was increased. 
Although any plant in this situation would be under many pressures in 
any case, that from Division constitutes another one. The difference 
here is that Division can provide assistance if necessary. In thi~ 
way it is conforming to the traditional role ~ssigP-8d to divisional 
organisations in mul ti-pl~,nt groups. During the research AP at one 
time made loans to Division, and at other times received money from 
Divi~ion • 
• 
The second important control system is the allocation of 
investment funds. Division has a reserve of funds which it can use for 
investment. These are on a scale which would not normally be available 
to a single plant. However the situation is not quite as ~imple as 
it would appear. Funds are often allocated on the basis of past and 
.. 
present performance. Particular areas for investment are identified 
and funds are channelled i:a that direction. These funds can not only 
be used to improve future performance, but can also be used to 
encourage-improvements in present p3rformance~ Therefore to an extent 
plants are in competition for these scarce resources. Some plants may 
be starved of funds, while others may benefit, simply on the basis 
of present performance. Funds are not only allocated in the U.K. 
but overseas as well, and Tubes may choose to invest a-broad rather 
than at home. Thus far from being the 'benevolent uncle' that its 
public relations material would suggest, Tubes uses itR investment 
decisions as a mechanism of control. 
One further consequence of Division control over investment 
was mentioned in an earlier section. Division provided much of the 
money to build the new mill at WL. This not only had a ~ig influence 
on IndU:strial Relations at the tiIHe, but its effects can still be 
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recognised at prese~t. Tt~ Combine Committee aimed at influer-cing 
investment decisions in Tubes was based at WL. This was prcbably 
because the employees in that plant had experienced at first hand the 
influence of Divisional control. Therefore the exercise of Divisional 
I 
Control systems such as those described in this secUon may promote 
union activity, which must then be regUlated by more controls. 
To recap very briefly three differer.ttypes of control systems are 
evident in Tubes. First there are Industricl Relations control systems 
which appe.ar dependent on union activity and hence 'are largely ad hoc 
in nature. These are aimed at preventing effective co-operation by 
unions between plants. They include the provision of services, the 
communication of information and the selective use qf guidelines. 
Second there are controls over individual managers and include 
control over recruitment, selection, training, promotion and 
movement of managers. B~cause of their individual ~ature the effect 
of these control systems is very difficult to ascertsin. However it 
is likely when they are used in combination with the previous control 
systems that their influence will be enhanced. 
Finally there are 'non-IR' cont rol systems concerned vd th finance 
and investment. These are aimed more at regulating plant performance 
as a whole. However for unions these may constitute crude displays of 
, 
Divisional interference in plant affairs. This may lead shop steHards 
to ~~estion where effective decisions on a whole range of issues are 
I 
being made, ~~d -to possibly challenge plant management authority. If 
this results in inter-plant activity this may require the Industrial 
Relations controls .noted initially. 
128 
3 Conclusion 
The major features of Industrial Relations in Tubes c~n be 
usefully summarised at this point. This will enable later chapbers 
to make comparisons with these initial hypotheses. 
Three £eatures have been stressed: coll~ctive bargaining in 
practice; union inter-plant acti v.i ty; the rnanagerne.nt control 
I.... ' 
process. Each of these is recalled in turn below. 
Two characteristics of bargai~ing in practice were stressed. 
First the variations in practice below the level of the plant. 
Second the inter-plant act i vi ty of the shop steV'~·ards. 
The variations within a plant indicate that an ~~derstanding 
based upon formal level of bargaining alone may give undue 
significance to that level. 
These variations were particularly noticeable in AP where the 
. 
business area structure existed. Informally many issues were 
dealt with at the business area level rather than at plant level. 
Persop~el would rarely be involved in day-to-day issues: these 
were settled by t:Qe lipe management and the stevlards concerned. 
Each business area tended to develop its own culture and tra.ditions. 
This was dependent not only upon the different products, but also 
on individual management styles. 
Within WL plant level management had taken deliberate steps 
to prevent this kind of activity. Although largely successful this 
had resulted in a majority of issues becoming 'plant' rather than 
'department' or 'shop floor issues'. 
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In this case therefore forma~ agreements over emphasise the 
signiricance of the plant level bargaining. In practice the agreements 
, 
provide the background against which departmental actions and traditions 
are developed. The formal level of bargaining provideu a poor guide 
to the conduct of day-to-day Indusiirial Relations. An analysis of 
informal bargaining over a range of issues reveals bargaining taking 
place at a number of levels • 
. 
In many respects the shop stewards and other union members were 
very parochial and inward looking. This was no doubt emphasised by the 
plant level bargaining. Certainly the members would often only consider 
themselves as part of a department, rather than a plant, let alone 
a major engineering group. 
However many shop stewards were suspicious of the role played 
by the Division in Industrial Relations. Although lacking clear 
cut evidence they suspected some form of covert involvement by 
Divisio~ in plant affairs. They were also aware of the inter-plant 
differentials on pay and terms and conditions. The combination of 
't_ 
these two factors was to encourage inter-plant activity. 
Attitudes within both AP and WL were a confused mixture of 
plant based parochialism and division based inter-plant activity. 
A variety of control systems were used by management when 
seeking their goal of control. ::J:1hese were a mixture of the formal 
and overt structures and the informal covert controls. As a 
conseqnence Division played a much more sigrnficant role in Industrial 
~ 
/' 
Relations than was evident from an examination of management structure 
alone. 
Many of the controls used were to support the bargaining structure. 
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Often these were a direct response to some form of uniOll inter-plant 
activity. There was therefore littleconcious planning or strategy 
behind many of these controls. They were obviously only temporary 
in nature and designed to counter ~he particular inter-plant activity 
of the time. The controls were a result of the thrust and counter-
thrust between m~~gement and unions. 
An awareness of the significance of all the control systems used 
by management leads to one conclusion: that an analysis based upon 
bargaining structure and management structure alone is likely to be 
partial and superficial. This tends to concentrate upon the more 
obvious and visible elements of the management control process. A 
more comprehensive picture of management control is possible by 
conSidering all the control systems employed. 
In some ways an examination of formal structures may under-
estimate the degree of decentralisation, while in other respects 
it may undervalue the centralised control. To an extent therefore 
for some issues one can speak ]f an 'illusioIl Df plant autonomy'. 
In other words on certain issues the plants are not quite as 
autonomous as they appear. Despite this the image of comprehensive 
plant autonomy is emphasised either in an attempt to limit union 
inter-plant activity or for public relations reasons. 
It is evident that ~anagement is in a far more f~exible position 
than the structural picture would suggest. Day-to-day issues are 
settled on the shop floor giving an exaggerated element of de-
/ 
centralisation. Divisional involvement in plant affairs allows a 
degree of centralised control to be exercised. This is therefore 
something of a compromise position and the result of various conflicting 
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pressures placed upon man~gement. 
On the one hand there are demands for a degree of shop floor 
or plant autonomy. While on the other there are pressures for a 
more centralised form of control. The former demands may come from 
both shop stewards and plant managers. While the latter may be a 
consequence of the increasing cost of capital and the need to pool 
s~ecialised resources. 
Tubes presented a confused and ambiguo~s picture of the 
management control process. Some issues are plant based, others 
are department issues, while still others may be subject to 
divisional authority. This may be a flexible compromise position 
for management, but it also encourages inter-plant Union activity. 
Shop ste",rards question which level of management actually has 
authority for the majority of issues. The shop stewards are 
inhibited from pursuing their questioning too far because of a lack 
of support and a preoccupation with plant based issues. These 
obstacles are themselves a result of the plant based bargaining 
structure .-
Having dis8ussed the evidence from Tubes the question to be 
asked is to what extent these observations are unique. Future cases 
will make comparisons with these initial findings in order to answer 
thes8 questions. Contrasts and comparisomwill be made in the same 
three areas as explored here: bargaining in practice; union activity; 
and the management control process. 
CHAPI'ER FI VE : GEC 
This chapier examines an organisation with a highly decentralised 
structure of management and bargaining. Twc plants are studied in 
detail In this group: TC ruld MC. This case study has two specific 
aim.s. First to make a n"'-lIDber of comparisons and contrast s with the 
original observations in Tubes. Second to examine different manag~ment 
and bargaining structures from those of Tubes in order to broaden the 
analysis. It will be demonstrated that although the details of this 
case are very different from those of Tubes many of the same principles 
apply. One difference which is important is that in this case manage-
ment appear to have much greater control over inter-plant activity -
some possible reasons for this are considereQ throughout the analysis. 
The plan of the previous chapter is repeated here. First 
bargaining in practice is examined, followed by an investigation into 
the attempts by management to control this. 
Following the initial examination of bargaining structure 
variations in the conduct of Industrial Relations below the level 
of the plant are studied. It is discovered ~hat in some respects 
the bargaining level actually underestimates the extent of de-
centralisation which exists. However overall the bargaining structure 
is effective in restricting union activity to within the plant.. The 
history of the plants and management style are both important in 
accounting for this. 
Secondly the managerial atte~pts at ,controlling pl~nt bargaining 
are examined. Briefly, these cOiltrol systems are very di~ferent 
from those used in Tubes. The empha~is in t~is case is much more on 
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non-IR control systems. Industrial Relations managemen~ either has 
to work within constraints set by these control systems, or is 
directly influenced by them. 
It will be apparent that management in this case plays relatively 
little attention to Industrial Relations. However despite, or perhaps 
because of this, management control over inter-plant activity is 
greater than in Tubes. Also paradoxically management occupy an 
extreme structural position, but they appear to have greater flexib~lity 
of action than in Tubes. These apparent contradictions are explained 
durin~ the course of the chapt er. 
1 Collective Bargaining in Practice 
This section looks firstly in seme detail at the bargaining 
structure in the two plants (further information is available in 
Chapter Two.) Following this collective bargaining in practice is 
examined. Overall the fragmented an~ informal nature of bargaining 
in both plants is stressed. This is then related to management 
attitudes towards Industrial Relations and union activity. 
" 
As noted previously the vast majority of issues in TC and MC 
are negotiated at, or below the level of the plant. Only pensions 
are settled at group level. 
Bargaining in TC is complicate~ by the fact that_the plant 
/' 
controls a number of factories throughout the country. This research 
concerns only those plants in the Coventry area. There are four 
factories in this area and for annual negotiations on pay and terms 
and conditions they bargain together. This is referred to as 
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'location bargaining'. In other areas Hhere there are a number of 
plants together similar prac-tices have developed. 
Across the Coventry factories there are very few written 
agreements or formal negotiations. Each bargaining un~t, e.g. 
representing foremen in one factor;jT, makes a separate claim and 
agreement with the central Personnel Department. This ~esults in 
considerable duplication. The majority of lssues are bargained over 
informally at factory or department level. For example the existence 
of a primitive: piecework system means that many values are negotiated 
on the shop floor. 
Bargaining in MC takes a very similar form. Although in this 
case there are some formal negotiations covering pay and terms and 
conditions. These resulting agreements affect not only MC, but also 
three other factories which are on the same site. These factories 
belong to other GEC organisations, but their work is totally uncorll~­
ected with MC. However for formal bargaining purposes the site is 
dealt with as a whole. These negotiations are conducted Hith the 
manual unions on a joint basis, and with the Hhite collar unions 
separately. In fact negotiations can take place with small groups 
within each white collar union. 
A similar structure of bargaining exists in both plants: a 
relatively small number of issues negotiated formally at pla~t level, 
with the majority of issuez informally agreed at shop floor or 
departmental level. 
The nature of bargaining in practice will now be explored in 
greater detail. 
It has been noted above that a limited amount of fo~mal 
bargaining on pay and terms and conditions takes place across the 
four Coventry f~ctories of TC. Most commonly this invclves conve~ors 
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(or Senior Staff Representatives) from each of the factories and three 
members from the Personnel Department. Claims are based O~ bargaining 
units below plant level and are separately negotiated. To an extent 
management had little choice but to adopt this structure. In the 
past the factories in the local area tended to make comparisons on 
pay leading to leap-frogging. In order to avoid this as much as 
possible management varied the level of negotiations on issues that 
were being compared to cover all the facto·ries. Inter-factory 
comparison is now much less prevalent. Convenors wish to maintain 
their own'autonomy, and will only make comparisons when it improves 
their factory bargaining position. 
Aside from pay and terms and conditions nearly all other issues 
are negotiated at factory or shop floor level. Two'important issues 
settled below plant level are piecework values and work practices. 
Piecework values are usually negotiated between an individual, or 
small group of employees and the rate fixer. The Personnel Department 
stressed that they had very little involvement in piecework bargaining: 
L 
this was the prerogative of line management. In particular Personnel 
were v~ry reluctant to put piecework disputes into procedure. 
Consequently most piecework prices were settled on the shop floor. 
This of course led to an enormous number of variations in standards 
between' the factories. In fact this inconsistency seemed to be a 
deliberate aim of shop stewards in the factories. 1 They were proud 
of achieving and maintaining inter-factory differentials. There was 
therefore to some degree competition between the factcries to galn 
what factory based improvements they could. These variations in 
-' 
gains seemed to be 'linked with shop steward bargaining expertise and 
1 This may als~ have been a deliberate aim of management to 
focus activity at below the level of the plant. 
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differences in line management at~itudes. 
A similar situation existed with work practices. These were 
often negotiated, or more likely had grown up uver a long period in 
each of the factories. Personnel management were rarely involved in 
negotiations over these lssues, and would in many cases be quite 
unaware of many of them. There was no attempt at standardisation 
across the four factories. In fact given the small size of the 
Personnel Department, and the limited resources given to Industrial 
Relations th~s would probably prove to be an impossible task. All 
Personnel Management can hope to do is to eliminate the ~osser 
anom~lies that exist. 
Many of these differences in custom and practice between the 
factories were not seen as fit subjects for comparison by shop 
stewards. These informal under~tandings and traditions were seen 
to be highly specific to each factory, and aside from basic terms 
and conditions issues stewards adopted a highly parochial point of 
vlew. In many instances the stewards would try to negotiate the 
greatest number of concessions for their own factory, and not be too 
concerned about what was taking place elsewhere. Indeed there was 
often an element of rivalry between the stewards as they attempted 
to maintain existing inter-factory differenti3.ls. This was particularly 
true of the convenors and senior stewards. The hierarchical position 
of these representatives was often in doubt, and this only encourag2d 
their "Competitiveness. It is difficult to say whether this was a 
deliberate policy of 'divide and rule' on the ?art of management. 
Mor~ likely it was simply a consequence of the managerial neglect of 
. ../ 
Industrial Relation~ and the previous history of the factories. 
In the past the four factories were far ~0re isolateQ than they 
new are. One factory has only recently come under TC control. During 
the time before this a wrole range of agreements were negotiated and 
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customs and practice3 developed which were quite independent of the 
other TC factories in Covent~y. Despite c~ming under TC control this 
factory tries to maintain its autonomy and distinctiveness. The 
employees like to think of themselves as a little bit E~parate from 
the other TC factories. Consequently the stewards resolutely defend 
the gains they have made in the past. 
These differentials between factories have been Il!3.intained partly 
because of the lack of contact between employees in the different 
factories. Although there were contacts between managers, there was 
relatively little communication between manual employees. This was 
despite the fact that the factories were only two or three miles apart. 
Management negotiates at plant level only over those issues which 
are subject to parity claims, ln the main pay and terms and conditions 
issues. Almost all other lssues are sett led informally at department 
or-shop floor level. The majority of union activity is concentrated 
at or below the level of the plant. In effect this makes inter-factory 
parity claims very difficult to make, even if there was the desire to 
do so. Management are of course quite happy for this situation to 
continue. This policy is effectively one of non-involvement. Most 
routine problems are dealt with by line management; Personnel are only 
brought in to deal "rith potential disputes. This is 'fire fighting' 
at its most basic, and is a consequence of the emphasis placed upon 
managerial aut onomy and financial performance by GEC. The highly 
derivative role that Personnel plays under this system seems to 
produce very few inter-factory parity claims. One might suggest that 
by giving little attention to Industrial Relations· fewer problems 
emerge than if greater attention is glven. It is almost as if 
having a large Personnel Department actually generates problems. 
This is very much the eituation in MC. Here bargaining takes 
place across a 2ingle site which includes other factories not directly 
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under MC's control apart from Industrial Relation8 matters. As 
previously noted bargaining is slightly more formalised th~~ in TC, 
however the majority of issues are still settled informally at shop 
floor level. Again many of these issues involve piecework barga::'ning 
and work practices. 
If anything the payment system at MC is even more confused and 
complicated than in TC. There are a variety of piecework -systems in 
operation, however cnly a relatively small number of workers are orl 
'active' piecework. The rates of the majority of workers are tied to 
these earnings via their rates. Personnel management is rarely 
involved in the shop floor piecework bargaining, and hence many 
variations exist between the different department s. This inevitably 
allows all kinds of abuses to develop, from bending "the rules to 
outright fiddles. Work practices highly specific to each departrr.ent 
have been developed often without Personnel's knmvledge. These have 
emerged for a number of reasons. 
First the four factories on the site are engaged in very differer-t 
operations. Two produce heavy engineering goods, another electrical 
products, and the fourth is a service organisation. Each of these 
has a very different history and set of present demands, yet they are 
all covered by the same agreements. 
SeCond many of the people employed on the site had different 
backgrounds. Some had recently been ~oved there because of the 
reorganisation following tOhe merger. Others had been employed since 
the war, and had qxperienced several changes of ownership. There was 
a contrast between the individual man3.gement styles of these different 
factories. 
Finally there was little contact between the different factories 
despite being c~ the same site. This vIas partly a functic,11 0: the 
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S1ze of the site (around 180 acres) and also because of the 
different operations carried. out in each factory. Even between 
middle management there were very few contacts between the different 
factories. 
This situation 1.S similar to t:1.at in AP. But in that case 
there was far more of a feeling of being part of a plant rather than 
being a single department. Comparatively speaking Personnel played 
an even smaller role here than in AP. One furthel' contrast vJas 
the desire to 'make inter-plant compar~sons. Stewaro.s in ~IC (as Hell 
as TC) had almost no contacts with other GEC plants. Even thoug~ 
there waS another GEC plant only a mile avJay from Me there ~\Tas no 
contact at all. The stewards had no knowledge of what these other 
GEC employees were earning. Thus in these plants stewards 1tlTere even 
more inward looking than in the Tubes plants. This seems to be 
partly a consequence of the lack of identification with the plant 
and the concentration of union activity at shop floor level .. 
The following section looks at the management control of 
Industrial Relations which has served to create this situation. 
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2 M~nagement Control of Industrial Relations 
Around one hundred and fifty people are employed at Group Head 
Office, and a variety of functions are represented. These inclu~e 
accounting, secretarial, legal, ove~seas, publicity and Personnel. 
There are very few organisation charts, those that did e~ist appeared 
to be for accounting purposes. In fact GEe appears to be the classic 
decentralised organisation with the plants enjoying a considerable 
degree of autonomy, and the group acting as a banker. This coincides 
very much with the professed philosophy of the group. Great stress 
is placed upon individual manageme~t and plant autonomy. 
The small size of the central group management (there are only 
around twenty members) is reflected in the CentrE·.l Personnel 
Organisation. Approximately twelve people are employed \vith three 
Industrial Relations specialists. Overall it appears that very li~tle 
emphasis is put on this function within the group as a whole. For 
example there is no Personnel Director on the main board of GEC. 
This seems to be a consequence of the managerial philosophy whicn 
attempts to eliminate any 'non-essential' members of the organisation. 
Both plants are part of a loosely held together Divisional 
structures. TC has a number of other factories in different parts of' 
the country. Me is at the head of a Division which includes othe~ 
plants which are for most purposes autonomous (there are some t'\.'I]elve 
plants in total). It must be stressed that this is not the kind of 
formal Di visi onal structure as found in Tubes • Although these 1-vE;i"'e 
Divisional boards which met occasionally it will be show~ below that 
they have a mush lower degree of influence than in the p~8vious Case. 
In particular their influence on Industrial. Relations \-jas 
negligible. Although each of these Divisions had a Personnel Directol 
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they were very rarely concerned with plant based matters. Instead 
they adopted the wider role of monitoring Industrial Relations 
developments in their plants. This information would then be fed to 
the Group Managing Director. Occasionally they would become involved 
in a plant dispute, but 4his then only took the form of giving advice. 
In general they had close links with Personnel Managers in the different 
plants, from whom they gained a great deal of informal information. 
Links of this kind rarely influence day-to-day Industrial Relations. 
Certainly from the union viewpoint contacts of this kind were 
virtually' 'invisible.' 
All these links are characteristic of the GEC philosophy of 
extreme decentralisation. In many instances, and for Industrial 
Relations in particular this autonomy is quite genuine. However as 
will be shown be'low plant management had freedom to act, but this t;'ias 
within very tight financial constraint s. As previously noted 1L.Ylion 
activity seems to have been influenced by this. Certainly even in 
comparison with Tubes both manual and white collar activity between 
plants was very limited. This means that management in GEC are less 
concerned about controlling this inter-plant activity. As will be 
shown they require very few of the ad hoc informal controls used by 
Tubes. 
In both plants Personnel playa minor role in the day-to-day 
matters. Their task seems to be confined to annual negotiations and to 
problem solving. Management structure within the plants is de-centralised. 
Within TC for e~ample there are four product gToupings within a single 
plant. These are highly specialised, and operate quite autonomously 
from the other groupings on routine matters. Each has its own 
accounts and fin=mcial controls. Management in these groupings is 
responsible for the development, engineering, manufacture and marketing 
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of its products. A number of functions are provided at plant level 
including Personnel, Trainir-~, Finance, Commerce and Research. 
In MC there is a similarly high degree of decentralisation within 
the plant. In general the line managers have a great c_eal of a1lt onomy 
and are held responsible for the performance of their own department. 
When the management structure of GEC is examined in more detail 
a number of anomalies arise. First not only is centr~l management 
very small but there is an almost complete lack of organisation charts. 
However this does not prevent the centre being in very close contact 
with a number of plant managing directors. Second the Group Managing 
Director has a very strong image and a well publicised philosophy. 
Yet this is a philosophy which stresses delegation of control and 
plant autonomy. Finally although financial control is seen as crucial, 
accounts are published only for the group as a whole and not for 
individual plants. 
These and other anomalies prompted the management control from 
the centre over individual plants to be examined in detail. 
Briefly it is argued that on certain specific occasions group 
management is far more influential than it immediately appears. On 
these occasions management structure under estimates the degree of 
central control. Initially Industrial Relations and Personnel controls 
are examined, although it will be found that these are of only mlnor 
significance. Far more importance"is attached to the role of 
'non-IR' and in particular financial control systems. The development 
of these control systems is demonstrated by reference to the 
historical growth of GEG. 
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La) Industrial Relations Control Systems 
Industrial Relations control systems ln GEe playa mlnor role 
in central control over tta plants. However a number of areas can be 
mentioned: the provision of services; setting of policies; and inter-
vention in disputes. One possible reason for the limited extent of 
these controls is the ve~y restricted amount of inter-plant union 
" .. -. 
activity with which management is confro12ted. Comnared with Tubes 
it seems that the bargaining structure gives greater control over 
union activity. 
First the provision of services within GEC can take a numter of 
forms. The group may provide spectalist advice and technical 
assistance on particular problems. This will also includ8 legal 
advice. Also the group may examine some of the practices within 
individual firms. For example during the research Group Management 
was undertaking a survey of self financing agreements ~sed in the 
plants. 
The' Group also monitors other routine information from the 
plants, for example the impact of chrulges in the National Engineering 
Agreement. Not all information collected will be through such formal 
channels, in addition plant managing directol"8 may comrmmicate 
information between one another. If a major problem arises ccntact 
is likely to take this form. 
The degree of influence that the centre attempte~ to exercise 
over the plants ln this way varied. Often this seemed to be 
connected with the group's estimaticn of the importance of the pla~t, 
and thei~ knowledge of the Managing Director in quest~on. Central 
management are very keen to stress that the plants do not have to get 
permission to do anything, yet they have to keep Group management 
informed. Obviously there is an element of playing with words here. 
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For example the word 'advlce 'can have a variety uf meailings. It is 
often difficult to distinguish between keeping tbe group i~formed and 
getting permissiC'~. In practice the Managing Directors and senior 
managers are not going to do anything that will make them appear in 
a bad light to Group Man~gement. Hence there is an expectation that 
the centre will be consulted" on major decisions, and hence a kind of 
negative permission exists here. For example even GEe Managing 
Directors are aware that they cannot make major changes in the terms 
of employment such as the length of the worKing week. Although the 
plants have the ability to make such changes they realise that even 
in GEe comparisons would be made between plants. 
Second, GEe issues a small number of policies and guidelines. 
Group management expects some vague overall consistency on matters 
such as the reco"gni tionof shop stewards. But as noted above they 
are quite willing to allow many differences in detail to emerge 
between the plants, and in fact may indirectly encourage these. It 
may be that this encouragement strengthens employee identification 
with their own plant. 
Thus there are none of the guidelines of the kind seen pre~no~sly 
In Tubes. This is probably because of the lack of a~ion, particularly 
white collar, compariso~s between plants. As will be shown below the 
constraints for Industrial Relauons management tend to come from 
other sources. The very tight financial controls mean that plant 
management have to do everything possible to reduce costs. Gui_delines 
are therefore indirectly set, because any sudden increase in TtJage 
costs would be monitored and then in~estigated by Group management. 
/' 
Therefore plant management in this case are not at all concerned 
about small increases in nOli-salary items as management are in Tubes. 
However the stringency of financial control systems me&~s that a 
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phoney product i vi ty deal such as is permissible in Tubes J_S out of 
the question in GEC. 
Thirdly there lS Group management intervention in plant disputes. 
In theory at least the plants were supposed to report every dis!'lute 
that occurs to Group management. Obviously not all disputes are 
serious enough to be reported, but the main ones are probably recorded. 
Each week the Industrial Relations specialists at Grou~ level compiles 
an 'Industrial Relations Inaction Report.' This summarises the positions 
of various disputes within GEC. Often these will be discussed in 
detail by Group management. The plant managing Directors may be 
contacted to explain the situation in greater detail. If the dispute 
persists, or is felt to be serious then a meeting may be called 
involving Group and plant management, either at head office or in the 
plant. An example of this took place during the research, but as with 
most of these meetings there was little tangible result. 
In general control systems of this kind were far :ess influential 
and direct compared with Tubes. This seems to be a result of the 
largely plant based union activity which is itself a consequence of 
adherence to plant (or below plant) level bargaining. GEC does not 
have to use strict guidelines of the kind seen in Tubes to supplement 
the control given by the bargaining structure. The control systems 
that it does use only tend to reinforce the image of plant autonomy. 
(b) Personnel Control Systems 
There are two types of Personnel ·control systems to be examined: 
the central employment of senior managers; and the attach!"nent to a 
recognisable managerial phil~sophy. 
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Some three hundred Directors and senior managers are employed 
direc~ly by the Group, and nut by the individual plants. Senior 
management suggested that it was very unlikely that any of the plant 
Managing Directors would not be within this number. Many of th8 
more senior Directors have been har~d picked by the Group Managing 
Director. Often they will be in close personal cont act \vi th him. 
Apart from cont act s such as these there 9-re very few of the 
functional control systems of the kind noted in Tu.bes. There was 
very little central direction of management. Graduates would be 
encouraged to move in a particular direction, especially the technical 
specialists, but there was not the career development programme of 
the kind used by Tubes. Contacts between managers in different 
plants were very unsystematic: often they were based simply on 
friendship or common interest. 
There is one area of group influence affecting individuals 
which is stronger in GEC than in Tubes. This concerns management 
philosophy. As will become evident later GEG resembles Ford in that 
it has an easily identifiable and clear cut philosophy. Almost every 
manager interviewed was not only aware of this but adhered to it 
strongly. Plant(management not only preached individual autonomy 
but practiced it as well. 
This adherence to individual autonomy had quite severe 
implications for Personnel Management. Line managers were encouraged 
to solve their own problems if they could, and they would certainly 
be judged by the performance of their own departments. Often the 
interests of line and Personnel Management would clash. Personnel 
would be seeking consistency and attending to long run bargaining 
relationships. While line managers may be more concerneJ with 
sol ving immediate problems. Lirle management's wishes invariably c~e 
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first in these situations because .they were being judged on whether 
certain targets were being met. This philosophy of individual 
accountability therefore seriously weakens the role of Personnel 
Management in the plants. 
Apart from this strong management philosophy noted above, 
Industrial Relations and Personnel control systems are generally much 
weaker in GEC than they are in Tubes. However as is shown immediately 
below central control in GEC is far more indirect. The section 
below considers firstly why these controls have developed, and 
secondly how they are used at present. It will become clear that 
in GEC Industrial Relations is derived from other management control 
systems far more than in any of the other cases. 
(c) 'Non-IR'Control Systems 
Non-Industrial Relations control systems are far more dominant 
in GEC than in Tubes. In particular central control is examined 
through a series of financial mechanisms which strictly monitor 
plant performance. Before looking at these control systems in detail 
./ 
it 1S of interest to examine how these have developed. 
The present GEC group was formed between 1967-68 when the 
original GEC group took over AEI and then merged with English Electric. 
The8e three groups operated in the same industry and often produced 
similar products. The a1m of founding the Group was to eliminate 
much of the duplication and over capacity within the industry by 
rationalisation. This was one of a number of mergers which took 
place at the time organised and prompted by the Industrial Reorgan-
isation Corporation. This was a government body set up to encourage 
mergers of this type and to improve productivity in British industry-
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Each of the original groups was very different in its own way. 
AEI was itself a consequence of mergers between Metro-Vicke~s and 
British Thompson IIouston. AEI was seen as something of an ailing 
giant with a high reputation in the industry but poor financial 
performance. English-Electric concentrated upon the 'heavy end' nf 
the industry. It was by far the largest company but had begun to 
stagnate by the early 1960's. GEe was very different. Much the 
smallest group, it had grown mostly from within. Unlike AEI and F:r; 
it had enjoyed a spectacular period of ·growth in the late 50s and 
early 60s" 
The three groups which came together in 1968 to form GEe had 
completely different backgrounds, cultures and structures. However 
it was the original GEe structure and philosop~y which remained 
unscathed. Both AEI and EE were reorganised, indeed the whole group 
underwent a period of severe rationalisation. Meny of the control 
systems used to carry out this rationalisation are still in use today. 
,The scale of the rationalisation programme can be Tecognised by 
the changes in numbers employed. When GEe was formed the three groups 
employed some 268,000. Present figures indicate that GEe now employs 
191,000 of which 155,000 are in the U.K. In the three and a half 
years following 1968 a total of thirty two factories were closed, and 
sixteen'were sold or were in the process of closure. During this 
period some 33,500 people were made redundant, and in total 60,000 were 
affected by moving or changing jobs. In fact during this period the 
labour force fel'l by 6.5% while sales rose by 15%. 1 
Rationalisation also involved moving people about as well. In 
fact the general policy was to move people to where there was spare 
capacity or under utilised plant. This was seen at Me where three 
1 Sunday Times 11 July 1971 
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sub-divisions of other plants were moved onto the Me sJ..·ve. Management 
and w.orkers were moved about as factories were shut and duplication 
eliminated. 
It is evident from thd scale cf the rationalisation. programme 
that 80me form of central control and direction was used. Unless 
an overall picture of the newly formed organlsatioll was seen then 
the movement of labour and resources on such a large scale could not 
have been possible. However the redundan8ies were so widespread that 
the centre could only indicate the broad areas and ruugh numbers that 
had to be 'lost'. Responsibility fnr the detailed planning was 
handed down to a small number of directors. These were put in 8harge 
of the major operating plants, and loose divisions 'of secondary plantE 
were put under theil' control. Group management exe:r-cise'd Jetailed 
control over plant redundancies through these directors. Each of 
the directors was given considerable :reedom to run their plants in 
the way they chose, as long as they met the targets vJhich had been 
set for them. One of these directors was quoted in an article in 
19711: 'I am decentralised from stanhope Gate (Group Head Office), 
but there is very little decentralisation below me.' The director 
had close control over the plants : 'I had to control them in order 
to get the rationalisation done.' 
2 . 
Another ar~icle in 1970 saw the 
role of these directors in a similar way. 'The directors func~ion as 
arms of head office, keeping their fingers on conveniently related bitE 
of business and relieving the Group Managing Director ilimself of a 
welter of detail.' These directors used very small staffs and relied 
mostly on personal contacts. 
1 Sunday Times 4 July 1971 
2 Management Today 1970:72 
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This rationalisation prograwne involved a very high level of 
central direction, with auto~omy delegated down as far as the pl~~t 
directors and no further. This pattern of control is still very much 
in evidence today. Although the main phase of redundal-:':;y is no~·~ 
complete the financial performance of each business is still under 
very close scrutiny. For example if a plant be~ins to make losses 
this will soon come to the attention of Group managemc:;:lt. Further 
information will then be sought from the plant director~ Based upon 
an analysis of:present and past performance and future prospects a 
decision will be made as to whether the plant sbould continue in 
operation. In some cases this may lead to an increase in investment, 
in others plant closure. Examples of the latter still occur 
occasionally. 1 
These occasional examples of 'control over rationalisation' 
display the control process which is continually in operation. Gr~up 
management, and in particular the Group Managing Direc~or are in 
constant contact with the plant Managing Directors. This is on a 
highly informal and personal basis, and is almost impossible to 
penetrate from the outside. Many of the Directors are known 
personally to the Group Managing Director and often subscribe to his 
management philosophy. It was suggested that the Group Managing 
Director personally chooses his Plant Directors, and takes the 
utmost care in doing so: for it is through these Directors that the 
business as a whole is controlleCl_. If these directors follow tlle 
group philosophy they are likely to demand and achieve a high degree 
of fresdom to act as they see fit. However it is they who are personally 
// 
accountable for the performance of their plants and will do everything 
they can to improve financial results. It is possible to see these 
1 Financial Times 11 March 1978 
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Directors as the 'barons' with considerable power over their own 
property, but directly answe~able to the 'king', the Group Managing 
Director. The philosophy of delegated responsibility can now be seen 
in its true light. It is ln fact a 'curious mixture of tight ar-d 
loose control' and 'A GEC manager is almost infinitely free to do 
1 
well, and not at all free to do badly.' 
The control process in GEC is now evident. Esselitially very few 
people are involved. There is almost a complete absence of structure, 
and individual:managers and directors are held personally accountable. 
It seems that GEC is a massive group run like a small business. The 
Group Managing Director has close contacts and good relationships 
with his Plant Managing Directors. He will not interfere unless they 
get into trouble, but if he does they will be held personally responsible. 
The Plant Directors are given the task of running their organisations 
as efficiently as possible and to have all the relevant informatio~ 
immediately available. The absence of Divisional Boards, as seen in 
Tubes, allows a highly personalise~ informal, but nevertheless strong 
method of control to be exercised. The small number of people involved 
means that decisions can be made quickly, and it is very difficult to 
shift responsibility. Unlike Tubes with its complex series of 
structures and Committees, GEC is r~~ like a small business. When 
asked whether his business methods had changed from the time when GEC 
was a much smaller organisation the Group Managing Director replied 
that it had not: 'I am still dealing direct with people who run the 
2 businesses. The main difference is that I have a lot more help now.' 
This seems to be the key to the GEC control process. The separate 
,/ 
identity of each plant has been maintained by the decentralisation of 
control, but alongside this a number of highly centralised control 
1 
2 
Sunday Times 
Sunday Times 
18 July 1971 
18 July 1971 
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systems are also used. An insight into the managerial pnilosophy can 
De gained from this statement by the Group Managing Director1 'I 
depend very much on the generals in the field, ~ut they look to me 
for certain things - I shoQld let them know what battles they are 
fighting. I should give them a sight of the enemy, provide them tvith 
reconnaisance repo:rts of where they are likely to run into trouble. 
They also want more troops and more money, and they expect me to 
supply that too.' 
The traditional argument employed to defend the decentralised 
structure is built around the divercification of products. However 
as has been shown this plant autonomy can be illusory on certaiD 
occasions. Moreover the managerial philosophy is sufficiently strong 
to justify the rati'Jnalisation programme. By and large the unions 
have accepted this justification. More often than not when faced with 
crude displays of central control they will try and negotiate the best 
terms they can, rather than oppose redundancy outright. This was ~Tell 
demonstrated at Woolwich where some 5,500 were made redundalit. The 
unions were completely unable to organise opposition on a group wide 
basis. The Personnel Director at the time was quoted as saying that 
'It is my impression that brotherly love does not extend far beyond 
2 the factory gates.' The unions simply negotlated then generous 
redundancy terms. It appears that even in an extreme ca3e sueD as 
this the unions are unable to oppose central control, they remain 
securely attached to the plant. 
Group management is able to exe.!'cise considerable influence o~ 
plants via its control of investment funds, a control system which is 
publicly acknowledged. This control system is used ln cOillbination 
with those outlined above. 
1 Counter Information Services 1973:17 
2 Sunday Times 11 July 1971 
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Each year the plant~ have to submit a budget for the coming 
years ' expenditure. Usually this takes place early in the year before 
the annual accounts are published in March. This is apparently 
something of a grilling session for the individual plant managing 
directors. Group management go through each proposed budget in great 
detail. The ~im is ~o question many of the assumptions which are 
made in support of the budgets. Also comparisons are made witL ths 
previous years budget and the results actually achieved. If any of 
the proposals appear to be abnormal or und~ly optimistic then the 
plant directors are closely questioned. The basis of the plant oudgets 
take the form of a number of financial ratios which are collected 
by the centre throughout the year. In most circumstances when 
everything appears normal ar..d performance is deemed· satisfactory the!J. 
the budget. will be approved. Occasionally a pl&~fs perform~Dce is 
unacceptable, and if the reasons given for this are judged inadequate 
then further action may be taken. As seen above this could result 
in management changes, redundancies or even closure. 
This method of control via investment allocation is very similar 
to that used in Tubes. The main difference here is the formalised, 
almost ritualistic method of approving budgets. Within Tubes far 
less weight was atto,ched to simple financial statistics, v-Ti th a more 
long run perspective being adopted. Hmvever in both cases the same 
principle of group or division rationing investment funds to stimulate 
present plant performance was seen. 
Within T"'J.bes the exercise of this control ~'Jas one of the maln 
reasons for the combine activity. Despite even greater use made of 
this control system in GEe there was no compara,ble response from the 
unions. This is probably -oecause GEes invo:l.vement was far less 
'visible' than that in Tubes. When GEe does intervene it is on a 
maSSlve scale which is explained a\"lay as the continuation of the 
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rationalisation programme. One further similarity between the two cases 
involves the distribution of investment between home and overseas. At 
the moment GEe like Tubes lS investing'vast sum~ abroad because of the 
'lack ,of opportunity' in tbis country. This is contributing to the 
declin:i.ng manpower employed in GEe. Trade unions are virtually powerless 
against the exercise of control on such a scale. Yet decisions such 
as these vitally determine the constraints within which they work • 
. ~ :..; ..: 
The control over investment funds referred to above is backed 
up by regular information from the plants on financial matters. 
Although similar examples existed within Tubes the control system 
in GEG is more systematic. Great store is put by this financial data. 
The aim is to regularly monitor plant performance so that any deviation 
from expected performance is quickly noticed. It is likely that one 
or two months poor results would be allowed, but any longer then 
this may lead to investigation from the centre. 
1 Six financial ratios are included in each months plant report. 
These are: sales to capital; profit to sales; profit to employees; 
'\ 
sales to stock; sales to Debtors; and sales to employees. These are 
compared with the previous year and with the projected budget. Sales 
and profits are taken as to two crucial results, with sales to 
employees taken as a measure of productivity_ These ratios form part 
of an almost continuous flow of information from the plants to the 
centre. Not all the figures are challenged, only the anomalous 
res11.1 ts are usually investigated. In this way the centre is 
managing by exception. 
The implications for Personnel illanagement in the plant of this 
kind of financial control are not difficult to see. Because of GEes 
acknowledged policy of eliminating 'non-productive' functi~ns Personnel 
1 Sunday Times 18 July 1971 
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may be under almost continuous pressure to justify their existence. 
The problem here is that the contribution of Personnel cannot be 
measured in quantitative terms, it is usually more qualitative. 
Gains made by Personnel may be .in intangible areas such as improved 
bargaining relaticnship. Personnel may attempt to demonstrate its 
activi ty in a more tangible form, for instance by the greater use of 
pro?edures and external conferences. 
. ~""". 
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3 Conclusion 
This concluding section has a number of ai~s. First to briefly 
recall the major characte~istics of GEC. Second to use this material 
to make comparisons with Tubes. Finally to consider some of the 
factors which may account for the effectiveness of management control 
over inter-plant activity in this case. 
Plant bargaining in GEC is highly informal and fragmented with 
few formal agreements. The majority of union activity was based at 
or below plant level. Personnel generally plays a minor role in 
routine Industrial Relations: their role is confined mostly to problem 
solving and negotiations at plant level. In general it is line 
management who are responsible for day-to-day matters, this gives 
considerable flexibility, but also pr0motes inconsistencies within 
the plant. 
An analysis based upon the level of informal bargaining in GEC 
therefore seriously underestimates the extent of shop floor and 
departmental bargaining. 
Management structure in GEC is also highly decentralised. Plant 
Managing Directors and individual managers have a great deal of 
freedom to run their plants in the way they see fit. However they 
have to work within a serious of severe financial constraints set by 
Head Office. Also Head Office made investment decisions for the 
plants. This system developed following the merger which formed the 
present organisation and has continued through to the present. 
Therefore it is evident that the management structure gives a 
very poor indicat~ion of the amount of central control that can be 
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exercised when required. It is as if central control is exercised 
through a highly decentralised structure of management. 
When compared to Tubes management control of Industrial Relations 
in this case takes a very different form. Much greater emphasis here 
16 placEd upon 'non-IR' control systems. These 00nstrain and set 
the limits within which Industrial Relations operates. These may 
directly influence Industrial Relations eg. a decision to make people 
redundant. At: other times the effect will be indirect, for example 
when a new product is developed changes in technology may be involved. 
Hence Industrial Relations management may be implementing decisions 
and working within constraints which they had no part in making. 
This relative weakness of Personnel can be related to the 
management philosophy within GEe. Management in this case, unlike 
Tubes, did not formally acknowledge the importance of Industrial 
Relations. Management policy for Industrial Relations in GEe was to 
have no set policy. For the purposes of this study this approach is 
important because of the unimportance attached to Industrial Relations. 
One conse~ence of this policy is that unions are preoccupied with 
plant or below plant level matters, and have little thought or 
opportunity to engage ~n inter-plant activity. It is difficult to 
, . 
say whether it is the low level of union activity which allows this 
policy to continue or that management policy results in this low level 
of activity. 
GEe provides an excellent example of the narrowness of an 
analytical approach based solely on bargaining level. Such an approach 
would ignore the high degree of informal shop floor bargaining, and 
the occasional bursts of central control. In fact GEe seems to 
exhibit some extremes of management control. The vast majority of 
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issues are settled at shop floor level. However there ~re isolated 
examples of highly centralised control.. This paradoxically suggests 
that because management in the plants 'have a high degree of freedom 
then some highly centrali~~d autho~ity is required to regulate their 
activities in the long run. 
This contradiction can be explained by vursuing the logic of the 
policy of decentralisation. Each manager is responsible and 
accoUntable for those activities under his control. It therefore 
follows that the higher up the hierarchy a manager is the greater is 
this responsibility arid accountability. Therefore the plant managerial 
directors exercise a good deal of control over their subordinate 
managers. These managers will be held responsible for the performance 
of their own departments. The plant managing directors in turn are 
accountable to the centre in terms of financial performance. Group 
management therefore controls the plants via the plant managing 
directors. Below this level the subordinate managers t-Jill be 
individually accountable even though in reality they have only limited 
freedom to operate. There is litt~e delegation of authority below the 
plant managing directors, although accountability reaches to the most 
junior levels of management. 
A number of other comparisons can be made between Tubes and GEe. 
In particular it appears that the latter case has a greater range of 
options open when solving problems. These can be dealt with either 
at shop floor level, or a group management level. This produces a 
much greater degree of flexibility for management than exists in 
T~bes. This is a useful resource for management;' since it allows the 
implications of any issue to be assessed and the correct approach 
taken to deal with it. Mrolagement in Tubes do not possess anything 
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like this degree of flexibilil,.j. This is either because they are 
constrained by the formal COli 1. r'vl systems employed, or because they 
fear their actions will be challenged by union activity. In GEG 
despite the greater degree of' flex:l bili ty this threat from union 
activity is present to nowhert' near the same extent. A number of 
possi ble reasons can be put ftJ t'Ward to explain this paradox. 
Shop" stewards are preocultvied with plant based problems, they 
have"little opportunity to ellrJ;:tge in outside activity. Also they 
are convinced that for the rna.jori ty of issues plant management actually 
are autonomous. Those issues which they realise the centre controls, 
such as investment, they feel are completely outside their influence. 
This contrasts with the situation In the Tubes plants. The formal 
level of plant bargaining highlights inter-plant differentials. 
This has made easier the int~l'-plant comparisons which have been 
encouraged by a progressi ve ct.~lltralisation of management._...cantrol. 
Unlike.j the GEG case plant ste\'Jn.rds are not convinced o£' plant 
management's autonomy and are quite prepared to challenge this. 
The key to this appears tu be the nature of the control system 
in the two cases. In GEG the plants are formally decentralised, yet 
. work within highly informal ct.'ntral constraints. While in Tubes 
there are formal controls at ~tvisional level. Thus for the majority 
of issues unions in GEG feel That the plant is autonomous. In Tubes 
they feel that some control s),';:,;tems are exercised at plant level, 
while others exist at Di visi 2.:;;.\1 18vel. This leads to stewards to 
doubt the authority of plant :."':t.nagement. 
In GEG this image of pl~:i autonomy is continually reinforced 
by an easily identified mana,§0'1"ial philosophy. " This ~ot only 
. . 
stresses the autonomy of pl~~~, but puts forward a series of reasons 
for this state of affairs. F'~~ example the philosophy insists that 
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plant autonomy is essenti~l to stimulate productivity and because 
of the wide range of products. In Tubes the managerial philosophy 
is much v;eaker. It does not provide a continual justification for 
management's authority. Fewer references are made to the external 
determinants such as product market to explain away the existing 
structure. This lack of a strong philosophy serves only to encourage 
rather than restrain union inter~plant activity. 
Management in GEC therefore have greater control over inter-
plant activity despite, or perhaps because of, devoting few 
resources to Industrial Relations, and having no recognised philosophy_ 
This appears to be because shop stewards in the plant have little 
desire to challenge plant m&~agement authority, and·are in any case 
preoccupied with the problems generated by a fragmented and informal 
bargaining structure. 
CHAPI'ER SIX ROLLS 
This chapter describes and analyses Industrial Relations in 
Rolls, an organisation with plant level bargaining. As in the previous 
case comparisons are mad~ in detail with the original Tubes hypotheses. 
A number of similarities are immediately evident. Rolls resembles 
Tubes far more than GEC does as regards the extent of management 
intervention from outside the plant on Industrial Relations matters. 
'The main difference being here that in 'Rolls it is Group Management 
rather than Division which is intervening. Rolls also demonstrates 
very well the importance of union inter-plant activity of the kind 
first seen in Tubes. For a variety of reasons which will be discussed 
below this activity (or 'read across' as it is known in Rolls) is a 
. 
major lssue. Perhaps because of the extent of this activity Rolls 
display8 a variety of control systems found In sBveral other 
organisations. Again although differences in detail exist, many of 
the original Tubes hypotheses are supported in this case. 
In order to maintain the comparability of analysis the plan used 
in preceding chapters is employed here. First bargaining in practice 
is examined, and comparisons made with Tubes. Second the control 
systems'that management employ to regulate this bargaining are 
examined. Comparisons are also made between the effectiveness of 
management control over union inter-plant activity. Suggestio~s are 
. , 
made to explain why both Tubes and Rolls have only a low degree of 
effective control. 
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1 Collective Bargaining in Practice 
The stated policy of the Group is to have plant level bargaining. 
For the majority of employees and ;.ssues this is the case. However 
for certain specific units of employees e.g. nurses, bargaining is at 
group level, along with pensions for all employees. 
In most plant s the p-:anual unions bargain together and the tv-hit e 
.collar unio~hs sep~rately. In theory there are a total of forty 
bargaining units, however this is not the case. Plants which are in 
the same geographical locality tend to negotiate together in a 
similar way to the 'location bargaining' seen, in GEG. For exaw-ple 
there are three plants in the Derby area and these have a co~~on 
agreement. In practice therefore Rolls has around twenty 8ight 
separate bargaining units. This fragmentation of bargaining takes 
place against a background of highly integrated financial 2nd 
production control systemcl. 
As previously noted there are three plants in what is known as 
the Derby bargaining area. One of these is uy far the largest 
employing 9,000 out of the 10,700 man~al workers on the three sites. 
Bargaining is highly formalised at Derby. There lS a formal Works 
Committee made up of twenty three representatives from all the sites, 
and in total there are over three hundred shop stewards. The 
agreements' are very comprehensive and detailed. In fact the .current 
manual agreement runs to over one ~undred and fifty p&ges. 
The staff uniors bargain separately ovei-' salaries, but ASTMS 
and APEX have close links. TASS mak~s a deliberate policy of 
staying separate. On matters aside from pay there is a Joint Staff 
Union Committee. This deals with issues such as discipll~~, holidays, 
expenses and sick pay. Despite this co-operation there is often 
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considerable tension between the staff ~~ions. There is also a 
whole range of other Committees at Derby including the Joi~t 
Consultative Committee, the Employee Relations Committee and a JPC & A. 
The second plant st~died, Leavesden also has highly formalised 
plant bargaining. Negotiations with manual unions are joint, although 
they tend to be dominated by the AUEW. Staff unions bargain separately 
over salaries, with often an element of conflict between them. There 
is some joint staff bargaining over holidays, hours of work and sick 
pay. Agreements tend to be very detailed and comprehensive. Again 
there is a range of committees including the Gvertime, Manpower and 
Sub-Contracting sub-committees. 
Bargaining "in Rolls can be more fully understood by looking 
outside of the formal bargaining structures. Two aspects in particular 
can be studied: the differentials between plant and the bargaining 
in practice below plant level. 
Perhaps one of the most noticeable points concerning bargaining 
1n Rolls concerned inter-plant differentials. For manual workers pay 
there are a total of seven separate bargaining units. Despite the 
fact that each unit bargains separatsly there are not seven different 
rates of pay. Five of the units have around the same level of pay 
(including Derby) and the" other two have aGother, and much higher 
level of pay (including Leavesden). These differences are partly a 
conse4~ence of historical reasons, ~~d partly a consequence of present 
day Group interference in plant bargaining. 
The two plants presently at the top of the pay league have 
traditionally occupied this position. Both are in what c~n be regarQed 
as high paying areas, and it is these local comparisons which have 
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been used as the basis for pay lncreases. Also until a~ound twelve 
years ago these two plants were not part of the present Rolls 
organisation. Since that time shop stewards in these two plants 
have deliberately sought ~o maintain the differentials which existed 
at thp time of the merger. 
Management have tacitly recognised that these differentials 
could not be eliminated. They have instead concentrated on removing 
the much smaller differentials that existed between the other five 
bargaining units. So the attempt has been to isolate the two high 
paying plants, and to bring the others into some rough alignment. As 
will be shown below this pattern of differentials has been aimed at 
reducing the potential for 'read across' and has been achieved via 
Group Co-ordination. of plant bargaining. 
For other issues e.g. sick pay, a different pattern of 
differentials emerges. In this case Derby and Leavesden are at the 
top of the league, while all the other plants have a similar but 
(' 
lower entitlement. Other issues produce different patterns. With 
white collar employees there has not been the same degree of Group 
co-ordination. This may be because differentials are not seen as so 
important, or simply because it is more difficult to make comparisons 
between white collar jobs. 
Any description of bargaining in practice in Rolls must take 
account of the context. All the Rolls plants have an integrated 
production system. Second there is a marked separation between 
production and engineering departmer.ts. Finally there are variations 
which exist between different factories on the same s~te. 
The large research and development departments in Rolls are a 
consequence of two factors. First the nature of the product means 
that to be competitive Rolls ffiUSt be at the forefront of technology. 
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Second Rolls has a !tradition of excellence' which it does its utmost 
to preserve. The effect of this on employment figures is marked: in 
Derby there are around 11,000 manual workers, and approximately 8,500 
staff. 
The Production and Engineering Departments in Derby are kept 
very separate. They are physically separate and the factories them-
selves appear very different. Production is located in the original 
buildings which are almost seventy years old, while Engineering has 
recently buil~' office blocks. Most of the white collar staff work 
in the Engineering department, and their problems are quite different 
from those of the largely manual (albeit mostly skilled manual) 
Production department. Yet despite this they both operate under the 
same set of agreements. 
There are also differences in management attitude towards 
Industrial Relations. Many of the line managers in manufacturing 
have had long experience in dealing with shop stewards, and may well 
have been on the shop floor themselves. They therefore tend towards 
a conciliatory and flexible approach when dealing with shop stewards. 
Management in Engineering may not have this kind of experience, and 
in any case have to deal with quite different types of union 
representatives. These managers tend to see things in rather 'black 
. . 
and white' terms, giving little consideration to any compromlses 
that may be available. This lack of experience, or lack of concern, 
can lead to more conflictual rel~tioLships with the mGllual workforce. 
This division is in some ways exacerbated by the management 
struct~e at Derby. As will be sho\~ Personnel Officers are assigned 
/' 
to particular line managers. Despite this the line managers have 
considerable freedom to act, resulting in many inconsist2ncies within 
the plant bargaining unit. This is encouraged by the lack of 'day-to-
day contact between management on the different sites. 
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Differences also exist between the main site and t~9 two smaller 
aites which make up the Derby bargaining area. Both of these sites 
are around twenty five miles from the 'main site, one employs 1,100 
and the other 1,500. The smaller nf these two, Mountsorrell was 
visited. As far as this site is concerned bargaining is centralised 
on the main site. Despite this a good deal of barbaining takes place 
on this site, to suit iseues and conditions which are unique to it. 
Although management have a good deal of contact with Derby the 
majority of employees do not. There 1S a feeling of separation, 
and some resentment at being party to the Derby agreements. This 
occasionally results in industrial action being taken in Mountsorrell 
independently. In fact one union (TASS) insisted upon making its own 
agreements separate (but identical) from those in Derby. In summary 
there are many strains with a large bargaining unit such as the Derby 
bargaining area. 
Another point COnCer!lS the reasons why Mountsorrell is part of 
r 
the Derby agreements at all. The answer is based on geography. 
Mountsorrell is approximately equidistant from coth Derby and Coventry. 
Earnings in Coventry are much higher than those in Derby. In an 
attempt to prevent comparisons being made with Coventry Mountsorrell 
has been placed in the Derby bargaining area. This is not only 
because of the effect that Coventry comparisons could have upon 
Mountsorrell rates, but also because of the 'knock on' effects. If 
rates at Mountsorrell were raised to the Coventry level, shop stewards 
at Derby may then begin to make comparisons with the Mountsorrell rates. 
Management have deliberately includ8d Mountsorrell in Derby bargaining 
because of the comparisons that could potentially take place. This 
appears to be quite successful since employees at Mount~orrell see 
themselves as very separate from Coventry, although they may not 
identify with Derby. 
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A similar example of management shaping the bargaining structure 
for its own purposes exists in Derby. One factory in the area (referred 
to as RR & A ) hEu3 recently been excluded from the Derby bargaining 
unit. This plant is engaged in a quite different higher paying 
industry to the other Rolls plants. Following a recent successful 
Fair Wages claim RR &, A was "removed from the Derby unit to try and 
discourage comparisons from taking place. So far this m~~oeuvre seems 
, 
to have been quite successful. These are therefore two examples of 
management altering the bargaining structu.ce in an attempt to 
prevent comparisons from being made, both so far successful. 
Collective Bargaining in Leavesden takes a somewhat different 
form. The majority of the 3,200 employees work Qn ene main site, 
although there is another geographically separate plant some miles 
away within the same bargaining unit. Unlike Derby bargaining here 
is somewhat fragmented. This is largely a consequence of divisions 
within the union side. There is a good deal of ill-feeling between 
both manual and white collar unions for reasons I was not able to 
discover. 
These divisions are however encouraged by the small Slze of 
the Personnel Department at Leavesden. Since only three people are 
employed it is virtually impossible for them to be involved in routine 
affairs. This small size may be something of a reaction against a 
prev~ous outbreak of 'effipire building' which resulted in a dramatic 
expansion in the· size of the personnel department. 
Shop stewards and staff representatives within Leavesden are 
generally very inward luoking. There are two main reasons for this 
attitude. 
First in the past fifteen years Leavesden has experienced three 
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changes of ownership. Also there is the feeling amongst employees 
that the plant is continuall~r under threat of closure. It was 
suggested that the plant was only kept open because it possessed an 
airfield which was useful to Rolls. As a consequence of this there 
is a very low level of attachment to Rolls. Unlike the other plants, 
particularly Derby, the employees did not identify with the history 
and tradition of the organisation. Some people still consider 
themselves to be employees of the original owners of the plant, de 
Havilland. This feeling of separation is also encouraged by the fact 
that Leavesden manufactures a slightly different product from those 
in other Rolls plants. In the past this meant that Leavesden had its 
own Board of Directors. However this was disbanded in a reorganisation 
some three years ago. 
Second the parochial attitudes are also designed to protect plant 
employees interests. As previously noted pay and conditions in 
Leavesden are amongst the best in Rolls. Shop stewards are not going 
to make comparisons with other plants that will put this position in 
danger. They will co-operate with the Combine, but they will not push 
for group level bargaining because they have nothing to gain from such 
an arrangement. The shop stewards are proud of their positions at the 
top of the league apd will not do anything which will narrow inter-
plant differentials. There is little point in making inter-plant 
comparisons at Leavesden because they have little to gain and 
everything to lose. 
Existing inter-plant differentials therefore act as an effective 
obstacle to combine activity. There is one further barrier to s~ch 
/ 
activity which is very noticeable in Rolls. There is a good deal of 
ill feeling between the plants for largely historical reasons. 
Because Derby was the original plant it is often. criticised for 
taking an elitist and independent attitude. This is also reinforced 
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by the fact that Derby as the main assembly area is the site which 
everyone associates with Rolls. The convenor at Derby is also 
criticised for his non-militant attitudes which contrasts markedly 
with attitudes taken ln seme other Rolls plants. The convenor at 
Derby is personally disliked by some of the convenors in other plants. 
The result of this friction is that there is reluctance to 
engage in Combine activities. Or, if combine meetings are arranged 
-. 
they may take place without the Derby representatives attending. 
Even when an issue emerges which affects all the plants, such as a 
lock out, it is very difficult to get any concerted action. This 
is not of course to say that inter-plant activity does not take 
place. But much of the activity which does take place lacks direction 
and co-ordination. 
Inter-plant differentials exist in Rolls for largely historical 
reasons. However these same differentials and problems of organisation 
create divisions between the various plants. This is something which 
management recognise and will entrench whenever they get the opportunity 
However this is not simply a policy of divide and rule by management, 
for the tactics involved are far more subtle. Management aims to 
maintain a balance between centralised control and plant autonomy. 
It will pursue divisive policies only to the extent that they do not 
harm overall control. For these reasons Rolls gives perhaps the bsst 
demonstration of Group co-ordination of all the cases. It uses a 
wide range of control sy3tems which permit centralised control and 
variations between plants as a matter of deliberate policy. Rolls 
seem to have been forced into this Gompromise position because it 
faces co~flicting pressures. The nature of the prod~ct demands 
centralised control yet there are obstacles to group level bargaining. 
The main difference between Rolls and Tubes ~s that the former 
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openly acknowledges the need for some form of co-ordination whereas 
the la-tt er does not. 
The varioll.s control systems used by management in Rolls are 
analyned below. On the whole it is evident that plant bargaining 
exists alongside centralised control over non-IR Personnel and 
Industrial Relations matters. 
-,","--
. / 
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2 Management Control of Industrial Relations 
This section looks at the control systems used by management to 
achieve control over Indu~trial Relations. As in Tubes the bargaining 
structure does not eliminate union inter-plant activity. Consequently 
management use a series of control systems wl1ich support and supplement 
the bargaining structure. Once the management structure has been 
described, the Industrial Relations, Personnel and 'non-IR' controls 
are then examined in detail. 
Although both Rolls and Tubes have a divisional structure the 
former is very different to the latter. The main contrast is the 
number of divisions. Whereas Tubes was made up of many divisions based 
on product Rolls has only two. One of these, the Aero Engine Division, 
1S by far the largest accounting for some 90% of employees (52,000) 
and 85% of group sales. ~he second Division (Industrial and Marine 
Division) has only one plant at Ansty near Coventry. In the larger 
Division·there are ten different plants. 
One further contrast is between the degree of plant integration. 
Whereas there is limited integration in Tubes there is a highly 
integrated system of production in Rolls. MOot of the plants produce 
components which are then assembled in' three major centres. Figures 
given by the company suggest that a relatively small number of people 
are actually engaged in the final assembly of the pro~uct- some 
13,000 out of a total of 52,000. The remainder either manufacture 
components or are engaged in research and development. Because of 
. // 
this high degree of integration Rolls is far more of a single group 
than is Tubes with its many Divisions which are themselvee run like 
separate businesses. 
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Group head office is located ,at Derby where some 345 people are 
employed. A whole range of functi8Ls are represented on the Main 
Board here including: Engineering; Commercial Services; Finance; 
Product Assurance; and Personnel. Also the heads of the three assembly 
centres are at Derby. These assembly centres are actually located at 
Derby, Bristol and Leavesden. In theory each of these centres has the 
capacity to design and manufacture a complete. engine. In practice 
\ 
this rarely happens because of the technical integration that exists 
between plants'. But this does mean that these three centres have a 
number of supporting functional departments. The other plants do not 
have these because they are far more simply manufacturing units 
supplying these assembly centres. In these plants research and dev-
elopment staffs are much lower compared with the assembly centres. 
The Personnel Department at Group level is really very small. 
There are only two specialists involved in Group Industrial Relations 
issues. However as wi]l be described they have an effective backing. 
The Board of Directors at the Derby plant includes the following 
functions: Engineering; Commerce; Manufacturing; Product Support; 
Finance and Personnel. Below this is a series of Work Centres and 
Product Centres, each with its own management structure. 
Personnel and Industrial Relations Staffs are organised separately 
at Derby. The Industrial Relations department is highly specialised 
and is concerned with for~al negotiations and providing advice to 
line management. The Personnel Department provides all the normal 
functions with one addition. There are a large number of Personnel 
Officers who work closely with the line managers. Their task is to 
provide help and assistance on routine matters, while attempting to 
achieve consistency with their central plant contacts. 
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The Leavesden management structure is far more straightforward. 
But since this plant is one of the three assembly centres it has the 
functional departments it might not have if it was simply a manufacturing 
unit. As a consequence 0: this ~1 the different product Leavesden 
has slightly more independence from Derby than the other plants. The 
board at Leavesden. includes the following: Engineering; Manufacturing; 
Finance; Product Support; Commercial and Personnel. A very small 
number of people are employed on Industrial Relations, with only two 
full time specialists. 
Management structure throughout Rolls is highly complex, many 
responsibilities are unclear, and communication channels take devious 
routes. It was sUGgested that because of the Government takeover In 
1971 that Rolls had begun to take on the appearance of a Civil 
Service Department. But surely no Government Department has such a 
confused and vague management structure. 
The range of control systems operated by management in Rolls 
are now examined in detail. However before these are examined they 
must be placed in the historical context of the group. 
In 1967 the present day Rolls group was formed when the original 
Rolls group merged with ~ competitor. Both of these parties to 
the merger have long history and traditions. This goes some way to 
explaining why the merger seems to have made no great initial impact. 
Unlike GEC there was no prograw~e of reorganisat-ion &~d rationalisation 
Despite the merger the two organisations maintained a great deal of 
their autonomy. This lack of integration may also be a function of 
the product. The product life of an aer~-engine is usually around 
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fifteen to twenty years, and it is not possible to make changes 
without changing the product.-
One development that did force some change ~vas the groups 
bankruptcy in 1971. On being taken over by the Governrr-~nt Roll~ was 
forced to adopt more centralised control systems over finance and 
production. This eventually led to an increasing centralisation of 
control and a reorganisation of management structure to its present 
form in 1975. Within this new structure the old organisation can 
still be recognised. 
In other ways the bankrupt cy has increased divisions \vi thin the 
group. For example there was a feeling among non-Derby workeTs that 
it was the Derby plant that went bankrupt and not them. These other 
plants resented what they felt was Derby dragging them dow~. 
There were some Industrial Relations implications of these 
changes. Increasing central control meant that the previously 
autonomous plants now became more integrated. For example work 
would now be moved about between plants depenQing upon the specialis~ 
skills available. There \.;as therefore a greater feeling of being a 
, 
part of a single organisation, even though there were still divisions 
between the plants. 
During these changes formal plant bargaining remained. Or-8 change 
in 1970/71 involved moving from PBR to MDW. This had the effect of 
simplifying the pay structure in ~ach plant. For the :irst timE.:; the 
rates of pay in each plant were now clearly visible and calculated 
on the same basis. This meant that comparisor:..s on earnings betwe~n 
the plants, encouraged by the increased. central control, 'l'lere nOH made 
that much easier. It was now possible to compare like with like, 
rather than like with unlike. The effect of these cha.'I1ges vIas 
therefore to encourage ~'I1ion inter-plant activity. Industrial 
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Relations seems to have been left out of this process vi' centralisation 
and this has necessitated a system of Group Co-ordinated plant bargaining 
1n an attempt to restrain union activity. 
One further factor h~s been i~portant in the development of this 
/ 
system. Over time the differentials between the plants grew very 
large. This took place to such an extent that the management could 
not afford to have group level bargaining although it would have 
fitted in logically with the other changes taking place. The main 
problem here was the inevitable process of levelling up that would 
result in a move away from plant bargaining. Management felt it 
would be more economic to maintain plant bargaining, despite the 
'read-across ' that was likely to ensue. Plant bargaining also 
matched the aspirations of most shop stewards, especially those at 
the top of the earnings league who wished to maintain their position. 
(a) Industrial Relations Control Systems 
The most important control Group has over plant Industrial 
Relations is in negotiations. This may take a number of forms. 
Group Management have a number of guidelines which must be 
adhered to by plants during negotiations. As in Tubes the strength 
and nature of these will vary. However as previously they tend 
1" 
to be strongest when issues are most easily compared cetween plants. 
However these tend to be more comprehensive than in Tubes because 
they are part of a programme for the harmonisation of manual and 
staff conditions of service such as holidays and sick pay. 
Guidelines also exist for pay as well as conditions. One 
issue of particular importance is manual pay. It was noted previously 
that although there were seven manual bargaining units there were 
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roughly only two different levels of pay. The group wide pay 
picture has been simplified and brought into line in an attempt 
to eliminate the potential for read across by means of these guidelines. 
For different groups of employees and different issues a differant 
pattern emerges. 
A third example concerns the introduction of a uniform percentage 
increase across all the plants tied to a Proquctivity Agreement. 
Group management decided upon the size of the increase (10%) yet 
left the detai1s of each agreement to be negotiated in each plant. 
The plants could bargain in the context of their own situation, but 
also within the constraints imposed by group management. 
Aside from the use of formal guidelines group management may 
also use a number of other means of controlling read across by 
co~ordinating bargaining. 
Throughout negotiations group management will keep in very close 
contact with the plant. The main purpose of this is to keep well 
informed of possible disputes that may develop. Disputes over pay 
do not usually develop over the size of the increase, which stewards 
accept is laid down centrally, but over the implementation of the 
-
agreement. One example took place during the research and was a 
consequence- of the different settlement dates. The result was that 
one plant came under the 5% Government guideline while most of the 
others had settled under the 10% rules. In effect this meant that 
the first plant should have received less than the others. This led 
to a strike lasting two months. 
/' 
This strike was a good example of the problems of negotiating 
plant agreements co-ordinated from the centre, but withcut 
synchronised pay dates. Without synchronisation there will always 
be plants that settle first, while others settle last. 
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During this dispute group management were very cartful not to 
intervene overtly in the plant. In fact they went to extreme lengths 
not to show their hand 8,..YJ.d undermine plant manElEernents authority. 
Any direct intervention wculd emph~sise the role of group management, 
perhaps leading to a union refusal to negotiate with plant management. 
Although the policy and tactics of local management were dictated by 
Group this could not be upenly acknowledged. If outside intervention 
wes overt this had to be perfectly timed. Management are in effect 
playing a trump card ~hich should not be wasted. 
This tactic of not undermining plant autonomy was part of a ~vider 
policy of boosting the image of local management's freedom whenever 
possible. This was very important for certain plants, e.g. Scottish, 
which were very inward looking and would bitterly resent any inter-
vention from outside. 
Group level co-ordination of this kind has to be backed up by 
efficient channels of communication. These take a number of forms. 
First there are formal mechanisms for communicating a whole 
range of statistics concerning Industrial Relations. Although 
a variety of issues are covered most attention is given to pay and 
terms and conditions figures. Each plant continually up dateS this 
information which it supplies to Derby. Group managemerrt then 
diseminates this IDnformation in the form of tables and charts to 
the other plants. This kind of information is essential if parity 
within the two established levels of manual earnin~s lS to be maintained. 
Each plant manager will know exactly where he stands In relation to 
.. /
other plonts. 
Trade unions, especially white collar unions,also have good 
soarces of information. In some Cases this may be the same as 
management's, although on other occasions this may be of a more informal 
nature. 
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Besides purely statistical data there are many other forms of 
communication between the pJ~nts and the centre. Much of this is 
informal and via the telephone. Through these channels a whole mass 
of information, gossip and rumour is circulated. Bec~1se there 1S 
so much detail to communicate Group cannot keep up with the develop-
ments in detail for each plant. Industrial Relations management at 
the centre tend to concentrate their attention on a nDmber of crucial 
areas which they feel may develop into a dispute. These 'hotspots' 
may involve veTY detailed issues which would otherwise be missed if 
some kind of selection did not take place. It is well known that 
disputes can develop over minute details, and because of the implic-
ations that a dispute can have for other plants it 1S essential that 
tpe centre keeps a very close eye on developments. Usually these 
'hotspots' tend to go ~ cycles. Issues and plants will become 
important for a short while, and then fade away. This may be because 
the problem in a single plant is solved, or a more gendral problem 
affecting all the plants becomes more important. 
If a dispute does arise then these commlli~ication links wil~ 
be strengthened. However as noted previously Industrial Relations 
Management at the centre may be very loathe to show their hands in 
the plants. They may be under pressure to do so however, from 
non-Industrial Relations management at Group level. -These managers 
may not be aware of the potential Industrial Relations repurcussions 
of undermining plant management autonomy, and may therefore press 
for direct intervention from the centre. Industrial Relations 
management will refuse to do this, and will continue to play the 
subtle game of maintaining the delicate balance between central 
1 
control and plant autonomy. 
Industrial Relations MGnag8ment at the centre will however keep 
Group Managemerrl closely informed of any potential disputes. In 
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effect this matches the central control that exists in ether areas 
3uch as production and finance yet in an informal manner. The result 
is that three or four senior directors' in Rolls ha.ve a good grasp of 
the overall performance of the business in terms of finance, 
produc+.ion and Industrial Relations. 
This central co-ordination enables contacts to be maintained 
with National Union Officials. For example during a dispute discussions 
may take place at national level which may result in pressure being 
applied to shop stewards from union officials. 
Many other links existed between the plants and the centre. These 
may be based upon friendship or common interest. If people have 
worked together in one plant they may keep in contact when in 
different plants, perhaps as a source of information and ~dvice. It 
was suggested that information gathered via these informal contact s 
was far more accurate than that gaineri through the formal channels. 
The likelihood of these contacts existing is increased by the 
movement of management between plants. This is one of the control 
systems used by central management which is Jescribed below. 
(b) Personnel Control Systems 
Many of the Personnel Control systems that exist in Rolls are 
similar, at least in principle to those in Tuhes. Central management 
attempt to control the recruitment, selection, training, promotion 
and movement of subordinate managers within Rolls. This is backed 
up by a group based record of individual management c~aracteristics 
and job vacancies. As previously the attempt is to exercise functional 
control over individual managers. Often these will be used in 
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conjunction with the Induztrial Relations control systems noted 
above. However it is the movement of management in Rolls which seems 
to be the key to these controls. 
In Rolls there is relatively little movement of managers between 
th~ plants, most of this movement takes place between the plants and 
the Group. In fact Rolls se"ems to regard Derby as some kind of 
'finishing school'. A normal career pattern would be for a man~ger 
to ioin one of the plants. He may then illove to Derby if an opportunity 
arlses, and be given specific training. Th~s may last for two-three 
years, and he will then move out into the plants. 
This 'patterned' movement of management is often resented iil 
the plants. It will be recalled thB,t many of the plants look to 
their previous rather than present owners. The long serving 
employees may resent younger managers coming and going simply to get 
some training. This opposition has restxicted the movement of 
management to less than it might otherwise have been. This has also 
been limited by one further factor. 
Many of the plants see Derby as the centre of this movement of 
management. They feel that the training given there will be for 
problems at the centre and using the 'Derby' philosophy of management. 
The skills learnt at Derby may not be applicable elsewhere because 
different attitudes and prolJlems may exist in the plants. 
For example this movement of managers came under criticism from 
the long servers at Lea"Iesden. Reference was made to the 'high 
turnover' of illanagers, and to the 'Empire builders' who used the 
plant for their own purposes and left. Over time 'Derby managers' 
had gained a reputation which produced conflict with the Leavesden 
managers. 
This resentment towards Derby covered not only the movement 
of managers but also other control systems as well~ It was felt 
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that many of the policies and guidelines emanating from the centre 
were drawn up by people whose experience and knowledge of present day 
problems were dominated by Derby. Many of these policies could not 
be easily applied to other plant s with for example a fFl.T' more militant 
workforce. 
This had a number of consequences. First 'Derby' solutions 
could not always be easily applieQ to problems in the plants. Second 
outside interference from the centre was highly visible 1n the plants 
because of th~s inapplicability of policies, or because of a clash 
of managerial philosophies. Finally this could lead to a wholesale 
rejection of 'Derby's' influence by plant management. This could 
also explain the union conflict between the plants and Derby. Since 
the convenors were closely identified with management at Derby they 
were treated with the same resentment as management. The resistance 
was against Derby influence over the plants whatever form this took, 
that is whether from the management or union side. CO:i1flict s such 
as this, largely based on historical differences, seriously weakened 
the strength of the combines. 
(c) Non-IR Control Systems 
The final series of management control systems concerns non-IR 
areas. These may seriously limit Industrial Relations in a var~ety 
of ways. However before looking at these in detail the context of 
these control systems should briefly be noted. 
As a member of the NEB Rolls must be able to demonstrate it has 
overall financial control of the group. It must be in touch with 
all developments that will ~ffect financial performance. It is for 
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this reason that uniform financial control systems hav8 been 
introduced. Second the nature of the product is important. The 
product itself is very complicated involving the assembly of literally 
thousands of components. These parts must be produced on a massive 
scale and assembled in three major sites. Fourthly there is the high 
level of research and development that takes place in Rolls. If the 
benefits of being part 0: a large group are to be reaped then it is 
essential fhat there is co-ordination between the various research 
departments. Finally there are the commercial considerations. Rolls 
must compete with the world, and especially the American market, 
successfully. If it is to do this it has to project a strong 
unified group image with substantial backup resources. Therefore 
to outsiders Rolls has to appear as a single closely knit organisation 
with highly integrated production methods. This image conflicts 
strongly with the plant level bargaining and the friction between 
the plants noted above. Rolls therefore leads something of a 'double 
life. ' 
It was noted earlier there are only three major centres of 
assembly. Most of the other plants are only manufacturing units, 
and it is these which have been most influenced by the centralisation 
of control in recent years. In the past there was only a very 
limited integration, but in recent years there has been an increasing 
movement of components between plants. This means that unlike 
previously management lir~s now exist below senior m~lagement level 
between the plants. Middle managers in one plant may report to their 
senior managers in another plant besause of the product they happen 
to be manufacturing. As will be shown in the following case inter-
plant management links in Rolls resemble those of Ford fa::r more than 
they do either GEC or Tubes. 
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This degree of integration of production requires a central 
control mechanism. Rolls has recently introduced a computer based 
financial and production control system. This effectively gives the 
Group complete information and control over the different plant~. 
This change in technology has had Industrial Relations 
implications. For example in order to introduce this system estab-
lished customs and practices may have to be changed. This can create 
opposition from the shop floor from both management and shop stewards. 
In some instances the Derby designed control systems have been 
difficult to implement. This is particularly true at Leavesden. 
Here the slightly different type of product meant that many of the 
control systems from outside were almost ~Dworkable. This led to 
the overall impression held here about Derby mar.agement which 
expressed politely meant they were interfering in something they 
knew nothing about. 
The high degree of central control over finance and production 
contrasts strongly with the image of plant autonomy projected fur 
Industrial Relations purposes. Hence Industrial Relations is bein6 
treated in an anomalous manner. Personnel and Industrial Relations 
control systems are designed to compensate for this and to provide 
a system of co-ordinated plant bargaining. 
Com~ared with Tubes, these control systems are far more deliberate 
and direct. Both cases however QCcupy a middle way structural position: 
some elements of control are cer.tralised while others are not. 
The reason for this elaborate system of co-ordinated bargaining is 
that this maintains central control, yet allows plant bargaining 
to continue. Maintaining this level of bargaining has two benefits. 
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First it coincides with the wishes of the majority of shop stewards 
(mostl~r those who have nothing to gain out of group level bargaining). 
Second this avoids the costly process of 'levelling up' which would be 
required to eliminate all inter-plant differentials. An internal 
working party estimated that this would cost £30 m. for manual and 
staff, and £18 m for the manuals alone. Thus the policy of centrally 
co-ordinated plant bargalning was adopted. The report stated that 
...... 
".-!.: .: 
''It would be wrong to assume that the available ccurses of action is 
either full scale company (Group) bargaining or completely unfettered 
~ite bargaining'. I~stead an intermediate position of the type 
described above is suggested. This involves leaving the sites to 
'negotiate and bargain separately' but to 'ensure that clear central 
guidelines for objectives are set'wtich plan for increasingly more 
consistent treatment of employees across the sites'. The advantages 
of this are seen to include: flexibiiity in the plants; the ability 
to take local conditions into account; shop steward and management 
involvement in plants; an1 the possibility of future change. 
However there are such a large number of bargaining units, and the 
feeling of inequality of treatment for some plants • 
. /' 
3 Conclusions 
In order to draw some conclusions from tLis case it is necessary 
to briefly summarise the main points. 
The original analysis of management structure showed that there 
was a central orgC:l.nisation, with three main centres of production. 
Over time the plants within Rolls were being progressively drawn 
'.::. '. 
together as control became more centralised. This was largely for 
financial and production reasons, however Industrial Relations has 
been largely omitted from these changes. There was somet~ing o~ a 
feeling that plant bargaining was an obstacle.to full centralised 
control. Plant bargaining was maintainea for two reasons: the cost 
involved in the inevitable process of 'levelling up' and shop steward 
j 
attachment to plant bargaining. The result was the centralised control 
over finance and production existed alongside formal plan~ bargaining. 
In the D8rby example 'location bargaining' took place involving 
a number of plants in the local area. This, and the diversity found 
within each plant, encouraged many variations to exist in practice 
within a common formal agreement. Many of these variations were 
connected with the separation between Engineering and Production in 
Rolls. Industrial Relations management accepted that complete 
consistency was impossible and tried simply to eliminate the grosser 
abuses. 
The Derby Case also provided examples of management adding or 
removlng plants which were covered by a common agreement to suit 
their own pur·poses. For instance Mountsorrel was included to 
prever-t comparisons with Coventry, and RR & A was excluded to 
prevent compariso~s with a different industry. 
This tactic of allowing variatiGns below plant level had the 
effect of concentrating E,ctivity and attention at departmental ana. 
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shop floor level. IVlany of the union representatives were preoccupied 
with shop floor based issue~ and had little chance to look to other 
plants. If they did this was often to improve their bargaining 
position in the plant. Despite inter-plant disparitie~ many 
employees identified simply with their own department or factory. 
Attitudes similar to this were also noted at Leavesden. In fact 
changes of ownership and product difference probably wade the employees 
here even more inward looking. Perhaps the most significant feature 
of Leavesden ~as the way it revealed the reason for the weakness of 
union inter-plant co-operation. Leavesden had among the highest 
wage rates in Rolls, and the stewa.rds were determined to maintain 
this position. They would engage in inter-plant activity only to 
the extent that it did not weaken their plant bc,rgaining position. 
Despite these obstacles to inter-plant activity Rolls 
management were continually concerned about 'read across'. In this 
way Rolls is very similar to Tubes. Management are forced to use 
a wide range of control systems in order to regulate inter-plant 
coercive comparisons. These comparisons are encouraged and made 
possible by a number of factors. First there are for mostly 
historical reasor-s large differences in pay and conditions between 
plants. Second the move to MDW has made comparisons' between the 
plants all the more easy. Thirdly there has been a 'pulling together' 
of plants which were previously ~utonomous: comparisoLs have therefore 
been encouraged. Finally the unions, especially white collar unions, 
are well organised with good channels of cOffiffiunication. 
The control systems used by management to restrict this activity 
are highly visible to the plant stewards. For example Group 
restrictions on bargaining are ~penly acknowledged by plant management. 
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It is possible therefore that these restrictio~s may envourage such 
inter-plant activity still further, for they provide examples of the 
very influence which first instigated the union activity. There may 
be something of a 'snowball effect' here: the bargaining structure may 
encourage comparisons, but measures taken to reduce these may further 
encourage such activity. 
One further point aboVe these control systems concerned their 
source. Since they emanated from Derby many of the plants resented 
them. This severely limits their effectiveness. The plants saw these 
control systems as being drawn up with Derby probJems and experiense 
in mind. Often this meant that t~ey were not easily applied i? the 
plants. In fact for the shop stewards ou~side Derby there was something 
of a common enemy of group management interference. This often united 
the plants away from Derby, but seriously weakened the combine as a 
whole. 
Comparisons between Tubes and Rolls can be briefly made. First 
in both cases Industrial Relations is something of ~n exception to 
the overall process of control. In both plant bargaining existed 
alongside more centralised control systems. While plant bargaining 
was maintained, the group exercised control o~er other issues such as 
finance. Second both cases experi'3nce'd inter-plant activity which 
necessitated Industrial Relations and Personnel control systems. 
These are attempts to regulate 'read across' without ~dermining plant 
management authority. However this has not always worked and 
'read across' has actually been enccuraged by these control systems. 
Finally pl~nt management au~hority is not supported by a consistent 
philosophy or ideology. There is some doubt or ambiguity over the 
role that plant management should play. ThiR contrasted markedly 
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with the strong.managerial philosqphy in GEC. 
These similarities between Tubes and Rolls, and their contrast 
with GEC, will be pursued in much greater detail following the 
final case study. 
CHAPI'ER SEVEN : FORD 
This final case study looks at Ford, an organisation with formal 
group level bargaining and a centralised structure of wanagemen~. 
Two plants were studied (Dagenham ~d Leamington) although most of 
the discussions refer to them together. As previously this chapter 
looks firstly at bargaining in practice and then goes on to examine 
the ways in which management attempts to control this • 
. 
The group level bargaining in Ford not only broadens the analysis 
still further, but also allows comparisons to be made with Tubes, 
Although bargaining in Ford contra!3ts with that in Tubes a number of 
parallels can be drawn with regard to management's control of Industr:al 
Relations. Briefly some of the main points are as follows. 
First this case confirms the view formed in Chapter Four that 
an" analysis based solely upon bargaining structure proves inadequ~~e 
for understanding Industrial Relations~ However it does demonstr~~e 
the role that bargaining structure can play. Since in this instance 
the bargaining structure appears to glve a high degree of control 
over union activity, although this is by no means complete. Second 
management use a variety of control systems to supplement the 
bargaining structure, yet this is to control in-plant rather than 
inter-plant union activity. The latter is effectiveiy regulated 
because of the parity of terms and conditions through the group, and 
the formal recognition of the Combine Co~~ittee. Fin~lly evidence 
from Ford appears to conflict with the observations in GEC. Here a 
very high degree of attention is given to Industrial Relations, with 
a strong bargaining structure, and this results in a highly effective 
~ 
process of control over union activity. However ip GEG ~xactly the 
opposite view is taken towards Industrial Relations, yet the control 
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over inter-plant activity was equally high. It is necessary to 
compare all four cases systematically in order to explain this paradox. 
l 
This is carried out in the following chapter. 
1 Collective Bar-g2ining in Practice 
In this section the bargaining structure in Ford lS briefly 
recalled, followed by an in depth analysis of bargaining in practice. 
Primarily-this involves a discussion of the ways in which group level 
agreements are interpreted and administered in the plant. 
Bargaining within Ford is highly formalised and takes place 
primarily at group level. Common group wide terms and conditions are 
settled annually. For manual employees the formal negotiating body 
is the National Joint Negotiating Committee (NJNC). This meets 
regularly throughout the year. The union side is made up of national 
union officers, and convenors from each of the plants. Management 
representatives are drawn from group level. Agreements are highly 
detailed and are written up on a booklet issued to every employee. 
This runs to over one h~Uldred and fifty pages and is known as the 
'Blue Book'. 
Non-manual negotiations are far less formalised. Employees below 
grade 9 have recognised trade unions who meet annually with management 
to negotiate terms and conditions. Grade 9 and above are taken as 
'management' and bargaining is largely on an individual basis. Some 
members of this group II1:J.Y belong to a union, but they are not 
recognised. Ford defend thj s by insisting -Lhat sir:ce their terms 
and conditions are far superior to any other company there lS no need 
, 
for union ~epresentation. 
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Within the plants there are formal Joint Works Committees 
established to implement the agreements and deal with routine problems • 
• 
These are COIIllIlon to all plants with formal min'..':tes and records • 
.-
lllien this highly formalised structure has been described the 
question then to be asked is: what is there left to do in the plants·? 
At first glance it would appear there is very little that remains to 
be dealt with in the plants. However wi tha deepe:r analysis a 
different picture is drawn. Examples are drawn from the two Ford 
cases which highlight some of the types of bargaining which take 
place in the plant. 
This bargaining must be located within the context of Ford 
management's changing attitude towards Industrial Relations. It is 
possible to detect a gradual recognition by management that some form 
of" plant bargaining is virtually inevitable. Initial attitudes were 
slowly changed as manageme~t began to formally recognise the role 
L. 
of the shop steward. This does not mean that all the original American 
derived principles and structures have been discarded, for plant 
bargaining takes place under strict group management control and 
scrutiny. 
Three areas of plant bargaining are discussed: those areas 
." 
which have developed because of gaps in the formal agreements; 
bargaining over managerial principles and prel"ogative; and bargaining 
over routine day-to-day matters. 
In -Lhis first section two issues are discussed: the operation 
of the discipline procedure, and shop steward activities ~~d 
facilities. Both of these examples show tha-t managements hands are 
not completely tied in tr.e plants. In fact it is shown that they 
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can bargain away some of central managements authority (real or 
imagined) to achieve concessions that they might not othe~iise achieve. 
The 'Blue Book' does not contain a disciplinary procedure; this 
is because management haye been unable to come to an agreement ,"r1. th 
the unions. 'l'here are group policy manuals which plant management must 
adhere to as well as the legal minima. Despite these plant management 
have considerable reom to manoeuvre. Group manuals in practice only 
define the limits within which management operate. In some ways 
this is inevitable because no centrally drawn up policy could possibly 
cover every eventuality in all the plants. 
It wan suggested that Industrial Relations management beCaJle 
involved J.n every discipline case, perhaps even before the line 
manager. Bargaining takes place between management and shop stewards 
depending upon each case. Industrial Relations management 9.re seen 
as the best qualified to deal with such issues for a number of reaSOLS. 
First they know what the management guidelines and policies are en 
specific issues. They know what issues they have scope for flexibilitYt 
as well as those on which they know they must conform to the letter of 
the policy. Second they have a better idea of the position throughout 
the plant. Unlike line managers they know what would constitute &~ 
anomaly, and what would net. Perhaps more importantly they knm·! I:hat 
they can keep as a se cret arrangement and what they CaYh"'1.ot. On 
discipline iSSUeS management have some fre8dom to act, but thi. '3 1S 
restricted by group policy. 
7he whole question of shop stevi2.rd activities and facilities is 
./ 
dealt with very briefly in the formal agreements. With reference t9 
steward activity the 'Blue Book' states 'a shop steward shall not 
act as such ou.~side the territory for which he is appoint~d (ut shall 
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be able to leave his department in pursuancE of unlon duties with 
the written permission of his superintendent, or foreman or other 
supervlsor in the form agreed IJetween the parties concerned, such 
permlsslon not to be unreasonably withheld.' Such restrictions Oli 
movement are rarely observed in practice; stewa~ds tended to move 
easily between departments. However the important point is that these 
relaxations of the agreement could be withheld at any tim6. The 
letter of the agreement could be followed to make life difficult for 
the stewards. ~uch restrictions are only used as a threat, and would 
in any case be very difficult to implement in practice. 
These relaxations of the agreement are particularly important for 
the convenors. In the 'Blue Book' they are referred to only as the 
'Joint Secretary of the JWC'. In practice the convenor was employed 
full time on union business and could move about the place at Nill. 
In £act the convenor would become involved in almost all Industrial 
Relations matters i~ the same way that Industrial Relations management 
would. The few number of references made to the convenor may represent 
Ford's unwillingness to formally recognise the role he does actv~lly 
play in the plant. There lS however one reference to the convenor 
in an agreement of 1962. It states that 'Senior Company Executives 
shall hold •••• meetings with Plant Convenors and their deputies.' 
Convenors also sit on a body known as the 'Dagenham Panel.' This was 
set up by the 1962 Agreement and consists of local union officers and 
the plant convenors. The standing of this body has var-ied over time. 
In the main the company refuses to formally recognise the 'Panel.' 
However although negotiations do not take plane a number of matters 
are discussed. These tend to be issues which would affect the whole 
plant, e. g. the shut down of a department. The management vie~1 is tha"t 
the 'Panel' has grown into ~f)mething of a 'monster' over 'lrJhich no one 
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has any real control.' However it does appear to have a fevJ benefits 
for management. They can choose to recognise it when they wish, and 
the union officials are likely to have' a constraining influence on the 
convenors. If the unions ~re forced to sit down together they may 
have to compromise their views in order to reach a common viewpoint. 
Shop steward facilities are dealt with :'11 a very vague manner 
in the 'Blue Book'. It states that 'Reasonable facilities shall be 
, -
afforded shop stewards to carry out their facilities within the 
framework of this agreement.' On top of this are legal obligations 
and group policy. In practice management has a good deal of freedom 
on this issue. Management may use these facilities as a bargaining 
.. 
ploy. For instance an Industrial Relations manager may agree to 
provide certain facilities in return for union concessions. This 
gives plant management something to bargain with, and helps them to 
build up a relationship with the stewards. However management must 
be careful not to give aw~y anything that could be trar_sferred to 
other plants. Any concessions that are made must be highly,: speoific 
to one plant. Other facilities such as cante~ns, or changes in 
working conditb?s can also be used in bargaining. Again on these 
issues management must ensure that any changes made cannot be 
compared with other plants. 
The second important area of plant bargaining concerps the 
day-to-day exercise of managerial prerogative. In part.ioular this 
refers to issues such as 'work content' and 'manning'. 
In most cases the 'Blue Book' r8fers to these issues only in 
passing, e.g. the 'Principles underlying the Pr6ductiv~ ty Enabling 
Clause'. Important phrases here refer to 'operating flexioility' and 
'efficient utilisation'. The effect of these statements on workplace 
Industrial Relations is far greater than appears from the agreemen-t. 
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These principles conceal a whole management philosophy Jesigned to 
ensure complete control over manning levels, work standards, and 
movement of labour. It is on these issues that most bargaining and 
\ . 
conflict takes place at pldnt level. Under any system of MDW conflict 
on the8e issues is likely, but when the tough management philosophy 
of Ford is added, this becomes even more probable. 
In practice day-to-day Industrial Relations is dominated by 
bargaining over issues such as flexibility and manning. Evidence 
for this comes from Ford figures supplied to the Bullock Commission 
referring to industrial disputes. 
Manhours lost Vehicles lost 
Pay 4.8% 9.9{0 
.. 
Work content 68".4% 61.7% 
Discipline 10.4% 12.7% 
These figures may be suspect oecause they refer only to 1975 
and because the distinctions between non-pay issues may be dubious. 
However they do back up the findings of an earlier study (Turner, 
Clcek and Roberts, 1967:2.62). This found that Ford had a below 
average number of strikes on wage structure, work loads and wage 
claims, but an above average number on 'management issues', 
individual dismissal, and hours and conditions. 1 They suggest that 
because of the simple wage structure many of the strikes were over 
work loads. 
/' 
The authors put this pattern of strikes dOv-In largely to managerial 
philosophy: 'The importation into a British Industrial Relations 
environment of elements of a managerial policy and attitudes which 
1 See also Beynon (1973) 
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even ln the USA could not always be maintained in the race of ~~ion 
resistance led to a substantial contribution to the Car firms total 
. 
strike incidence'. They particularly' noted tbs.t ' it s insistence that 
work loads and efforts WE:.i'e not negotiable particularly invited 
conflict' (1967:346) 
The~~~al area of plant bargainicg covers issues such as 
<,' "ol, ....... ~ :.: .. 
grading, shiftwork and overtime. 
Altho~gh the grading structure itself cannot be changed there are 
ways of getting around it. For example it may be possible to combine 
two jobs of the same grade so that the overall grade is raised. Also 
employees can s~vi t ch between jobs of different grades. 
Rates for overtime working cannot be altered, but there are a 
number of 'fiddles'. For example a group of workers may be put on 
a 'specially negotiated rate for continuous seven day working even 
though they may only work a weekend. Other examples ~an be quoted 
but the point to be made is that management in t~e plant h~ve some 
freedom 'to bargain, although this is carefully defined by group. 
Occasionally some of these deals would take the form of covert 
arrangements with a small group of employees. This may be kept 
secret just long enough to achieve a target and may then become 
common knowledge. 
Some indications of management policy on such custom and 
practice issues can be got from tile JWC minut8s. Occasionally 
there was a union request fo~ management to state its position on 
a particular iS8ue. These meetings were not always a useful guidp 
/' 
because of the circulation of the minutes. Some discussions were 
therefore 'off the record.' 
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The explanation for 0hispattern of bargaining in the plants lies 
in manageme~t's gradual acceptance of shop steward activity in the 
plant. Initial m~nagement attitudes derived from Amer~can philosophy 
.... 
have slowly been changed in the face of British conditions. These 
changes can be traced over time. 
Although established since 1911 in this country Ford did not 
,build its first major plant (the Dagenham Engine Plant) until 1931. 
, 
A number of employees belonged to the AEU in the 1930s but Ford 
refused to recognise them. Up until 1944 tDe TUC's pOlicy was to 
1 
'leave Ford alone'. But in 1944 there was a strike in a manufacturer 
which supplied Ford with bodies (Briggs). As a response to this 
Briggs management agreed to recognise all stewards (Toolroom stewards 
had been recognised since 1941). Despite being on ·the same site Ford 
managed to' stop' the strike spreading to its own factories. But in 
return for this it agreed to set up a negotiating body with the TUC. 
From the very beginning Ford refused to negotiate in the plant with 
the stewards, and instead preferred to deal with the national officials 
of tne ten unions outside the.plant. This initial attitude appears 
to have been based very much on American experience. In the early 
days Ford in this country was trying to apply the same structures 
and principles used by its American parent. Many of these in turn 
were derived from the deepseated beliefs of the founder of the organ-
isation. But these structures and principles conflicted strongly 
with the firmly established customs and practice of the British 
Engineering Industry. Although Ford was able to maintain tight 
control over its own employees it was when it took over the other 
plants with different histories and traditions that changes were 
virtually inevitable. 
A good ex~ple of this is the takeover of the Briggs plant by 
Ford referred to above. This took place in 1953 following a strike 
1 Cmnd 131 HMSO 1957 
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in the plant the previous year which had interrup~ed the supply of 
bodies. In Briggs shop stewards in the plant had been recognised since 
1944 and an active workplace organisation b~d developed partly as 
a result of a tolerant management att it ude . The two plant shad, and 
still have, very different cultures. One management view of this was 
that the cultlire of Briggs was 'ideological' while in Ford it was 
'pragmatic' • 
It was inevitable that changes would take place as a result 
of this takeover. Two areas were important: the paJ~ent system and the 
shop stewards organisation. After long and drawn out negotiatioJ.ls the 
Briggs pay structure was eventually incorporated into the Ford structure. 
However the issue of steward organisation took longer. In the years 
\ . 
following the takeover therc was continual conflict. over shop ste1rJarci 
rights in the plant. Management was unwilling to compromise its 
principles and the stewards did not want to lose their hard won gains. 
A series of major disput8s leading to Courts of Inquiry was the result. 
However gradually management attitude began to chRnge, but this 
did not prevent occasional explosions of conflict. In 1962 after a 
dispute management refused to take back a number of those whom it 
regarded as militants. The resulting Court of Inquiry eventually 
backed this decision. However this could not remove the basic source 
of conflict. 
This tradition of conflict is exaggerated in Ford by the number 
of present employees who may have worked ~der the more tolerant 
Briggs management. Ford figures suggest that the number of people 
employed with more than 25 years serV1ce 1S: 
Hourly paid 10.8% -
Salaried 17.3% 
Overall 12.25% 
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Therefore the tradition of shop steward autonomy l2 likely to 
be strong even now. 
The change in management attitude can be seen by reference to 
changes in'the composition of the NJNC and the Disputes Procedure. 
As noted above Ford would initially negotiate only with National 
Officers. However in 1969 shop floor pressure threatened to break 
up the NJNC and convenors were allowed on to the union side. These 
were referred to as 'additional representatives' in the 'Blue Book' 
and were pro rata with union membership. Before this the convenors 
would be in very close contact with the national officers. Since 
this time the structure of the NJNC has been altered further. At 
present one convenor from each of the plants sits on the NJNC along 
with the National Officers. It is the former who are instrumental in 
drawing up the claims although the latter will actually conduct the 
negotiations. This change could increase management control over 
the plants and is discussed in a later section in gre&ter detail. 
~-
Second there have been procedural changes, most importantly the 
shortening of the disputes procedure. Previously the final stage 
seven of the procedure vIas at NJNC level with the first five stages 
in the plant, and stage six outside the plant. There were a number 
of problems with this procedure. A consider~ble time lag was involved 
in making a reference to the NJNC, and there was a feeling of ~reality 
when the issue was eventually discussed. In order to try and avoid 
this it was agreed that the proce~ure should end at Stage Five. Only 
disputes over 'NJNC issues' (i.e. terms and conditions) would 
automatically go to National level. The aim was to settle the majority 
of issues in the plant. 
,/ 
In fact this change is refle8ted in a 
I. 
company policy statement dealing with shop floor problems. It is 
suggested that 'from the management side great importance is attached 
to the local handling of labour problems initially by the foreman 
20C 
and the management team in the plant.' This is not quite accurate 
since greater emphasis is pl~ced on Industrial Relations management 
rather than line management than is acknm'lledged here. 
Overall it appears that Ford management have been forced to move 
away from its initial philosophy bp-cause of the need to expand and 
the consequent demands for shop steward and convenor recognition. 
However the analysis suggests tha~ only those princip~es and policy 
which conflict strongly with British traditions have been changed. 
Management have only changed where they have been forced to : British 
customs and practice have been ~ncorporated into the Ford style of 
managing Industrial Relations. Hence there are certain characteristics 
of Industrial Relations in Ford which remain unique. 
--
""'-
The NJNC has been protected at almost any cost. Its constitution 
was changed when its existence was threatened. A policy of 
standardisation has been consistently followed. Since the Briggs 
takeover all new Ford plants have been incorporated in~o the existing 
payment structure. This is essential if group wide bargaining is to 
be maintained and contrasts markedly with the situation in Tubc~. 
Here there was no attempt to achieve parity as plants were taken 07er. 
However it must be recalled that Tubes growth has been largely via 
acquisition, and at the time control was far less centralised than 
it now is. This compares with the largely internal growth of Ford, 
expanding on to 'green field sites'. 
The wagES structure and MDW payment system are rigidly 
defended. Plant management are aware that whatever they change they 
must not alter either of these. Although this elimin~tes conflist 
over payment by result bargaining switches to other issues such as 
'. 
job content. 'I'he inability of ma:q§l-gement to discu~~s pay in the 
plant does not mean that their hands are complet.ely tied. Management 
.... 
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bargaip over steward activities and facilities In order to build up 
~ bargaining relationship with the stewards. 
Management have steadfastly insisted that serta~n issues are 
.. 
.'" 
not negotiable e.g. manniL6 levels and ltl0rk standards. They have 
largely resisted steward attempts to take control of these issues 
using two techniques. First they have a pool of reserve labour which 
is highly mobile and can "te used to cover for any shortages of labour. 
Second there is the practice of taking pecple 'off pay' if they are 
unwilling to work normally. This combination glves an efftactive form 
of control especially when they are in the hands of Industrial 
Relations managers l~ the plant. 
The final part of the investigation into bargaining in practice 
concentrates on union activity. This points to the existence of 
management control above group level. It will be shown that this 
leads to the international comparison of terms and condltions and 
domestic industrial action which affects continenta.l plants. However 
before this is examined the potential for inter-plant comparisons in 
L 
this country is examined. 
I,. 
It was noted above that despite the group level bargaining 
pegotiations do take place in the pla~t. These are not merely the 
implementation of agreement s but also issues ~..rhich are no-t fully dealt 
with at Group level. Because of this differences are almost 
inevi tably going to emerge between the plant s. The se d.i fference s 
in custom and practice are esssntial if management in the plant are 
to have a limited amount of freedom to negotiate with the stewards. 
However these are differences in detail not in principle. Virtually 
all the plant bargaining iss~es are ones which are highly Sf8cific 
-to a particular plant. This makes it i!ery dif:icult to make comparisons 
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for example on work practices between plants. In gener~l the shop 
stewards are not concerned to make comparisons on these issues, and 
are content to make what gains they can in their own department. 
Even where a nrunber of Fori plant s are on the same site there will 
be m~y arrangements made over routine issues that are not known outside 
a single department. Occasionally these infurmal dealings come to 
light - to the great emburrassment of the managers involved. 
~: .: . 
The only internal comparisons that were made tended to be demands 
for parity in areas such as environmental conditions and various 
facilities such as canteens. However in general these comparisons 
are difficult to make because of the lack of a common measure. 
The situation described above demonstrates not only the strength 
of the bargaining structure but also managerial attachment to a set 
of principles. Plant bargaining takes place within strictly defined 
limits so that management have a cle8.r idea of what they can and 
cannot do. Occasionally this pattern may be broken. Management 
in the plant may make a concession which is comparable to other plants. 
One example quoted was the allowrulce to seclli~ity guards of premium 
payme~ts for meal breaks. This became quickly known throughout the 
plants bec~use of the excellent union communications. Consequently 
management at group were faced with demands for parity, which they 
refer to as 'best balling'. Eventually this concession became group 
policy to prevent leap frogging. In cases such as this the cost of 
the initial concession is multiplied many times, and the managers 
concerned were dealt with severely by top management. It was 
\ 
suggested by group management that inst~ces such as this could be 
a result of younger managers in the plants trying to make a name 
for themselves and taking risks. Comparisons in Ford t~nd to be very 
different from those in Tubes. Within this country ~hey were 
.... 
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restricted to mlnor details of agreements, however international 
comparisons were made on wages and terms and conditions. 
In particular comparisons were made with Ford's German plants. 
The rationale behi~d this was that Ford's production system was 
integrated on a European basis. The 1977 wage claim stated 'Ford 
UK is in fact becomiilg just'one component In a multi-national 
production process and management decisions are no longer taken on 
t~e basis of economic and social conditions in one country.' The 
1. 
document suggests that the varying costs ir. each country are seen 
as an important determinant of where to expand. Hence 'in an 
important sense international comparisons between labour costs and 
worker earnings are now just as relevant to wage bargaining as 
differences between plants in the same co~try'. Parity between 
UK plants has led to demands for international parity. The unions 
are attempting to organise across international boundaries to 
match management control systems. 
This type of comparison has only emerged rece~tly. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s claims for parity were made with other 
firms in the industry. A major strike in 1971 was over a demand 
for parity with Midlands firms. Since then the argurne~t has shifted. 
Not only have differences within the industry been eroded, but the 
I. 
European i~tegration of production has become more obvious. 
In some ways this type of comparison is similar to the combine 
activity in Tubes. In "both cases the unions feel that decisions 
affecting their'future are being taken at a level above that at 
which negotiations take place. In Tubes it is Division which is 
suspected of interferense, while in Ford it is the European 
organisation. The same principle of management exercising a central-
ised control above the level of bargaining is involved. In Tubes 
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the combine is seeking to influence these decisions, wh~le in Ford 
parity between countries is sought. This latter activity may be a 
consequence of the fact that Ford unions realise that investment 
decisions may be taken above even the European level, and they have 
no hope of influencing these. 
Group management's response to these pa::'ity claims is to vigorously 
deferid the exist~ng bargaining structure. This is because of the large 
differentials (50-70%) between UK and German plants, and their ipsisteY'.ce 
ott group level bargaining. Evidence of the defence used by management 
• 
is con-iiained in a Group management response to a union demand for 
information on European pay and benefits, conditions of service. 
,. 
manpower performance and financial prospects. This stated that 'We 
have not included In the attached material any information in respect 
of Ford companies outside Britain because such information has no 
significance for the determination of conditions of employment In 
Britain'. This then goes on to say that 'conditions of employment 
in any particular country are determined by the social and economic 
circumstances of that country alone, and not by what pertait}? in 
other countries.' 
Although the unions may not be totally serious in their claims 
for parity with Germany, their awareness of Ford's European links is 
important. Despite this awareness Ford lS very successful in 
preventing these comparisons from being effectively pursued. In 
many ways they are more successful than Tubes are in preventing inter-
plant comparisons, especially for white collar Q~ions. This success 
appears to be a consequence of the simplicity and strength of the 
national negotiating structure. There is little ambi~~ity or 
. . 
confusion about the most important level of bargaining i~ Ford. 
This is a highly visible and formc~l structure which is easy to defend 
because of the strong and consistent base. It is easy to defend a 
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system of national bargaining when the only alternative is a claim 
~. 
for international parity. The differences on economic, social and 
political grounds mean that this type of parity claim is easily 
attacked. In Ford comparisons mad8 on terms and conditions are there-
fore ~"!ell controlled. This situation can be compared with the vague 
aQd confused control process in Tubes which seems to encourage union 
coercive comparisons. 
The third area of union activity to be considered concerns union 
industrial action and management's attempts to counteract this. Mass 
product~on is used iill most Ford plants, and therefore a stoppage by 
a small group of employees often quickly brings the plant to a halt. 
Because plants are integrated a dispute ln one plant will soon affect 
others leading to lay offs. Production is integrated not only on a 
UK basis but also across Europe because of the common model policy. 
However the use of cornmon components means that shortages caused by 
an unofficial dispute-_ in a plant can be made good by increasing imports. 
In fact the JWC minutes record that this action is often used as a 
counter ~o unofficial strikes. Although the production process gives 
considerable power to the shop floor, this is negated to some extent 
by the European integration of production. 
The situation is slightly different in ufficial strikes because 
imports from Europe a:r;:e usually prevented by union blacking. Although 
stocks would last around ~ix weeks lay offs would be inevitable after 
this. Eventually European plants may be starved of ~C produced 
components forcing the company to pay expensive lay-off pay to these 
workers. In order to prevent this the comp~~y is introducing double 
sourcing of critical components, and stockpiling supplies of 
essential part s. 
Group level bargaining does have one benefit in the UK. In 
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an organisation as closely integrated as Ford action ln one plant 
could soon affect others, possible causing lay-offs. But in all 
official strikes all plants will be involved, t:r".l~ eliminating the 
need for lay-off pay. 
One final point must be made about the consequences of the 
,group level bargaining. As previously noted convenors from all the 
plants sit on the union ncg.?tiating teams. In effect Ford have formally 
0 .. '-
.. 
re-cognised the combine committee for bargaining purposes. This has 
.-
led to a separation between the convenors and the shop floor in some 
plants. The national negotiators seem very isolated from the ordinary 
employees. There is occasionally a feeling that the convenors may be 
selling the members short because of the various national pressures 
they may be subject to. Consequently a number of rank and file 
organisations have grown up, opposed, at least in part, to the official 
union line. This may lead to unofficial action taking place in the 
plants which may result ip the hand of the official negotiators being 
forced. Obviously this may weaken national union strength because 
of the fragmentation of support. With this in mind there is evidence 
to suggest that management in the plant may act in a way which encourages 
unofficial action. This may t~en undermine the strength of the union 
negotiators at a crucial stage in the bargainipg process. 
The discussion above has described and analysed bargaining in 
practice in Ford. It has shown that certain iSGues are settled at 
plant level, and hence for these group level bargaining over estimates 
the degree of cent;.~alisation which exi.sts. In principle this is 
./ 
similar to the situation in Tubes where shop floor bargaining exists 
within formal plant agreements. Secopdly union activity points to a 
greater degree of centralised control than the management structure 
indicates. In this case tbe structure underestimates the degree of 
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centralisation. Again -tht: parallel in Tubes lS th~ interference in 
plant bargaining by Divisional Management. 
Below the control systems used to restrict this bargaining are 
outlined using examples detailed above. 
2 Management Control of Industrial Relations 
In order to provide a background to tho discussion of the 
management control of Industrial Relations in Ford the management 
structure is first examined. Following this the various control 
systems used by management are then analysed in detail. 
Management structure in Ford is basically at three levels. At 
'group l~vel there is the Central Industrial Relations staff under the 
Director of Labour Relations. This is a functional department and is 
concerned with the following: control over operational Industrial 
Relations departments; setting down of policies and procedures; 
national negotiations; forward planning; research; wage administration 
and grading; manpower planning and recruitment. A formida1)le list 
indicating a wide range of central resources devoted to Industrial 
Relations. 
Below this central organisation are four divisions based on 
product. Their role is primarily to control and co-ordinate 
production on a·Europea~_basis. They have very few Industrial 
Relations responsiblities, but are kept closely informed of all 
developments by the gro~p and the plants. Compared with Tubes the 
Divisional level is much lees important. Responsibility for 
Industrial Re18.tions in Ford is shared betwE:en the Group and the 
plant. 
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Each of the t~Tenty thre8 plants has an Industrial Relations 
manager with his own depart~~nt. He is responsible equally to the 
Plant Manager and to Group Industrial Relations. The Plant Industrial 
Relatio:n~ ma-Ylager i.s responsible for all Industrial Relations activities, 
as well as applying all agreements and cent~al policies. As noted 
above the Industrial Relations managers in the plant are highly 
involved in routine matters, either directly themselves, or indirectly 
through their Industrial Relations officers. This indicates a greater 
, 
degree of dec~ntralisation of control of Industrial Relations th~l 
is -immediately apparent from manag~ment structure. While other 
non-IR control systemR suggest greater centralisation of control. 
(a) Industrial Relations Control Systems 
One of the principal means of controlling pJ.ant bargaining in 
Ford involves Industrial Relations management playing a ~arge part 
in day-to-day matters. In both the Dagenham and Leamington plants 
Industrial Relations management became involved in almost every 
routitl:e issue that could possible affect them. In comparison vIi th 
the Tubes plant s the Industrial Relations department s in the plant s 
occupied a far more central position and involved mo;,e people. This 
is not only because of the greater number of employees, but also 
because of the wider range of respons~?ili ties of th-::: Departme:-:t .. 
In practice the Industrial RelatioYf.s officers took over many 
of t.he responsibilities of junior line managers. This included not 
only the procedural aspects of disc~pline and grievances but 
bargaining OV9r the minutiae of day-to-day events. Th~s left the 
foreman and s1_'_pervisors free to enq,ure that production ta!'get8 were 
met and quality standards achieved. The Industr~al Relations officers 
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were in close and continual contact with line management and were '. 
bombarded with a whole range 0f questions ~~d problems. It was these 
officers who came to secret understandings (not to say fiddles) with 
the stewards. The Industrial Relations manager may not always be 
aware of the details of·these arrangements, but would trust his 
officers not to create any anomalies. This was unlikely since the 
officers knew what plant practice was, and what they c0uld keep covert 
for as long as was necessary. The Industrial Relations manager would 
immediately be.come involved in any issue that could escalate into a 
major dispute. In these cases he would work closely with the plant 
manager or his .. ,assistant depending upon the size of the plant. 
This major role played by Industrial Relations management in the 
plant was necessary to establish control over pl~nt bargaining. It 
is essential that inter-plant inconsistencies in Industrial Relations 
practices do not emerge. These managers have been centrally trained 
to know group agreements and policies. But it is esselltial also 
.. 
that plant management's hands are not completely tied. For it 1S at 
this level that much of shop steward activity takes place. In order 
to match and counteract this management in the plants must have 
something to bargain with. Also this bargaining must take place 
without setting precedents. Ford have recognised that plant 
bargaining is inevitable, but attempt to regulate this via Industrial 
Relations managers answerable to the Group. Compared with Tubes 
this system appears to extend Group control into the plant without 
completely eliminating plant management autonomy. In Tubes this 
has not bee.n possible vIi th the result either that inconsistency exists 
or flexibility is severely limited. 
One tactic used in plant bargaj"ning in Ford can usefully be 
mentioned. Management may initially approach a .problem by saying 
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they had no authority to settle it in the plant. This ~~y cr may not 
be the case depending on the issue. Despite this management may begin 
to discuss the issue. Eventually they' corne to an agreement in exchange 
for a concession from the '.mion side. It may appear to the stewards 
that management attach a great deal of importance to the issue and 
are willing to take a risk to gain a solutio~. In some cases manage-
ment may be bargaining aw~y central control which does not actually 
exist. This can be termed an 'illusion· of parent autocracy'. The 
group cannot hope to control everything in the plants, but the 
illusion may be created that they can in order to give plant management 
something to bargain with. For exa.mple. management may treat a 
discipline case leniently in order to obtain concessions on mannlng 
arrangement s • 
Although the manual combine lS extremely well,~organisp.d managerneYlG 
exercise a high degree of control ove~ its activities. ~~en threatened 
by the breakup of the combine in 1969 management allmved a nmnber of 
convenors to join the union negoti~ting side. This has subsequently 
been extended to include all the plant convenors. In effect therefore 
management formally recognise the manual combine. Management may 
have felt that the combine was so powerful th~t it could not be 
ignored. By recognising it they have formalised and made more 
predictable its activities. 
There have been two Gonsequenses for the convenors which have 
extended management control. First the con'Jenors are now encouraged 
to take a 'national' rather than plant based viewpoint. This, 
according to management, may result in a more responsible attitude 
from the convenors. Second the convenors have effective:y been 
isolated from the shop ste~Tards and the shop floor which may 
moderate their views. 
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-(b) Personnel Control SY2tems 
In addition to the Industrial Relations controls outlined above 
group management operates a number of Personnel control systems. On 
the whole these appear to be far stronger than those in Tubes, but 
are again ba.sed. on individual managers. In particular there are very 
close links between plant and group Industrial Relations managewent. 
These control systems are used in conjunction'with those controls 
outlined above. Rather like Tubes, the centre realises that it cannot 
control every detail in the plants through policy or making agresillents 
and hence uses indirect influence over individual managers to 
achieve their goal. 
The centre is responsible for control over the. recruitment, 
selection and training of management. Since Ford is far more of 
an.inte~rated organisatio~.than Tubes these control systems are much 
more immediate. This is also helped by the fact that there are far 
fewer plants in Ford. than in Tubes even when the European plants are 
take~ into account. This integration is made all the more strong by 
the production links between plants. As will be shown the 'non-IR' 
control systems are such that any halt to production in any plant will 
soon be evident to group management. This means that the plant 
Industrial Relations manager is far more under the scrutiny of group 
than in any other case. 
These controls are particularly strong over promotion, and espec-
ially for graduates. Great attention is paid to their career develop-
ment with lengthy induction courses and training programmes. Ford 
is often regarded as onp. of the best management schools in the 
country. It is not unusual for graduates to begin with a super~ri.sors 
or foremans job. 
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Movement of management in Ford takes place on a much wider scale 
than in Tubes. It lS not uncommon for managers to move bet1'Jeen the 
European plant s in order to broaden their expe:-ienc.e. 'lthere is al so 
movement between UK plant~. Howevdr a false picture should not be 
painted. The average Ford manager is not some superbeing Hho spends 
most of his life jetting around Europe. Ford, just like any other 
group, has its fair share of managers who spend all their working life 
in one plant. It is simply that certain managers receive a great 
deal of attention. 
Fordts training programmes for managers go to great lengths to 
instil the desired principles of the managerial philosophy. This is 
part of the attempt to regulate bargaini~g in the plant indirectly. 
In general there lE a more 'hard headed', many would say c:cude and 
brutal approach, to the control of labour in the plant s, very 
different from the more benign philosophy found in Tube s for example. 
The whole pace and temperament of working life seems tna t m1.lch more 
competitive in Ford. Middle managers, in particular seem to be under 
considerable pressure because of tne control systems outlined above. 
One manager described this as 'forever looking over your shoulder.'. 
(c) Non-IR Control Systems 
Non-IR control systems in Ford are highly centraiised and are 
concerned largely with production and investment. Many of these 
control systems are either at or above the level of bargaining. 
The manufacture of components and the final product is integrated 
on a European scale. Parts and finished goods are transpvrted 
regularly between here and the contin'3nt. Fcr example the company's 
latest model is produced ~n three countries with components from a 
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dozen different plants. This has a number of benefits. First Ford 
can take advantage of the economies of scale and hence lower 1IDit 
,cost considerably. Second the really'vital com::,>onents can be dual 
sourced. A stoppage in O~8 plant ~eed not halt all European 
produGtion. Finally stocks of components and finished goods can be 
kept so that a shortfall of either in any country can be made good. 
It has been noted (CIS:1~77:59) that stocks of British produced 
, " 
'': .. 
components are planned to last for forty rather than the normal 
twenty days. 
This high degree of product integration is backed up by a whole 
batte~y of information channels. For certain plants, e.g. Dagenham 
and Halewood produotion returns are made on an hourly basis. Group 
m8,nagement are ln close contact with production in all thE:; plants V1a 
this process. It is somewhat unnerving for the visitor to Groun 
Management to hear that 'the line has stopped at Dagenham' or that 
the previous nights production sched~le at Halewood W&3 miss~d by 
twenty cars. This type of statement brings home the extent of 
control that central management have over tht pl~~ts. 
These production figures are backed up by a whole series of 
Industrial Relations statistics collected monthly. These cover 
discipline, absenteeism, disputes, labour tUl-nover and details on 
shop stewards. Also the minutes of JWC meetings are widely circulated. 
When all of these control systems are put together the strong 
central control over individual managers and plants c~ be recognised. 
Almost any action which causes production losses or a dispute is 
likely to come immediately to the attention of group management. It 
./ 
1S almost as if all the plants were working under on€ roof connected 
by long lines of communication. It is this tight central control 
which contributes to the highly restricted n~ture of bargaining in 
the plant. 
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It is a characteristic of the industry that the scale of 
investment is likely to be beyond the resources of any single 
national group. "For example it may cost £500 millions to build a 
new car which will involve building new production facilities as 
well as design and manufacture costs. When funds are required on this 
scale it is inevitable that the American parent company will become 
involved. In the past the parent has negotiated with Governments 
, 
in order to get the best deal possible. This may involve the plant 
being partly government financed e.g. Bridgend Engine plant. Along 
with this ' availability of investment capital goes the threat of not 
providing funds if certain targets are not met by the plants. 
Industrial Relations criteria may influence some of these decisions. 
For example labour intensive production e.g. assembly, may be located 
in areas or couritries which have a good strike record. Capital 
intensive manufacture. e.g. component production may be located in 
areas with a poor strike record. Ford concentrates assembly abroad and 
major component production in the U.K. Its control over immigrant 
labour in Germany results in a comparatively good strike record. 
The final decision for any major investment project is firmly 
. 1 
in the hands of the American parent. It may sound extraordinary 
but it seems that many of the major investment decisions in the 
world's,third largest orga.nisation are taken by a handful of people. 
This situation is of course one of deliberate policy and stems from 
the original beliefs of the founder of the organisation. He wished 
to keep as much'as possible under his own control, no matter how 
large the organisation. These beliefs have been han~-;'ed down and become 
accepted as unchangeable facts of life. 
1 The CIS (191'7: 7) suggests that any investment involviilg more than 
~25 millions has to go to the parent. See a.lso Seidler (1.976) 
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There is of course something of a parallel in Tubes. Divisional 
management accumulate and ration investment funds in the same way 
that the American parent does in this case. However in the Tubes 
case these control systems are not backed up by a highly integrcded 
production system. The same principle is in evidence: non-IR control 
systems are exercised above the level of bargaining and result in a 
far greater degree of centralisation than is immediately apparent. 
Unlike Tubes the unions in Ford do not challenge the investment 
decisions made: by the parent. As noted previously this may be because 
they feel that these are completely out of their control. Ford is 
able to exercise control above the bargaining level with little fear 
of repurcussions. The inter-country comparisons that result are 
easily repelled because of the Qbvious problem of comparing across 
national boundaries. Therefore as. has been noted (CIS: 1977:1) 'the 
workforce remains fragmented organisationally by geography and 
nationality. Ford, on the other hand, benefit from centralised 
control of management strategy.' The trade unions comparisons are 
not aimed at achieving international bargaining but merely seek to 
improve their own bargaining position. In this way they are 
merely strengthening and justifying the existing level of bargaining. 
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3 Conclusiuns 
The major points of this Case are briefly recalled to provide an 
introduction to the concluding comments. 
Formal bargaining in Ford is very diffe~'ent to that in other 
cases. But despite, or perhaps because of, the group level bargaining 
informal negotiations take place in the plant. An historical analysis 
showed that this represented a gradual change of attitude by manage-
ment towards .shop steward activity. Gradually it was realised that 
some form of workplace bargaining was inevitable and a movement away 
from the Americandevised structure and strategy was required. However 
compared with Tubes plant bargaining emerged within tight constraints. 
In the main steward activity is controlled and predictable. This is 
made possible by a series of Industrial Relations and Personnel 
control systems. 
Bargaining of this nature in the plant demonstrat8s that in some 
ways the formal bargaining level overestimates the degree of 
centralisation that exists. In some ways this parallels the situation 
in Tubes. Here the formal level of bargaining diverted attention 
away from the informal negotiations which took place at shop floor 
level. Individual management style was important for both cases in 
this informal bargaining. There was a notable contrast: Ford 
management took a much tougher line on issues such as manning and 
I 
discipline. The consistency of this approach is a l'esult of the 
more intensive training programmes devised by Ford. 
Secondly the formal management structure underestimated the extent 
of central control over production and investment. The former was 
organised on a European basis, while the latter was often controlled 
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by the American parent. Again the parallel with Tubes shows central 
control above the bargaining level, in this case at Divisional level. 
The result was that unions were forced to make international comparisons 
which were difficult to support in the face of vigorous management opposition. 
These comparisons were largely ineffective. They were necessary 
because of the control exercised by the bargaining structure in this 
case. Group . .1evel bargaining ensured parity of terms and conditions 
between plants. Any differences that did emerge were usually highly 
specific to one particular plant. 
In general therefore management control over union activity in 
Ford is more effective than in Tubes. This is not only a consequence 
of the strength of the bargaining structure. In addition a number of 
other factors appear to be important. 
- The majority of the control systt~S within Ford are located at 
group level. Those exercised over finance and production are not very 
'visible' to stewards and convenors. Together the formal control 
systems produce a strong national image which is easy to identify with. 
These control systems are mutually supporting and leave little doubt 
as to the effective level of decision making. In comparison the 
control systems in Tubes are seen to emerge fTom a variety of levels 
creating doubt and confusion as to the effective level cf control. 
Second Ford seems to enjoy the benefits of centralisation and 
decentralisation even though it has not deliberately adopted a 
compromise position in the way that Tubes has. Highly centralised 
control over investment exists alongside formal group level bargaining 
. /' 
and informal plant negotiations. There is a deliberaie specialisation 
of decision making. Those decisions which are best made ~t particular 
levels are in general made at those levels. The result is that 
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management have a combination of formal and informal control systems 
which it can use to solve a particular problem. This is a greater 
degree of flexi blli ty than has been achieved by Tubes. 
Finally Ford have a clearly identifiable management philosophy. 
Tllis serves not only to support the image of group control but also 
provides a means of explaining away particular actions ':and structures. 
For example the philosophy stresses the high degree of plant integration 
in support of the group level barg~ining. 
One paradox has emerged during the examination of these four 
cases. Both Ford and GEG have achieved a high level of control over 
union activity, yet their approaches towards Industrial Relations 
could not be more different. There seems to be no consistent link 
between management control over Industrial Relations and the 
resources and attitude given to it. This contradiction is analysed 
and explained in the remaining chapters. 
PART III : ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The material outlined in the four previous chapters provides a 
resource of d~ta from which' to draw. The chapters which follow 
systematically analyse this material. However before this is ~der­
taken the argument of the thesis can be usefully recalled. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to compare case studies of 
organisations having different structures of collective bargaining. 
These are compared in order to examine the following relationships: 
between bargaining structurG and union behaviour; between management 
structure -and bargaining structure; between situatioLal determinants 
and bargaining structure. 
Having introduced the study and explained the research method 
previous literature was reviewed by applying some of the data 
available. This revealed that relying on bargaining level alone was 
an inadequate criterion for classifying bargaining structure. 
Secondly there was evidence to suggest that bargaining structure 
as a whole did not display all the metl10ds of control used by 
management in Industrial Relations. 
With these findings and others in mind four detailed case 
studies were carried out. Material was presented firstly to show 
the form bargaining took in practice and secondly to examlne the 
control systems used by management to regulate this. 
These detailed findings are now systematically analysed in 
two ways. A framework for analysing the mru~agement control process 
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is developed in Chapter Eight, a~d a comparison of 'Styles of 
Manag~_ng Industrial Relations' 1 is undertaken in Chapter Nine. The 
final chapter considers some of the implications of the study. 
Framework of Control Systems 
Chapter Eight develops a framework of control systems. This 
systematically analyses the components of the control process used by 
management. 
This framework is based upon the stages in the control process. 
Three stages will be analysed moving from the general to the 
specific and they comprise Policy, Achievement and Appli0ation. 
At each of the stages in the control process the various control 
systems used by management will be outlined. Additionally the 
influences upon management control at each stage will be discussed. 
This framework outlines the variety of control systems which may 
potentially be used by any organisation. It is unlikely that any 
single case would use all of these systems. Each company will use 
a selection of the control systems outlined to suit its own needs. 
This is purely an analytical device used to study the impact of 
management as Industrial Relations in a systematic manner. Certain 
combinations of controls, with their associated influences may 
be used. 
1 Clegg (1979: 160-l)used this phrase to describe the variations in 
management's role in Industrial Relatiorts in large and small 
companies. In this instance it is used to in8lude not only the 
manag'ement control systems, but also the attitude towards Industrial 
Relations built up in the company OVGr time. 
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Comparative Styles of Managing Industrial Relations 
The impact of management control on union behaviour is examined 
on u comparative basis in Chapter Nine. As will be recalled from the 
first Chapter only one form of union behaviour is discussed: th0 
inter-plant activity within a single group. 
Four 'ideal types' of styles of managing Industrial Relations 
are evolved based on the case studies~ These are used to explain 
a paradox which emerged from the case studies. Two cases having 
different bargaining structures enjoyed a highly effective degree 
of control over union activity. Two other cases with similar 
bargaining structures had only a low degree of control. 
CHAPI'ER EIGHT : STYLES OF MANAGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter develops a framel-Tork for analysing the impact of 
management upon Industrial Relations. It provides a comprehensive 
means for investigating all the controls and structures of management 
which can influence union behaviour. 
Additionally this chapter examines some of the influences which 
affect management in their efforts to control Industrial Relations. 
This framework is based upon the available data drawn from the 
case studies, and examples are frequently quotEd. However the 
analysis is expressed in sufficiently genera~ terms to have wider 
applicability. Case study material is now quoted as evidence to 
support the generalisations and concepts developed here. Although 
based upon empirical research this framework could be seen as a 
tentative model for studying the impact of management on Industrial 
Relations in general. However the concepts and hypotheses developed 
here will require further refinemen~, possible only by more 
empirical research. 
The framework developed here provides a means of examining in 
detail the component parts whic~ together make up a particular style 
of managing Industrial Relations. In practice each style will use 
a selection of the controls and structures examined below. The 
framework does not represent any one' single style, but is in 
effect an amalgam of a whole variety of styles. The fcllowing 
chapter looks at some possible combinations of .the controls outlined 
here. 
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1 The framework lS based. upon the stages in the control process. 
Management's role is examined as it proceeds from the most general 
policy decisions to the most specific day-to-day decisions. 
These sta.ges are not necessarily tied to any particular level 
of management. One of the key points of the analysis is that 
management ha~e the ability,to use these stages in the control 
process at a variety of levels. 
Analysis based on management struct~re alone lS rejected 
because this would produce an unduly infleyible and static framework. 
Also as Anthony notes(1977:13-4) 'It is easy to draw up catego.ri3ations 
of levels in management or personnel management, and it lS easy to 
imply that these levels are distinct and separate and that they 
represent horizontal divisions of responsibility which ought to be 
initiated., This is of course nonsense.' 
The framework used here is far more flexible. For example the 
application of policy m~y be carried out at board level. Alternatively 
policy may emanate from day-to-day decisions made on the shop floor. 
At each stage a variety of control systems may be used by 
management. These are classified as follows! 
'Non-IR' control systems financial, production and investment 
'PersorL~el' control systems recruitment, selection, training, 
promotion and movement of managers 
'Industrial Relations' control policy formation, co-ordination of 
systems bargaining and information 
'Collective Bargaining' control bargaining structure; preparatio~ 
systems and backup for negotiation 
1 Similar approaches have been taken by Goo~~an et al (1975); 
Purcell and Earl (1977); Baker and France (l954); Anthony (1977:14-6) 
. , 
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Industrial Relations lS likely to be affected by two sets of 
influences. 
First those $enerated internally by non-IR decisions which 
themselves are influenced by situational determinants. 
Second those external to the organisation which affect Industrial 
Relations directly, e.g. changes in the law and trends towards the 
formalisation of bargaining structures. 
These are examined at each stage • 
225 
A POLICY 
This is taken as the stage of control whi ch is most removed from 
the day-to-day. Two aspects are studied. 
First the impact of 'non-IR' decisions (e.g. production and 
financial decisions) on Industrial Relations. This includes a 
consideration of the factors which will influence thE:;.3e decisions. 
Second the notion of a policy for Industrial Relations. The 
possible characteristics and influences on such a policy are also 
included. 
1 Corporate Policy 
Before the impact of non-IR decisions on Industrial Relations 
are studied three points must be made about the notion of a 
corporate policy. 
First, Legge (1978:40-1) expresses doubts as to whether ali 
organisations may actually possess a corporate policy. It is likely 
that larger organisations may have policies, but very unlikely that 
smaller ones will. Where a policy does exist it may not actually 
guide decisions, but may be used simply to rationali'se actions once 
taken. Legge suggests that even in large organisations ad hoc 
decisions ba~ed on 'hunches' are widespread. 
Second, policy decisions may not necessarily be taken by the 
1 
Board. Evidence' suggests that on some occa3ionsthe Board may only 
kk make rather than actually make decisi-ons. The Board may act as a 
formal 'rubber stamp' for decisions that are taken else~:here, perhaps 
by management committees. 
1 See Brarmen et al (1976) and British Institute of Managemen-+: (-1972) 
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Finally it is possible that policy may emerge from.+'he shop 
floor. Decisions may be taken on a day-to-day basis, some of which 
may constitute precedents or anomalies. In oruer to avoid 'custom 
and practice drift' management may be forced to form a generalised 
policy on the basis of these separate decisions. Policy may emanate 
from this level in order to try and achieve 8onsis~ency and predic-
tability in an unstable situation. 
Non-IR decisions such as those on production and investment are 
likely to have a big influence upon Industrial Relations. For example 
a change in the production process may involve altering manrling 
arrangements or learning of new skills. The need to hit ~inancial 
targets may require making people redundant. 
Hyman (1975:9) has noted the importance of such decisions. 'TherE: 
is an area of social relEi.tions which exert a profound influence over 
all others: the decisions taken by employers and managers in opening 
or closing a workplace, determinir..g the type of level of production, 
introducing particular forms of technology and 1rJork organisations t 
allocating a specific distribution of profits.' As l1.ot8d previously 
such decisions are often taken as given in Industrial Relations 
analysis. However in this study they are seen as internal influences 
affecting the management control of Industrial Relationz. The need 
to stress influences such as fina~cial criteria has been stressed by 
Anthony (1977:178). Such influences are of particular significdnce 
at this stage in the control process. 
Before the impact of these decisions on Industrial helations 
and some of their influences can be studied thesE decisions must be 
examined. 
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These non-IR decisiG~s will be affected by tbe structure of 
management, and in particular the divisions that exist within 
management. 
Horizontal arid vertical divisions within management will produce 
a number of groups of managers. Each of these may have their own 
aims and autl~ority and may 'compete with one another if resources 
are scarce. Fox (1971:67) characterised management as a 'plur~lity 
of interest groups'. While Goldner (1976:76) suggests it is useful 
to recognise a number of different 'manageillents' within what 1S 
formally-an homogeneous group. Each group will have its own se~ 
of targets and rules to adhere to. This has been noted by Bats cone 
(1977:155) 'Consequently each has tareets and constraints Hhich 
derive not merely from his own department, but also from others.' 
Batstone goes on later (1977:156) to point out that production 
considerations often have priority over others. The conflict 
between line and persol~~el managers has been described by Clegg 
(1977:100). He suggests that to many line managers 'their colleagues 
in personnel posts may appear, at least sometimes, as the people 
who se~l them down the river, with ever more compromises with the 
unions and shop stewards, thus putting further obstacles 1n the way 
of line managers achieving the results they should.' 
Decisions made on production and financial matters may often set 
the constraint~ or limi. ts ~vi thin which Inclustrial Relations takes 
place. Many of the decisions made in Industrial Relations will be 
dependent upon or derived from other decisions taken by other groups 
of managers. Industri:l.l Relations decisions are often taken withie 
constraints which are internally generated. Non-IR decisions interpret 
and translate the impact of situational determinants for the 
organisation as a whole. They often govern the way Industrial 
Rela~ions will be influenced by changes in these factors. 
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Legge has noted (1978:44-45) that many important decisions are 
taken in isolation from one another. The result may be that often 
personnel managers are presented with a fait accompli, and have to 
devise ways of amending their policies to fit in with non-IR decisions 
taken elsewhere. 
Legge suggests later (1978:59-66) that these exa~ples are 
symptomatic of the low level priority generally given to Personnel 
and Industri~l Relations. This she feels is a consequence of two 
factors. First it is difficult to measure the contribution of these 
departments. Second even if they can be measured they may not be 
seen to be contributing to' increased profitability. 
Anthony (1977:34) has also noted that it is common for Industrial 
Relations to receive only scant attention at the policy making stage. 
Evidence from Marsh (1971:16) shows that only rarely is there a 
personnel specialist on the board. He found that in 58% of multi-
establishment companies in his sample there was no director 
responsible for Personnel. Also some 45% of companies lacked a 
divisional or group manager for Personnel. This evidence suggests 
a generally low level of funds, facilities and expertise granted 
to Industrial Relations. 
This picture has probably changed slightly in the intervening 
n1ne years. However the general trend is probably still that seen by 
Slichter, Healey and Livernash (1960:952) in that it is very rr:J.ch a 
case of Industrial Relations management fighting to survive in the 
face of hostility from non-IR management. ." .. t best the Industri~l 
Relations department may be seen as only one of a range of 
specialist activities for exercising control over the workforce. At 
worst it may be little mor8 than an obstacle for line management to 
overcome. 
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Anthony (1977: 28-30) notes that Industrial Relations may be used 
alongside a whole range of other techniques such as 'human relations' 
and participation. While Fox (1974:45) notes that collective 
bargaining is only one of a series of strategies used by management 
in an attempt to solve what he defines as the 'managerial problem' n 
, 
That is the n~ed to gain compliance and commitment from the workforce. 
In practice management may have no particular attachment tu 
, 
Industrial Relations techniques when attempting to control the work-
force. They will be used when they appear to be relevant or effective. 
Three of the cases studied may be exceptions to the general 
picture presented above. Ford, Rolls and Tubes each devoted 
considerable reBources to Industrial Relations. Ford, in particular 
paid a great deal of attention to the subject. Rolls and Tubes both 
devoted slightly more attention to Industrial Relations than is the 
norm in Engineering. This is only to be expected. All three had 
some degree of integration of production, especially Ford and Rolls, 
and each was faced by well organised unions. 
GEC is of course the exception. Industrial Relations was 
generally accorded a very low priority. Most of the decisions In 
this area were a consequence of non-IR, largely financial, criteria. 
GEC had a low level of product integration. 
However as noted previously the resources devoted to Industrial 
Relations were not consistently related to the degree of control 
exercised by management over union behaviour. The contradiction lS 
pursued in greater depth in the following chapter. 
? Influences on No~=IR Decisions 
If non-IR decisions affect Industrial Relations then the 
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influences on these decisions must be analysec.. Three factors can be 
recognised, two of which are closely related. 
In the multi-plant context the degree of integration of production 
is a big influence on management. This may be closely connected l'li th 
a centralisation of financial resources. In cases such as Ford a,nd 
Rolls production is highly integrated. A stoppage of production in 
anyone plant will eventually have repu~cussions in others. In Ford 
this integration is on a European scale. This high level of 
integration requires that a group wide perspective is taken on all 
Industrial Relations decisions. 
Within Tubes this perspective can be restricted to the Divi~ion. 
Integration of production is only usually found within division. 
However financial resources are also located at this level. Hence 
. 
a Divisional Industrial Relations policy results. 
_ r 
GE0 is again the exception. Although financial control is 
highly centralised, there is a low level of integration of production •. 
In this case it seems that it is the diversity of products which 
separates each plant. This together with day-to-day operating 
autonomy allows plant based Industrial Relations policies. 
Two other factors, the growth of an organisation and its mar~gerial 
philosophy are closely linked. 
Apart from its effect on managerial philosophy discussed below, 
growth pattern has another consequence. This concerns the impact 
of a merger. Two of the cases, Rolls and GEC, were the result of 
mergers of around ten years ago. HOv-Iever the effect in each case 
has differed. In Rolls the merger has served to bring plants 
together which were previously separate. T~is has brought demands 
for pal-i ty on Gertain issues. While in GEC the merger has merely 
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increased the product diversification and has led to competition 
between the plants in a tim~ of rationalisation. 
Ford's growth has been quite different, it has grown largely as 
a result of internal expansion. This has led to an i~creased feeling 
of being part of a single group. Tubes was in the past far more 
fragmented than it is presently. Previously autonomous groups are 
now being brought under divisional control resulting J.n inter-plant 
union activity. 
Management philosophy is of course closely tied in with the -
problem of growth. Traditions and customs present within the 
organisation can be demonstrat'ed by the pattern of growth. Thus one 
may support the other. 
In Ford there is a clear managerial philosophy and this added 
to the pattern of growth concentrates union attention at group level. 
Similarly in GEC the management philosophy stresses piant autonomy, 
as has the pattern of growth. While in Tubes and Rolls the lack 
of a clear philosophy has only added to the confusion emanating from 
the pattern of growth. 
3 Industrial Relations Policy 
The CIR (1973:5,16) emphasised the need for a policy in Industrial 
Relations. They suggested that a written policy should form an 
integral part of the organisation strategy. Accordingly this would 
./ 
allow management to take a long run \qew of Industrial Relations and 
would allow changes to be made more easily than if based solely on 
custom and practice. This viel"l seems to be an adapt2.tion of previous 
work by Ansoff (1965); Cyert and March (1963) and Chandler (1962). 
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These approaches have a number of problems. First Legge 
(1978:40) has noted that there may not be a corporate strategy v.rhich 
Industrial Relations policy can become a part. Seco~d as Anthony 
(1977:20) notes, it may b~ sheer folly In some cases to maKe 
manag~ment's negotiating policy known. Finally as Wood and Thurley 
(1977:1-2) have noted this approach suggests that Industrial Relations 
is a discrete area of activity which ca,n be incorporated into overall 
policy. 
In general Anthony notes(1977:20) that there is little evidence 
to suggest that Industrial Relations policies exist in the form put 
forwaTd by the CIR. Although he suggests that the threat of b8ing 
investigated by bodies such as the CIR might be a good reason for 
'running one up'. 
Accordingly Anthony puts forward a more realistic view of the 
form policy might take. And this is one which is supported by the 
case material. Although a policy may not be explicitly formulated 
and written up 'it is certain that management in Industrial 
Relations has normally accrued a set of intentions, which in part 
influence its behaviour.' Therefore: if this is \vhat we mean by 
policy in Industrial Relations, then most managers have one even if 
they do not know it.' 
Very often this may result in a 'fire fighting' approach. 
Problems will be dealt with as and when they arise. This ad hoc 
policy may be self perpetuating. Legge (1978:55-56) Hates the 
consequences of ad hoc decision-.making. Neglect of Industrial 
Relations matters from day-to-day lsads to crisis management. The 
exclusion of Industrial Relations management from thede day-to-day 
-events means that they are likely to be less than effecti~3 when 
actually dealing with problems. The result ~Till be that less 
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resources are devoted to Industrial Relations, and pro-DIem solving 
ability declines still further. Anthony (1977:22) suggests that this 
approach may be a consequence of top managemeD~fs reluctance to 
recognise that there are ~ome are~s in which they may have only 
limited resources. \,linl~ler (1975:206) notes that 'Directors 
literally do not want to know about Industrlal Relations.' 
This ad hoc approach has been widely criticised (e.g. Flanders 1904) 
and is discussed'further in Chapter Ten. A number of influences on 
policy can be recognised. These influences are largely external to 
the organisation. They include the growth of labour legislation and 
changes in bargaining structure. 
Government legislation Slnce 1963 has become increasingly important 
In Industrial Relations. The statutes of 1974 and 1975 have extended 
the degree of government intervention significantly. ~anagement have 
reacted to this in a number of ways. They may have bolsterGd up 
their own Personnel Departments to ensure correct action was taken 
over issues such as discipline and redundancy. Alternatively small 
firms may have relied upon the services of their local emplcyerst 
association. 
Hawkins (1978:159) notes the procedural bias of the !'lew le.gislation. 
This places an additional administrative burden upon management 
leading to an expansion of Personnel departments. Ho~ever the 
influence of such enlarged departments may remain lO~l. 
Commenting in 1975 Brow~ and Sisson noted (1975:49) th~t 'The 
last five years have seen the most radical reform of barga.ining 
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structures in Britain s~:;::ce the ~1hi tel~{ reforms that follmA!ed the 
first world war'. They are referring to the decline in til':! 
significance of the national or multi-emp~oyer agreement and the 
rise of the single employer agreement. Evidence to support this 
1 assertion is available from a number of sources. 
This treni was C9gun by the productivity agreements of the early 
sixties and encouraged by the publication of the Donovan Repor~. If 
management are to carry out such reforffi3some kind of policy for 
Industrial Relations is required. Changes such as a movement from 
payment by results to measured day work requires considera.ble t: ~e 
and attention. And as Brown and Terry note (1979:129) having 
devised their new structures management will not want them to be 
undermined by changes in th8 national agreement. Hence they may ~vant 
to maintain the initially high level of attention given to I~dustrial 
Relations. This discussion is returned to in Chapter Ten. 
4 Policy on the Sh£P Floor 
The policy making stage is not the exclusive preserve of the 
higher levels Qf management. Policies can be derived from the 
shop floor in an ad hoc fashion. Purcell and Earl (1977:45-6) note 
that it may be difficult to distinguish between when policy making 
ends and application bpgins. 
For example during routine decision making a line manager may 
make a decision which is against established policy. If this is 
sufficiently ser~ous i~ could be taken as a precedent by the shop 
stewards. They will use the original decizion in arguments in 
1 For example Daniel (1976); Warwick Survey (1979); Brown and 
Terry (1979); Wilders and Parker (1972) 
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similar cases. In effec1i they will attempt to U8c this as the 
basis to extend custom and practice in their favour. Mal;~~gement 
may feel that this situation could get out of their control and lead 
to leap frogging claims. In order to prevent this plant management 
may re-establish policy on the basis of the original decision in 
an attempt to prevent further 'cus"tom and practice drift'. 
Winkler (1974:202) notes that this is the way shop floor 
decisions come to the notice of higher management, and hence 
reporting systems are ways of concealing rather than communicating 
decisions made. 'What is effectively happening is covert decen-
tralisation of decision making.' 
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B ACHIEVEMENT 
This is defined as the stage at which the -rather vague (or non-
existent) policies and strategies are translated into specific 
structures and actions. Included in this section are ~Iarious control 
systems: Collective Bargaining; Industrial rtelativns; and Personnel. 
Three initial points are made • 
. ",:~ . 
First, this is the only stage at which Industrial Relations lS 
likely to be seen as a discrete activity. At the policy and 
application stages it is often very difficult to extract Industrial 
Relations from the whole range of other activities. As Legge 
(1978:39) has noted the expertise of specialist staff and their 
reporting relation3hips may be a good indicator of attention given 
to Industrial Relations. 
Second, it is at this stage that general trends towards formalis-
ation and single employer bargaining seem to have had their biggest 
impact. 
Finally it appears that certain of these control systems 
particularly Industrial Relations controls, are used to support the 
bargaining structllre. 1 For example in Rolls and Tubes bargaining 
structure does not appear to give complete c0ntrol o·ver union 
inter-plant activity. Hence a series· of Industrial Relations contrcl2 
are used to make good these deficiencies. In both Ford and GEC 
control over this aspect of union behaviour as a result of bargaining 
structure is greater, and therefore they have less need to use 
other control systems. However in Ford Industrial Relations control 
systems are used to regulate union activity in the plant. 
1 See the CIR (1974:28-9) 
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1 Collective Bargaining Control Systems 
The Collective Bargaining control'systems include not only the 
bargaining structure but ~lso the preparation and back up for negot-
iation. This section will look at the varying emphasis placed upon 
bargaining structure and some of the factors which influence this. 
It will be recalled t.hat bargaining structure has been suggested 
~s the foremost influence on union behaviour (Clegg: 1976:4). Both 
McCarthy (1971) and Clegg (1976;1979) have suggested varlOUS dimensions 
of bargaining structure for understanding the impact on union 
behaviour. 1 
There are variations between .the cases in the emphasis placed on 
bargaining structure. Ford has comprehensive, detailed and written 
agreements covering the majority of substantive and procedural issues. 
GEe, on the other hand, has relatively few formal agreements relying 
mostly on informal shop floor negotiations. While Rolls and Tubes 
negotiate at plant level their agreements ar~ less comprehensive and 
detailed than those of Ford. 
If one aspect of union behaviour is analysed, inter-plant activity, 
an important contradiction emerges. Those cases with the most 
extreme forms of bargaining structure, Ford and GEC, seem to display 
similarly high degrees of control over inter-plant activity. Those 
cases with similar bargaining' structures, Rolls and Tubes, have 
similar but low degrees of control over this activity. Correspondingly 
Rolls and Tubes appear to make use of Industrial Relations controls 
in order to try and limit this inter-plant activity. Furd and GEC 
have less need of such controls io limit this form of union behaviour. 
1 See Chapter Three 
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This apparently cont~adictory evidence relating to the impact of 
bargaining structure will be considered further in the foJlowing 
chapter. 
2 Influences on Bargaining Structure 
, 
Two sets of influences are briefly considered below. Those 
emanating from within the organisation, and those from outside. 
1 
Research has stressed the impact that management structure may 
have upon bargaining structure. Evidence from the cases suggests 
this is an important influence, but also other control systems 
should be -considered. 
The major influence of management structure on bargaining 
structllre is a result of the divisions that exist within management. 
As shown above these divisions mean that separate specialist groups 
of wanagement are created. Hence Industrial Relations management 
may emerge as a specialised department concerned only with negotiation 
ffild solving problems. In many cases Industrial Relations may be 
given a fairly low priority. Therefore relatively little attention 
will be given to bargaining structure and negotiations in these 
circumstances. 
A second influence concerns the impact of non-IR control systems 
used by management. Changes in production and financial control 
systems, for instance, ~ay have repurcussions for bargaining 
structure. 
1 eg. Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer - (1975); Clegg (1976); Brown (1973) 
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A good example is a case with plant bargaining. As a result of 
various pressures managemeni may decide to centralise control over 
finance at either group or divisional level. This may mean that non-
IR control systems are now located at a different leve~ from th~ 
bargaining structure. It is possible that this may lead shop stewards 
in the plant to question the authority of plant managem~nt on all 
matters. In turn this may lead to the kind qf inter-plant activity 
seen in Rolls and Tubes designed to match the level of management 
decision making on non-IR matters. 
Changes in non-IR control systems may undermine the bargaini~g 
structure. Doubt and confusion ar3 created in the minds of plant 
employees. The inter-plant activity that results may require 
management to use Industrial Relations controls of the kind studied 
below. This situation can be contrasted with that in Ford. Here the 
nO'n-IR control systems are aligned with the bargaining structure. 
Hence one set of control systems supports and reinforces the other. 
External influences can now be analysed. 
The post war growth of workplace bargaining led many managers ~o 
feel that they had lost a degree of control over Industrial R81ations. 
Two changes in bargaining structure have resulted from this. First 
an increasing formalisation of bargaining structure. Second a movement 
away fro~ multi-employer towards single employer agreements. 
These changes have a number of implications for multi-plant 
groups. 1 In most cases the plant has now been formally recognised 
as the most important bargaining leve 1. The movement away from ll!ul t i-
employer agreements has highlighted the differences between plants. 
Also as Brown and Sisson (1975:45) have noted changes ill payment 
systems have made comparisons e9.sier. The result of these two 
1 This discussion is continued in much greater detail in Chaut-:r ~en 
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changes has meant that i.Liter...;.plant comparisons ar~ encouraged. In 
cases where this has taken place (Rolls and Tubes) management have 
attempted to control the resulting inter-plant activity by means of 
the Industrial Relations controls of the type discussed below. 
3 Industrial Relations Controls 
Industrial Relations controls are used by management to supple-
ment the.bargaining structure. Three sets of controls are analjsed: 
co-ordination of plant bargaining; provision of services; and 
communication of information between pl~nts. 
The extent of these controls appears to be related to the level 
of inter-plant union activity. 1 In Ford and GEC the limited inter-
plant activity requires few controls of this kind to be used. While 
in Tubes and Rolls these controls are well developed to deal with the 
inter-plant UYlion activity. This activity usually takes two forms. 
First the formation of combines desi~1ed to co-ordinate action and 
information. Second the making of coercive comparlsons between 
plants within ~he same group. 
It.will be noted below that the use of these controls may 
actually encourage the very behaviour they are trying to limit. This 
point has been noted by Fox (1971:38). Management may fall back on 
their coercive power if their legitimate exercise of authority lS 
ineffective. This in turn may require a further use of power. For 
unions the use of such Industrial Relations controls may provide 
further evidence of the kind of management .lnt erference ~'Jhi ch 
stimulated their initial activity. (CIR 1974:49). 
1 In Ford Industrial Relations controls are used to limit plant 
baseJ. union behaviour. The impact of these controls is dealt Ttli tn 
--- .J...1.._ · ___ 1"; ,......,+; I'"\Y\ C+O::>(J"~ r..f the control process. 
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(a) Co-ordination of Plant Bargaining 
Perhaps the most important types of Industrial Relations control 
involve managements attempts to co-ordinate bargaining in the ~lants. 
This may be undertaken by group or divisional management and c~~ 
take a variety of forms. These will range from the subtle and 
covert to the crude and overt. Management outside tt~ plant may 
intervene in disputes, or lay down guidelines or provide advice to 
plant manage~ent. Two examples can be quoted, both aimed at limiting 
either the scope for inter-plant activity or its impact. However 
this may be a highly unstable situation (eIR 1974:44). 
Rolls uses a system of co-ordinated plant bargaining. During 
negotiations in the plant group management are n.otified of all 
developments. The final agreement has to be submitted to group for 
assessment. On certain subjects, e.g. annual pay increase, gToup 
management may specify the overall increase while allowing ths 
details to be settled in the plant. (eIR 1974:16). The result of 
this policy over time has been a patterning of pay and terms ru~d 
conditions issues across the group. Although there are eleven 
separate bargaining units there are not eleven different sets of pay 
and terms and conditions. For pay there are two units, which are 
highly paid, and the other nine having a lower, but ·roughly equal 
level of pay On other issues there are different groupings of 
plants. The overall aim is to limit the potential for 'read across' 
or ~nter-plant comparisons of terms and conditions. It is hoped 
to eliminate differences betvJeen plants whic~ have attempted cOIr?ariso::l3 
1n the past. 
Tubes uses a slightly different set of ccntrols aimed largely at 
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containing inter-plant comparisons made by white colla.J.' unions. 1 
These comparisons are either straight forward 'leap frogging claims' 
or made under the Schedule 11 provisions of the Employment Protection 
Act. 
Comparisons have been made l")rimarily on non-salary conditions 
e.g. holidays and fringe benefits. This is becau8e such items are 
easily compared between plants, while salaries for white collar 
workers are not transferable. 
In an effort to limit the potential for such comparisons 
management in Tubes used a serles of highly selective guidelines. 
On those issues which were highly transferable between plants, and 
hence prone to comparison, divisional management used a series of 
guidelines which were rigidly enforced. This eventually resulted 
in a standardisation of such items across the Division. However 
Tubes refused to negotiate such issues at Divisional level, perhaps 
because they felt this mdY damage their image of plan~ autonomy, and 
encourage the manual unions to seek parity across the Division. 
On other issues, such as sala::-ies, which were far more difficult 
to compare individual plants had much greater freedom. This added 
to the image of autonomy of each plant. But the result of this 
was noted. Management in the plants could dLaw up a costly and 
phoney producti vi ty deal, but could not alter the car mi.leage 
allowance. 
(b) Provision of Services 
All the cases studied had a central source of serviceq to 
plants within the organisation. This was usually either at group 
1 The impact of white collar unions on bargaining structure has been 
noted by Ramsay (1971:44). Brown a.nd Terry (1979;131) have stressed 
"Y'I';""'isation an.d. movement of management 
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or divisional level. The aim being to provide a range of services 
that would not otherwise ha~.~e been available to plant management. 
These services include legal advice, and general Industrial 
Relations information. Many of these services replic~te those which 
are increasingly provided by emplnyers'associations. They are often 
a result of increased government intervention in Industrial Relations. 
Two examples can be quoted: changes in the law al~d incomes policy. 
Plant management may require legal advice on matters such as 
discipline, -Ghe closed shop, and dismissal. Over time they will 
build up some experience in dealing with these issues, but 
occasionally a new problem will emerge and advice will have to be 
sought. Plant management may also wish to be a~vare of any group 
policy that may exist on such issues. 
In one case white collar unions were making great use of the 
Schedule 11 provisions of the Employment Protection Act. Plant 
management worked closely with Divisional management when preparl~g 
their submission to the Central Arbitration Committee. Similarly 
divisional management may help in the preparation of managemencs 
side in Tribunal cases. 
The existence of incomes policy has also encouraged the nrovision 
of services. For example Brown and Terry (1979:131) note that group 
management needs to have an overall picture of pay bargaining vIi thin 
their organisation. This may require improved inforrrlation flows of 
the kind noted below. 
A further service provided to plant management is advice on 
Industrial Relations issues. (Thomson and H~~ter 1975:38). Plar.t 
management may keep in close contact l/vith group or division during 
a dispute for example. However at times this may be sO"1ething more 
than pure 'advlce. In some 0ircumstancEs pl~~t management may have 
1 little choice but to accept this advice.' However group management 
1 Especially if a manager's promotion prospects are tied to his 
'18Xt section. 
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may insi8t this is ~dvice, even if it cannot be ignored. To an 
extent management are playing with words to protect the 'sacred cow 
of decentralisation.' Brooke and Remmers (1978:78) found a similar 
pattern in the multi-national context. They quote one question as 
'What does this English word advice mean?' 
(c) Comm~nication of Information 
. In most organisations there will be two overlapping communication 
systems: the formal and the informal • 
. 
The formal system may be based upon an elaborate monitoring and 
reporting system. As will be seen at the application stage a whole 
range of reports and statistics may have to be supplied by the plants 
to the centre. 
In addition there will be a series of visits to aLQ from the 
centre, meetings, conferences, and telephone contacts. These will 
take place almost continuously, and often will be mixed up with 
general business information about the organisation. At certain times 
e.g. during a dispute, these contacts may become critical. This is 
especially so if a dispute in one plant may have repurcussions in 
other plants because of an integrated system of production. 
Information will also be supplied on bargaining and the results 
of collective agreements. This may be supplied to the centre, ~d 
then circulated to all other plants. In'Ford this flow of information 
was comprehensive and detailed. Group management would know almost 
immediately when production was halted in any of the plants throughout 
the country. 
Many other contacts exist between managers in the different plants. 
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These are largely informal, but can nevertheless be significant. 
~his may be referred to as the 'grapevine' or 'Bush Telegraph' 
These contacts may be between people who have previously worked 
together, or who have common interests. Da.lton (1959) has laid 
particular emphasis on this clique formation. Such contacts may 
purely be used as an ad hoc basis but may be the only wa.y in which 
plant managers can find out 'what 1S really.going on'. These 
contacts may also be a highly useful source of advice and information. 
However Bake; and France (1954:90) no~e that the informality of 
these controls makes them all the more difficult to penetrate. 
Later Baker and France (.1954: 151-4) note that various other 
forms of intervention may be used. A member of head office staff 
may participate in plant negotiations, or head office may draw up 
the basic agreement, the details of which are settled in the plant. 
No evidence for these kinds of Industrial Relations controls was 
found in these cases, however they may well exist in other organis-
ations, e.g. Lucas. 
Many of these Industrial Relations controls are aimed at 
controlling inter-plant ~mion activity. However the use of these 
controls may have something of a 'snowball' effect. Their use may 
encourage the very activity they are aimed at controlling. For this 
reason management may employ Personnel control systems which are 
more long term. (eIR 1973:39-40). 
4 Personnel eOLtrol Systems 
The Industrial Relations controls described and analysed above 
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are mainly concerned with controlling one form or union behaviour; 
activity between plants within the same group. These cor.~rols are 
often ad hoc an~ tend to fluctuate in response to changes in this 
act.i.vi ty. 
Control systems described in this section are somewhat diffprent. 
They are usually more permanent and long run. They are designed to 
influence the behaviour of individual managers, and hence to in-
directly affect Industrial Relations. 
Two sets of control systems are described. First, those concerned 
with control over recruitment, selection, training, promotion and 
movement of managers. Second, control systems concerned with 
establishing a functional link between Industrial Relations management 
at the centre, and in the plant. These latter control systems are 
concerned'mostlY with reporting procedures. 
(a) Controls over Management 
The impact of these controls has been noted elsehwere. Goldner 
(1970:133) has noted that 'Despite our references to Industrial 
Relations as a corporate entity, no organisation as such was set up' 
instead the power of group Industrial Relations was largely 'defined 
by corporate Industrial Relations power over career lines of the 
Company Industrial Relations Personnel - the power to appoint, the 
power to remover the power to transfer and the power to promote.' 
Central.management control over the recruitment, selection, 
training and movement of management allows them to potentially 
regulate the ability and eApertise of mana~ement in particular 
roles. (CrR 1974:17). The priority given to Industrial ~elations 
may be reflected in the calibre of managers recruited for such 
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posts. If Industrial Relations is accorded a 10\-1 priority then it 
may be difficult to recruit people with sufficient ability for the 
task. This may only add to tlle low priority of Industrial Relations. 
Certain groups of managers may be subject to these controls. 
Graduates and senior managers may be moved about on a national or 
international scale. Movement may be crucial to an individuals career 
progression. Goldner (1916:133-5) notes that often i~ may not be a 
question so much of whether the manager moves or not, but at what 
speed he does:so. He quotes one manager as likening this movement 
to'a 'gigantic chess game.' 
This is not to say that all managers are moved about at the 
whim of central management. In most cases they will have some choice~ 
'However this may be an unreal choice if their promotion depends upon 
their willingness to move.Directors tended to form a small specialised 
unit in the organisations. They were often moved arou.nd when thei_r 
skills s~ted a particular vacancy. 
Central management may also be responsible for training or 
management development programmes. They may attempt to achieve a 
consistent company philosophy amongst their senior managers. This 
is not to say that managers are easily brainwashed. Often they will 
reject the more obvious persuasive measures used by 'such development 
schemes. 
All of the cases had control systems of this type. In Ford 
managers were moved between European plants. ~lliile in Tubes and 
Rolls this was natio~41ly based. In·Rolls this movement took on a 
particular pattern. Managers tended to move between the.plants and 
the cent re, but rare ly bet\":'3 en the plant s • 
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(b) Functional Control 
Functional control systems are aimed at increasing group or 
divisional influence in the plant. (Goldner 1970:132-3); Baker 
and France (1954:202). They may take a number of forms. 
For example an Industrial Relations mro:~ger m~y be responsible 
not only to a senior line n~anager in the plant, but also to his 
functional head at the group 'or divisional level. 
The strength of such functional links may be an accurate 
indicator of the actual degree of central control. Baker and 
France (1954:60-1) stress this point. They note that 'The plant 
Industrial Relations staff representing ••••• an extension of 
headquarters staff into the plant'is also a factor in cer-tralisation. 
As a member of the staff the plant executive, the local Industrial 
Relations manager also represents the view of headquarters. In the 
latter respect he is facilitating decentralisation. ~Jhich part of 
his job is given greater emphasis is one measure of the balance 
between-centralisation and decentralisation.' 
This certainly seems to be so in the cases studied. As will be 
shown in Ford plant Industrial Relations managers played a big part 
in day-to-day control and were also in close contact with group 
management. In Rolls and Tubes day-t:o-day involvement was less, 
while Industrial Relations managers still had close links with group and 
divisional management respectivel;y. GEC Industrial Helations managers 
were virtually solely responsible to plant managers and had relatively 
little contact with group management. (CIR 1974:18,31-34). 
Thus the strength of the fQnctional links between the centre and 
plant Industrial Relations management appears to reflecG the overall 
focus of control within the organisation. 
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There appears to be ~ connection between the strength of these 
functional links and central management's control over promotion. 
If group or divisional management has a significant influence 
over a manager's promotion prospects then it is likely that he will 
conform to their functional controls. For as Fox (1971:85) has 
suggested 'prugress up the ladder depends on the grace and favour 
of his superiors, which means that his orientation to their goals 
must appear clear and unequivocal.' 
Plant management may in fact evaluate ~Jhich of the two sets of 
people he reports to will have the bigger influence on his promo~ion. 
This may lead to the situation described by Winkler (1974:202) 
'subordinate managers have a strong incentive not to communicate 
~ 
upwards information. They are under pressure to hide problems in 
the hope that .they can reach covert accommodations with workers 
before the director finds o~t. Normal management reporting systems 
are in the Industrial Relations context, systems of concealment.' 
The eIR (1974:16) has summed up the connection between functional 
and promotional controls. They note that: 
'In many multi-plant concerns the avoidance of precedents 
was achiev6d by the control of veto from what appeared to 
be .advisory Industrial Relations departments at the group, 
but which in reality exercise a firm control through 
associated functions -such as management development 
policies. In a number of cases it was explicitly acknow-
lAdged that disputes at plant level which arose out of 
plant management's failure to accept group advice was an 
important factor in determining their career advancement.' 
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C APPLICATION 
Application is the final stage ~ the process of management 
control over Industrial Relations. It is important to define how 
this term is being used in this ccntext. Most commonly this phrase 
would be taken to include the negotiation, administration and 
implement~tion of agreements. In addition to this it is taken to 
include the exercise of other control systems not directly concerned 
with Industrial Relations, e.g. production and financial decisions. 
Two questions need to be asked when looking at the application 
stage of control. The first dea13 not so much with what is being 
applied but with who is responsible for the application. This 
involves a discussion of the relationship between line and Industrial 
Relations management in the plant. The second examines the division 
of responsibility for actually making, as opposed to taking deci~ions 
between plant management and management outside the plant. 
1 Line and Industrial Relations Management 
Attempts to differentiate between management functions within 
the organisation have usually been based upon the concept of line 
and staff (see Dalton 1959). However this classification is not 
without its problems. In many Gases there may be a number of other 
divisions which may override those between line and staff, e.g. 
divisions between different departments. 
However it is possible to speak of a distinction between line 
1 
and Industrial Relations management (Brown 1973:164-66). Legge 
(1978:50-59) has commented upon this type of division. She notes 
1 See also Slichter Healey and Livernash (1960:898) for a discussion 
of the significance of these differences. 
-
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that the line manager may have a stereotypical Vlew of the personnel 
specialist, often feeling that these specialists are completely 'out 
of touch' tvi th the realities of line 'management. 
Considerable differences were displayed by the cases with regard 
to the balance between line and Industrial Relations management 
responsibility. 
-In Ford Industrial Relations management plays a significant 
role in the application of control on a day-to-day basis. These 
specialist managers had taken over many of the responsibilities of 
junior line management. However these managers were also in close 
contact with group management. This pattern of control seems to be a 
-
consequence of Ford's bargaining structure. Despite having group 
level agreements some bargaining took place at plant level. In an 
effort to control and confine this group management have extended the 
role of Industrial Relations management in the plant. So it is very 
much the case of group management representatives negotiating with 
shop stewards in the plant. The ~ttempt here is to avoid the 
setting of precedents and anomalies lrJhich could be 'read across' 
between plants. Management's hands in the plant are not completely 
tied. But they must work within the confines laid down by group 
management. 
Plant management in this case may deliberately exaggerate the 
influence of group management on ~ll issues. This then gave them 
the opportunity to bargain away and undermine this authority vihich 
they had artificially created in order to obtain concessions from 
the unions. This was referred to as the 'illusion of parent 
autocracy'. Industrial Relations management in Ford arc faced with 
the classic case of having two bosses. They are responsible to both 
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their functional superior and the plant manager. The alms of these 
two may at times conflict, c~lsing the Industrial Relations manager 
some concern over which to give priority to. 
In all the other cases there was a plant bargaining structure of 
some kind. The result seemed to be that there was a much greater 
incidence of the 'ambiguity' of the role of Industrial Relations 
management of the kind noted by Legge (1978:21-26). For example 
there was ofte~ disagreement over what the role of specialist manage-
ment ought to be. There was conflict over the influence Industrial 
Relations management should have on day-to-day matters. 
In Rolls specialist management provided advice to line management 
on day-to-day issues, but did not take decisions in the way they might 
do in Ford. In Tubes Industrial Relations management tended to be 
treated as 'problem solvers' who would be brought in when a crisis 
developed. This was similar to their role in GEG, excbPt that ::i..esR 
priority was given generally. 
There are broadly two roles that specialist Industrial Rel&tions 
management can play in the application of control. Both are 
indicative of the ambiguity surrounding this role. 
First the specialist mana.ger may be involved in routine day-to-
day matters. But if a major dispute arises they may be relieved of 
control. As Flanders (1964:254) notes 
'Then men who have hardly given any thought to lahour 
relations are suddenly forced to take important decisions. 
Then when the problems to be settled are most ·complex ani 
call for careful, penetrating and. informed judgement, as 
like as not they are handled by amateurs who trust their 
hunch as tpractical men of ~ffairs.' 
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The second possibili~y is the 'vicious circle' of the kind 
described by Legge (1978:55-7). Specialist managers may b~ excluded 
from day-to-day matters and will only be called in as problem solvers. 
Their exclusion from routine matters will render them less effective 
in dealing with the tasks they are set. This will lower the priority 
given to Industrial Relations even further. 
One reason for this type of role is given by Legge (1978:59-66). 
, 
It is suggested that Personnel's contribution is difficult to measure. 
This is certainly the case if the nature of information communicated 
is considered. Industrial Relations information may be impossib~e 
to quantify. Goldner (1970:130) compares this with the 'harder' 
data available for production and sales. Where statistics are used 
in Industrial Relations Baker and France note (1954-:84-6) that these 
may only give a vague guide as to whether specific policies are 
being applied. No indicatio~ can be given of the qualitative aspects 
of Industrial Relations. Often statements can only be expressed in 
terms of 'progress i.s being made'. The eIR note (19"74:16-9) that 
even where such information channels exist they may not be used. 
2 Plant and Central Responsibility 
It is essential to make the distinction between the making and 
taking of decisions in the application stage. These are most easily 
confused when estimating the degree of decentralisation in any 
organisation. Although decisions may be taken at one level, e.g. the 
plant, they may act-uallJ" be made at another level, e.g. the group. 
On some issues plant m8~agers may take the aecisions while 
directors at group level may actually make tllem. 
With -t.his in mind one must stress the level at which effective 
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decisions are actually taken, rather than where they may appear to be 
made. In this way directors at group level may be engaged in applying 
control. 
Baker and France (1954:58-9) have stressed this point. They 
suggest it is essential to distingQish between the 
'application of policies permitting some v~riation In 
decision on the one hand, and the transmittal of 
decisions or other supervisors-employee contacts not 
involving decision making on the other.' 
Thu~ management may refer to decentralisation as 'the methods and 
personal relationships rather than the actual delegation of discretion 
in decision making.' Management may define decentralisation in terms 
of who is responsible for transmitting the deciSions, rat~er than as 
who is responsible for making the decisions in the first place. 
A good example is provided by a dispute in a group with a highly 
integrated system of production. During the period of research a 
strike took place In one of the Rolls plants. The level of integratiol~ 
was such that other plants in the group would soon be affected by this 
stoppage. Because of these group wide implications Industrial 
Relations management at group level became involved. At one point 
group management were actually making decisions regarding the dispute, 
although they were actually being taken by plant management. This was 
in an attempt to maintain the image of plant autonomy. Group 
management wer.t to great lengths to preserve this autcn.omy using 
highly covert and subtle forms of intervention. At times non-IR 
management at group level pressurised the specialist managers to 
intervene directly. In the main these pressures were resisted because 
of the desire of Industrial Relations managemsnt to protect the 
illusion of plant autonomy. 
There are occasions when such outside intervention can be useful. 
255 
Intervention from group level in plant matters can rejuvenate negot-
iatio~s which have become bo~ged down. However this intervention is 
something which must be expertly timed. It is a 'trump card' which 
must not be wasted. Winkler notes (1974:205) that directors may 
deliberately cultivate this image cf 'separateness' and 'anti-concern' 
so that their intervention may have an increased impact. 
It is therefore essent ial as Brooke and . Remmers (1978: 22) 
have noted to distinguish between independence and discretion. 
Managers may be in positions of indepencence, while having very limited 
powers of decision making. A plant manager may be independent from 
group control for routine day-to-d~y matters, but this independence 
may be limited to these matters alone. If a dispute arises which 
influences other plants in the group, he may suddenly lose his 
independence. 
The application stage of control may therefore be a good indicator 
of the actual degree of centralisation that exists within the 
organisation in practice. 
Particular importance should be attached to the functional liwzs 
that exist between plant and central management. The level to which 
plant Industrial Relations management reports may be indicative of 
the actual locus of control within the group. Therefore if Industrial 
Relations management has a high priority within the organisation and 
has strong links with the group or division this is likely to 
result in important decisions in Industrial Relations being made 
centrally. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a framework for analysing the role of 
management in Industrial Relations. In particular it has recognised 
three stages in the control process. At each of these stages various 
control systems have been discussed. This h~s provided the 
opportunity to put bargaining structure in the context of the control 
process. Two sources of influence on management have been identified. 
First, those internal to the organisation such as size and technology. 
Second those external to the firm such as product market and the law. 
The final question to be answered concerns the impact of the 
management control process on union behaviour. In particular the 
paradox noted at tIle beginning of this part needs to be explained. 
'. 
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CHAPrER NINE : EFFECTIVENESS OF STYLES OF MANAGING INDUSTRIAL ~~LATIC~TS 
- -~~-.======================= 
Introduction 
Chapter Eight outlined a framework for analysing the style of 
managing Industrial Relations employed in any orga~isation. It describei 
systematically the possible control systems that could be used. 
At this stage the impact of these styles' of managing Industrial 
Relations on union behaviour is examined. This will have at its core 
the relationship between bargaining structure and union behaviour. 
As noted previously one aspect of union behaviour unique to multl-
plant organisations is studied: the comparisons and contacts made 
between plants within the same group. 
In fact the focus here is slightly more precise. This chapter 
concentrates upon the effectiveness of management control over this 
activity. Management control is said to be effective if this unioD 
activity is regulated and maLe predictable. Thus the actual existence 
of inter-plant activity is not taken as the criterion for judgi~g 
effectiveness of control. It is the control which management have oveT 
this activity that is important. Therefore there may be a high level 
of activity which is well controlled by management. Alternatively 
a low level of activity may not be under management control. 
Comparisons are made between different styles of management In 
order to extract the crucial factors influencing the effectiveness of 
management control. This will enable the paradoxical impact of 
bargaining structure on union behaviour to be explained. Ford and 
GEC although having completely different bargaining structures 
enjoyed a high level of control ove~ union behaviour. Rolls and 
Tubes, having similar bargaining structures had only a low level 
of control. 
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In order to explain this paradox the concept of 'ideal types' 
of styles of managing Industyial Relations is used. These ideal types 
are based upon, but do not completely represent the cases. They are 
abstractions from reality designed to make comparisons easier. This 
concept has a number of benefits. 
First it exaggerates the predominate traits of the control 
process with a case, but is not dependent on a case. Second the 
types are not mutually exclusive and are used in combination. Finally 
the concept widens the applicability of the study but using the cases 
as the basis. Generalisations and hypotheses can be generated using 
ideal types in a way not possible if the analysis was solely restricted 
to case studies. 
Thus it is the style of managing Industrial Relations in each 
case which is abstracted and idealised, not the actual case material 
itself. 
Below the notion of ideal types is explained further, and then 
applied to the task of comparing effectiveness. 
Weber was t~e first to develop the notion of an ideal type. Its 
use here has two attractions. 
First, as a type it was designed to include a number of similar 
but complex phenomena. It enabled one to distinguish, analytically 
at least, between types which previously had been seen as largely 
homogeneous. 
Second, the type was not seen as ideal in that it represented 
something desi~able. But rather as Burger (1976:154) has noted 
'ideal means that the conceptual content is abstracted from 
empirical reality in an idealizing or exaggerating fashion.' 
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Thus an id.eal type e.A.aggerates and highlight2 the salient 
characteristic of each case. This allows the differences, rather 
than the similarities between the cases to be compared more easily. 
These four types analysed below represent only some of the 
possible stylecl of managing Industrial Relations. 1 They are those 
which have emerged from the cases studied. With different data a 
, 
whole variety of other styles are possib:i.e. No claims are made for 
these styles to be comprehensive in any way. They merely represent 
the styles which appeared to be important in the cases studied. 
1 It may be considered unusual to develop four 'ideal types' from 
four cases, but it must be remembered that these cases wpre deliberately 
chosen to represent some of the major variations of large multi-pla~t 
organisations in the eneineering industry. The use of 'ideal types' 
is more of a method of ~~alysis than an attempt to represent all t~~ 
major variations. 
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A IDEAL TYPES OF STYLES OF MANAGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The four ideal types outlined below exaggerate and simplify the 
predominant form of control in each case. They have tnree important 
components. 
First, the types of control systems used ~ld the levels at which 
they are located. 
Second, the significance attached to and the use made of formal 
bargaining structure. 
Finally the extent of inter-plant unlon activity and the degree 
of control which management appear;:; to exercise over this. 
The four ideal types studied 
Parent Autocracy 
Group Co-ordination 
Divisional Co-ordination 
Plant Autonomy. 
1 Parent Autocracy 
1 
are: 
Management control is located primarily at Group level and covers 
finance, production, investment, Personnel and Industrlal Relations 
control systems. 
Within this type financial and production control systems 
operated in the plants are administered from group level. This style 
requires 
system of 
a homogeneity 
t . 2 produc lone 
of product, but allows a highly illtegrated 
1 These ideal types are based respectively upon the follOtving cases: 
Ford; Rolls; Tubes and GEG. 
2 Th~re are of course excentions to this generalisatDn which on 
_______ -; ___ ~---- --~~-~ ~-:::-~-::: ;";-;_____ ---:::C-:-:_;':;:'T' it. 11Y1<::!n1lY11'"i 0.(;" T(1T 
261 
Personnel control. systems are also located at grc~p level. 
These include control over recruitment, selection, training, promotion 
and movement of managers. In theory, 'at least, group management has a 
high degree of control over other managers. By use of these control 
systems group management can attempt to influence the characteristics, 
attitudes and expertise of management throug~out the group. Also it 
is aole to match up the demands of particular posts with the abilities 
of individual managers. 
Major terms and conditions for manual workers are settled at 
group level for manual and staff workers. Agreements are written up, 
signed and detailed. There is complete parity of terms and conditions 
across all UK plants. This bargaining structure is likely to be 
associated with the development of 'green field' sites with standardised 
terms and conditions imposed from the outset. 
Although formal bargaining takes place at group level some 
negotiations may take place in the plants. This would cover issues 
which are either omitted from the group agreement or are inadequately 
dealt with. 
However group management will attempt to exercise control over 
. this. It is likely that the Industrial Relations managers in the 
plants will assume responsibility for much of this bargaining. Close 
links will be maintained between group management and the managers 
in the plants. Bargaining in the plants will take place within the 
confines of the group agreements ~d under the scrutiny of group 
management. 
Inter-plant union activity is b~sed upon a manual combine 
comprising of convenors from all the plants. It/is well organised 
and formally recognised by management. The combine constitutes the 
major part of the union side in negotiations. This main activity 
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between the plants ~s well developed but largely ~~der management 
control. 
Thus bargaining structure in this style occupies an extreme 
position along the continuum of bargaining levels. Also it is 
largely consistent or congruent with the other control systems 
employed by management. Fin'ally it is seen as a major means of 
controlling union inter-plant activity and is largely effective. 
2 Group Co-ordination 
In this style finance, production, investment, Personnel and 
most Industrial Relations control systems are located at group level. 
Products will tend to be homogeneous, with a few variations of one 
type. Plants will usually be integrated, most producing components 
which are assembled in a few major sites. 
Personnel control systems are also located at group level. These 
too are aimed at improving the integration of the group as a whole. 
Centralised control over recruitment, selection, training, promotion 
and movement of management will be aimed at promoting a feeling of 
belonging to a single organisation. 
Collective Bargaining takes place at plant level, usually on a 
formal basis with detailad written agreements. A number of separate 
sites may be included within one plant agreement. It ~s likely that 
there ~ill be major disparities between the plants on terms and 
conditions. One reason for this may be that such groups are the 
product of mergers. Plants that were previously part of another 
group are now part of the same group. 
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Bargaining stru~ture in this style does not occupy an extreme 
position and is not consisten~ with many of the other control systems 
·operated by management. 
In an effort to co-ordinate plant bargaining Industrial Relations 
management may intervene from group level in a ilumber of ways. Group 
management may set limits for pay increases and try to shape bargaining 
across the group as a whole, or may intervene directly In disputes. 
Some of this co-ordination may be in response to the high level 
of uncontrolle~ union inter-plant activity. Inter-plant disparities 
are 'likely to encourage comparisons or 'read-across' between plants. 
In order to remove some of the more obvious differentials management at 
group level may equalise certain rates of payor conditions. Such 
intervention may encourage unlon activity between. plants still further. 
The overall result is that management have a generally low level of 
control over inter-plant union activity. Union activity of this kind 
may be restricted by differences of attitude and aims which exist 
between plants which prevent the co-ordination of action. 
3 Divisional Co-ordination 
In this type a number of important management control systems are 
located at Divisional level, for example financial, investment, Personnel 
and some Industrial Relations control systems. 
A number of divisions may exist within the group, each based upon 
a series of products. There may be some integration of production 
within the Divisions, but not between them. Division management may 
supply funds fOT new investment proj6cts, and set overall financial 
targets. This gives a strong but normally loose ~ethod of control. 
Plants which in the past have been run independently may now be coming 
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increasingly under the control of Division, especially if they have 
poor financial results. 
Divisional control over the plants is strengthened by a ser1es 
of Personnel control SySt~illS. These cover recruitment, selection, 
training, promotion and movement of managers. These controls are 
used particularly for graduates and senior managers. 
·····i· !" 
Collective Bargaining 1S conducted at plant level for most lssues. 
Negotiations are formalised with written agreements. As in the 
previous style it is likely that many disparities of pay and terms 
and conditions may exist between plants. This may be because plants 
were subject to few controls in the past and allowed to bargain 
independently. As these plants are brought together the differentials 
are highlighted.· 
Again therefore bargaining structure is not aligned or consistent 
with the other control systems used by management. Also the structure 
does not occupy an extreme position on the continuum of lev~ls. 
Divisional management may intervene to try and counter the 
inter-plant union activity or simply to provide advice and guidelines 
for bargaining. Guidelines may be strengthened for issues prone to 
'read across'. Usually however such controls are ad hoc. 
Within this style union activity will be present but poorly 
organised. Manual combines may challenge investment decisions at 
divisional level rather than seeking pay parity. While white collar 
activity may concentrate upon inter-plant comparison, particularly 
. /' 
as non-salary items. Again inter-plant union co-ordination is 
limited by the sheer weight of plant based matters and divides 
between the plants. Hence the unions may be ~ware that for some issues 
plant autonomy is illusory, yet they are unable to challenge this at 
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the moment. But this lS ~ highly volatile situation which may 
easily change. 
4 Plant Autonom~ 
The majority of issues In this style of managing Industrial 
Relations are controlled from plant level, e.g. production and cost 
control systems. Groups with this style teLd to have highly diverse 
product ranges with very little integration or contact between plants. 
Financial and investment control systems are located at group 
level. These allow separate plants a great deal of day-to-day 
autonomy. In return for this the plants are expected to meet pre-
determined·financial ratios and targets which are set by the group. 
Plants are free to succeed, but not free to fail. Any plant 
performance regarded as unsatisfactory results in rapid investigation 
from group level. The Managing Director of each plant may be virtually 
completely responsible for the running of his plant, or for a series 
of closely related plants. 
Styles of control such as this may be a consequence of ~he 
formation of the group. For example if the group is a result of 
mergers.with a wide range of products centralised control on all issues 
is not feasible. But certain crucial subjects, mostly financial, 
can be controlled from t~e centre. Such control systems may have been 
used to rationalise production after a merger. The extremes of plant 
autonomy arid parent autocracy exist within one style. Indeed such 
a combination may be vital to managing a highly varied and complex 
group. It appears that the greater the degree of decentralisation, 
the greater is the need for some form of overall control. This is 
referred to as the 'paradox of Qecentralisation.' 
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There are very few Personnel control systems seen in previous 
styles. Group management prnvides informa.tion, ad-iTice and training 
facilities. But in general the focus is on the plant. 
Bargaining in this style will take place at or below plant level. 
The low attention given to Industrial Relations may mean that few issues 
are formally negotiated at plant level. Many issues ~~y be the subject 
of informal negotiations and custom and practice at shop floor or 
department level. 
Bargaining structure lS therefore at the extreme of the continuum 
in terms of level and form. Also bargaining structure is largely 
consistent with the majority of the other plant based control systems 
used by management. 
In styles such as these union activity between the plants is 
likely to be very limited. Despite the fact that significant disparities 
may exist between the plants neither manual or white collar unions 
engage in inter-plant activity. Management has little need for the 
Industrial Relations controls seen in other styles. Management has 
effective control over inter-plant union activity. 
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B COMPARI SON OF' STYLES OF MANAGING I1'musrRIAL RELATIONS 
Comparisons Gan now be made between the styles on the basis of 
their effectiveness of control. This is defined as the degree of 
control afforded by each.style over inter-plant union activity. This 
may be irrespective of the extent of such union activity, and is 
concerned with whether it is controlled hy management. 
It is immediately evident that effective control is not linked 
to the control systems employed by management in any simple way. At 
first sight there appears to be no consistent relationship betwec~ the 
attention and resources devoted to Industrial Relations and the 
effectiveness of control over inter-plant activity. Opposite styles 
. 
of management seem to result in similar degrees of effectiveness. 
This paradox is explained below. However first the argument must 
be retraced. 
The initial point to be stressed is the range of control systems 
1 that exist within anyone style of management. When attempting to 
control Industrial Relaticns management do not rely solely on 
bargaining structure. In addition various other control systems are 
used. Some styles place great emphasis upon highly visible structures, 
while others seem to achieve similar results by means of more covert 
and subtle techniques. 
As a consequence of this it is evident that management do not 
occupy one extreme structural position or another. To suggest th~t 
management have to choose between extremes of bargaining structure 
1 Reference should be made to Table 6 for a summary of the controls 
used in each style. 
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(as is typified by plant autonomy and parent autocracy) is to pose 
an unhelpful dichtomy. Comt~nations of structures and controls are 
used which are not easily assigned to one position or another. 
Thirdly management do not simply adopt a compromise between these 
two extremes. Management do not attempt to merely achieve the 
advantages of the extremes by adopting a 'mi~ way' position. In 
practice the tactics used are more sophisticated. Two examples can 
be quoted. 
When bargaining in the plant ~anagement are faced by a number of 
constraints emanating from the various levels of management. It is 
possible that they may stress different constrai~ts depending upon 
the issue in question. Management may alter their reference group 
in-bargaining to suit their argument. On some issues, e.g. pay, 
management may stress the independence of their plant. If shop 
stewards in the plant make inter-plant pay comparisons management may 
insist upon their own autonomy. They will emphasise that pay 
settlements must be based upon the plant's ability to pay. On other 
occasions management may use a quite different reference group. For 
certain subjects eg. fringe benefits or holidays, management may 
emphasise the constraints that are placed upon them by group or 
divisional management. They may suggest that although they may want 
to concede their 'hands are tied'. In these examples wanagement may 
emphasise different constraints or reference groups depending upon 
the subject. 
There are other occasions when the same issue can potentially 
at least be dealt with ln a number of different ways. For example 3. 
dispute can, ln -theory at least, be dealt with by shop floor, plant, 
division, or group management. Often the level used wi~l depend upon 
the 'seriousness' of the dispute. Minor disputes will be dealt with 
in the plant, while major disputes affecting the whole group will 
be dealt with at a much h~.gher lev'9l. Management therefore have a 
number of control systems which they can use to solve anyone problem. 
In this case management occupy a number of ciiffere:nt positions at 
the same time and for the same issue • 
.... 
• j •.•• ;"::.: 
Not only can different issues be referred to various reference 
groups by management, but also the same lssue can be dealt with in a 
number of different ways. These two examples constitute an important 
resource for management which is not available to unions to the same 
extent. 
One would think that this flexibility would be a crucial factor 
in determining management's control over inter-plant activity. That 
1S the more positions management could adopt the greatar its chances 
of solving one problem. However this does not seem to be the case. 
The'degree of flexibility appears to be li~~ed to the style of 
management adopted. For example flexibility should increase as the 
resources devoted to Industrial Relations are expanded. With 
increased attention management would have a greater range of services 
on which it could rely. 
But it has been seen that the style of management and degree 
of ~ffective control are not consistently linEed. A ~igher degree 
of attention given to Industrial Relations does not result necessarily 
in increased cOl':trol. Flexibility ioes not appear to be the intervening 
variable between the, style of management and effectivJ control. 
Flexibility may be important in certain circumstances, bu-t does not 
appear to be crucial in extending management control over inter-
plant union activity. 
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In order to explain the paradox of management control it is 
necessary to consider the legitimacy of management authori~y in 
each style. 
1 Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is a useful one for understanding 
the effectiveness of different styles of managing Industrial 
Relations~ 
Brown (1972:48) notes it 1S essential to ask the question 
legitimacy for whom. In this case it is the legitimacy of management 
control from the employees perspective Which is being examined. 
For Fox (1971: 34) management control is legitimate if it takes 
the form of a non-coercive authority which is acceptable to both 
sides. If this legitimacy does not exist then management will be 
seen as exercising coercive power against the interests of the unions. 
But as Fox (1971:47) notes it is rare for there to be complete 
acceptance or rejection of management's position. In most cases 
there l-lilL be a conflicting legitimacy which may detract from 
management's authority. For example unions may accept the overall 
authority of management while challenging certain specific aspects 
of the exercise of this authority, eg. collective bargaining. As 
will be shown below it is 'not the reality of management control which 
is important so much as the image of it that is perceived by the 
workforce. Also it will be evident that the ability to challenge 
/' 
managerial legi tima'cy may be limited by material and ideological 
factors. 
Fox (1971:39-42) has analysed the bases of managerial legitimacy 
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which management seek to support their authority. The concept of 
ideology is central to this discussion. 
He notes (1971 :39) that 'we are concerned T/vith the ideas and 
values by which management validat3 its procedural norms. In this 
quest for legitimacy, ideologies are pressed into service in the hope 
of promoting agreement on these values.' Later he suggests (1971:1 24) 
that 'ideology is a resource in the struggle for power since it shapes 
the way in which men perceive, think, fecI and act. Management seeks 
to propogate an ideology which justifies its behaviour, legitimizes 
its rule, evokes loyalty and commit~ent on the part of lower as well 
as higher participants, and serves asa support for those norms and 
values which are congruent for its goals.' However Fox does point out 
that ideology should not be seen in a deterministic fashion since 
(1971: 125) 'On neither the management nor the collectivity side does 
ideology take the form of a consistent and related body of ideas and 
values. Rather does it consist of a ragbag of assorted notions 
fashioned to suit varying exigencies, sometimes qtute incompatible 
with each other.' 
It must be noted that the above simplifies the situation somevJhat. 
Two points will be briefly mentioned now and developed further below 
once the bases of legitimacy have been outlined. 
First the 'reality' of management control or ideology may not 
always be the crucial factor. This may take Gne form, while employees 
may perceive the situation in a completely different way. Hence it 
is essential to take account of the image of manage~ent control and 
",-
ideology as much as the reality. It is this subjective aspect of 
legitimacy which 1S the cr~cial factor in determining mal~gerial 
authority. The projection of an ideology by management can be studied. 
But also it is essential to investigate hmv this image is received and 
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interpreted by employees. On some occasions the image will correspond 
with reality, while o~ other occasions it may not. 
Second the challenges to managerial legitimacy must be studied. 
In particular the conflicting ideology of the trade unions must be 
investigated. This conflict takes place often in bargaining. 
side is trying to convince the other of the validity of its position. 
In particular the obstacles to this union challenge, both material 
and ideological must be studied. 
Fox (1971:38) has noted some consequences of such challenges. 
He notes that management may react with increasingly sophisticated 
'techniques in order to protect its ideology, or it may resort to 
coercive power. 'Finding its authority failing, management falls back 
on the coercive sanctions of power, only to find that this further 
undermines its own legitimacy, which in turn prompts the intensifieQ 
use· of pl)wer.' 
The concept of legitimacy can be applied to the multi-plant 
context. Two aspects must be considered. First the ability of 
management to justify and legitimate its authority. Second the ability 
of employees and unions to challenge this legitimacy by inter-plant 
activity. 
In this context only one aspect of managerial legitimacy is dealt 
with: that concerning different levels of management. It is suggested 
that tllere are a number of sources or bases which will influencE: the 
extent to which the authority of various levels of management are seer-
as legitimate. 
A group with plant bo.rgaining can be taken as an example. Al thm.:..gh 
agreements are made at plant l~vel the legitimacy of plant management's 
authority may be low. The ste~lards may feel that plant mano,gerr~nt QO 
not have complete control, and hence may seek ~o challenge their 
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authority. They may do this by attempting to conduct bargaining at the 
level at which effective dec~sions are made. 
Therefore for a number of reasons, \-,rhich are examined in detail 
below stewards may doubt the legitimacy of the level o~ manage~0nt 
with whom they bargain. They may feel that plant mana.gerr.ent are only a 
front or obstacle protecting those who actually make the effective 
decisions. Shop stewards may challenge this ~uthorits by making inter-
plant comparisons at the level at which they feel important decisions 
are made. Or .they may seek to bargain directly with those whom they feel 
are" responsible for important decisions. For whatever reason shap 
stewards will engage in inter-plant. activity where they doubt the 
legitimacy of the level of management with whom they bargain. 
In putting forward this challenge the stewards are providing 
support for a more general statement made by Clegg (1976:10). 'Collective 
bargaining has its regulatory effect by restricting and controlliLb 
managerial decisions. Consequently it has its best chance of being 
effective when it operates at the points where managerial decisions 
are taken. f 
Such inter-plant activity is not solely a consequence of doubt 
about plant management's legitimacy. Inter-plant comparisons may 
simply be pursued because they add strength to a ~ion argument in 
bargaining. As such they are only one form of a whole series of 
comparisons made by unions. 
Brown and Sisson (1975) and Hyman (1975) have both noted the 
signifi~ance of pay comparisons in wage bargaining. Hyman (1975:74) 
notes that 'they form the bread and bu-tter of trade union arguments 
over wages'. Brown and Sisson note (1975:23) that the p~suit of fair 
comparisons may produce a 'mecha.nism of wage determination beyond 
the scope of conventional labour market forces'. These authors 
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concentrate upon intra-plant and intra-occupational comparisons and 
conclude (1975:44) that the use of comparison 'has been an influence 
, 
upon wage determination of outstanding importan0e.' 
Thus it can be established that the notion of comparison lS at 
the heart of many conceptions of fairness in pay. In the multi-plant 
context such comparisons ~ay be used in support of arguments seeking 
.. ,-
to reduce inter-plant differentials. It may be thought 'fair' that 
plants in t~e same group should enjoy the same pay and terms and 
conditions. 
Inter-plant activity may not only be a consequence of doubts 
about managerial legitimacy but is- also a function of fairness. 
However indirectly notions of fairness may be attached to the concept 
of legitimacy. For example if the authority and independeLce of plant 
management is accepted this may inhi bit inter-plant cOfuparisons even 
though large differentials may be present. Notions of fairn8ss may be 
plant based, rather than group or dlvisional based. 
The sources or bases of managerial legitimacy can be analysed in 
the following way. 
Three bases of managerial legitimacy in multi-plant organisatiops 
can be recognised. 
The congruency or consistency of controls and structures 
employed by management may be a crucial influence upon the legitimacy 
of management. 
For example legitimacy may be strenthened if non-IR, Personnel 
and Industrial Relations control systems ~re aligned with one another. 
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Should these not be in harmony then it is possible that shop st~wards 
in the plant may become curious, if not confused, as to wt~t is the 
effective level 0f control within the organisation. 
The existence or lack of consistency can become complicated cy 
two point s. First, ther,e may be an incongruency whi ch managemer.-:: may 
be aware of, but which is not perceived by shop stewards in the plant. 
Second, stewards may be aware of this disharmony, but they may be 
unwilling or unable to do anything about this. Hm..,rever the initial 
point remains valid, if the controls are aligned the potential for 
inter-plant union activ:k,ty is that much less. 1 
The ability to refer to external determinants of action is another 
important resource for management in its search for' legitimacy. 
Managerial actions and structures can be justified and validated 
·bymaki~g references to external forces. Legitimacy may be further 
increased if management can create the impression that they have 'no 
control' over some of these factors. Management may suggest that 
they have 'no choice' but to take a particular COU1~se of action. For 
it is not their choice, but forces over which they have no influence 
which are dictating to them. 
This may of course be the case on some occasio!~. Management 
may be forced to take one course of action simply t2 survive or 
maintain a minimum level of profitability. But the~~ are also other 
occasions ~Then management 'may stress those influences which su:r;port and 
add weight to particular actions or decisions. In ~~is way management 
are able in some ways to 'interpret' the influence ~: their enviro~~eLt 
to suit their own purposes. A similar point has be{".:: made by Child 
(1973:93) in his criticisms of 'contingency theoryt_ 
1 See eIR (1974=59); Thomson & Hunter (1975: 21) 
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This ability may be well suited to Industrial Relat~ons decisions. 
~or it has been shown that many of these are derived from other decisions 
made inside the firm. Many of the constraints within which Industrial 
Relations operates 'emanate from inside the organisation. Hence it lS 
possible to alter the amount of emphasis placed on each constraint 
depend.ing upon the situation. 
Overall it appears that groups with the most extreme structures 
and controls seem best able to explain these away in terms of external 
const raint s • 
Finally the existence of a strong or unified managerial phjlosophy 
seems to strengthen managerial legitimacy in two ways. 
First it will provide a continual and comprehensive r~tionalisation 
for management's position. Ideally, at least, it will provide an all 
embracing and consistent explanation for a whole series of management 
actions and structures. It will therefore provide a focal point for 
the organisation, and give the employees something with which they can 
identify. ' 
Second the philosophy may represent a whole series of traditions 
and beliefs that have been built up over a long perloa. The philosophy 
may sum up the culture of the organisation, ani will often be regenerated 
by the process of socialisation. Brown (1972:54) refers to this as 
'customary legitimacy'. Such a philosophy supported in this way may 
be highly resistant to change since it develops its o~ inertia~ 
Managerial legitimacy is not the only factor influencing inter-
plant union activity. It is essential to consider the factors which 
may inhibit such activity. Hyman (1975:82) has divided tllese into 
. 1 
'ideological' and 'material' facto~s. 
1 This discussion is con-cinued in the following Chapter. 
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A common factor inhioiting inter-plant activity is the traditior.al 
attachment of employees to their own plant. Such loyalty ~ay be 
particularly strong in small plants run in the past on paternalist 
lines. The result may be that employe'es may ignore management 
interference from outside the plant, and care little that large 
differentials exist between plants in the same Division or Group. 
A good example of this existed in the Tubes plants. Both plants 
had been run in an autocratic paternalist manner and enjoyed considerable 
operating autonomy. Many employees still based their attitudes upon 
the earlier period, although those conditions no longer prevailed. 
The inward looking and parochial attitudes developed in the past 
severely ir~ibited inter-plant activity_ The eIR (1974:23) have noted 
that management in the plant may try to emphasise such attitudes. They 
note plant 'management 'have built up the authority of senior stewards 
as part of a deliberate policy of retaining control of Industrial 
Relaticns matters generally within the organisation.' 
The traditional attachment to the plant may be ch&llenged by 
overt demonstration of divisional interference. Management in the 
plant go to great lengths to play these down. The result may be 
confusion within the workforce as to the effective level of control. 
Second are the more pragmatic or material obstacles to inter-
plant activity. The result of these is that shop steward power outside 
the plant is extremely limited. 
'" 
The majority of iSbues and problems ccnfronting shop stew~rds are 
at plant level in most cases. This is of course a consequence of the 
bargaining structure. Shop stewards are dependent upon the workforce 
,/ 
for their support and mLlst appear, at least, to be serving their 
interests. This requires t~at they concentrate upon plant based issues. 
Often the sheer weight of plant based matters means that =tew~rds have 
little time or inclination to engage in inter.-plant activity- Often 
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such an activity will be undertaken with the hope of improving the 
bargaining position within the plant. Fox has made a similar point 
(1971:1 27) 'In situations where men are conscious of incongruency but 
are prevented from organising themselves collectively c ••••• thpy 
seek to justify and rationalise self-seeking benaviour with an 
appropriate individualistic ideology.' 
Therefore when faced with the need to satisfy thej.r members 
shop stewards rationalise their behaviour even in the face of marked 
inter-plant disparities. 
" Even if there is demand to set up a combin:~ there are many 
obstacles to be faced. 
The eIR (1974:35) notes a number of prerequisites for setting 
up effective combines. These include a willingnoss to co-operate, 
provision for time off and access to information. 
Beynon and Wainwright (1979:169) have noted that Gonflicts or 
divisions can exist betwe8n plants. This was well demonstrated In 
Rolls. A number of factors contributed to the disharmony betwe€fl 
the plants. These were personal conflicts, and a feeling that some 
plants adopted an elitist attitude. But perhaps most important was the 
pay disparities that existed. Those pl~~ts at the top of the earnings 
league would do nothing which would put thQS position" in jeopardy. 
T!ley would support the combine on certain issues, but would not 
press for group bargaining leading to an elimination of their hc::.rd 
won differential. Management were not unaware of this feeling and may 
at times exaggerate such attitudes. In doing so they are pursuin~ 
a policy of 'divide and rule'. 
Brown and Sisson (1975: t15) have not ed the i~portance of inform-
ation flows. The availability of such information is the crucial raw 
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material upon which comparisons are based. As the authvrs note 
'Information, whether true or false, is essential for there to be a 
basis for effective comparisons'. The availabjlity of such data may 
alter if there is achang~ in bargaining structure or payment systeffi. 
For as Brown and Sisson note 'The major cause of the growth on intra-
. plant comparisons on Fleet Street was the quite fortuitous fact that 
'comprehensive' agreemen-'us made pay levels clearly identifiable which 
.:.: . 
had hitherto been obscured by the complexity of the pay system'. This 
was certainly the case in Rolls where a change to measured day work 
some years ago improved union ability to make meaningful comparisons. 
Inter-plant differentials could no longer be written off as a 
consequence of complex systems of pay bargaining. It is possible 
that white collar unions may have a better access to information. 
(Brown and Terry 1978:131). The result may be that certain unions 
eg. ASTMS may attempt to match the s~yle of managing Industrial 
Relations. For example they may attempt to bargain at group or 
divisional level while management insists on bargaining in the plant. 
It ·appears that these unions have acknowledged the changes that 
have taken place in bargaining structure. They realise that it is 
not the extremes of shop floor or industry which are important, but 
plant or company level. Changes such as these are discussed by 
Ramsay (1971:44). 
Managerial opposition to combine activities may result in no 
time being allowed to shop stewards to engage ln inter-plant 
activity. Certainly there is no liSgislative provision for such 
. ./ 
time off. 
Official trade union opposition (CrR 1974:35) may starve 
combines of funds. One possible reason for union hostility is that 
they see such organisation as a threat to the established institutions. 
\ 
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Management are likely to be aware of these inhibitions and 
obstacles and will use them to their own advantage. 
At the very least management will do nothing to weaken those 
factors limiting inter-plant activity. ]lor example they will avoid 
overt displays of extra-plant managerial infLuence as far as possible. 
It is possible that a total refusal to recognise a combine may 
actually encourage such activity. The shop stewards may oe suspicious 
of the uniform attitude taken by plant management. Also they may feel 
that their ac~~vities are important enough to be ignored. 
Occasionally a different tactic may be used. If faced by a 
combine that is almost inevitably strong management may choose to 
formally recognise the body. The combine may come under the influence 
at least of management and its effectiveness may be weakened. This 
has been noted by Hyman (1975:193) 'once industrial conflict is openly 
articulated, it stimulates institutions of re~llation which limit 
its disruptive manifestations'. As shop stewards atte=pt to organise 
their activities they may find that they are forced to limit their 
efforts. 
This seems to have been the case tn Ford. Beynon and ~Tainwright 
(1979:169) have noted that Ford management recognised the combine 
simply because it was too powerful to ignore. Management then 
incorporated the combine into the negotiating structure in an attempt 
to control its activities. 
The styles of managing Industrial Relations can now b~ compared 
using the bases of legitimacy and the factors inhibiting inter-plant 
activity as a guide. 
The styles will be compared in pairs. The two styles ~ith the 
highest degrees of contro1 1 will be examined first. Second the 
. 2 
styles with 1m'; degrees of control will be investigated. 
1 Plant Autocracy and Plant Autonomy 
,... ,....""""',.,.~i"',~,.,~ o--~.:-~~+~-c-::.~~ "ivisional Co-ordination \l)l JL ~\l.J;""I""'" ~~=~'.O--v --' = __ ~u 
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2 High Degree of Effective Control 
The two styles with a high degree' of control also enjoy a high 
level of legitimacy. This appears to be for the following reasons. 
First the controls and structures employed by both of these 
styles are in harmony within each organization. Th3 majority of non-IR 
contl'ol systems are align8d with Personnel, Industrial Relations and 
Collective bargaining control systems. The result is that each 
control system reinforces and supports the other. 
In Parent Autocracy the majority of formal control structures are 
at group level. While in Plant Autonomy they are primarily located 
at the plant. The control of systems are internally congruent and 
consistent. There is little to pr.ovide confusion concerni:;:}g the 
effective level of control. Both cases present a clear and unambig-
uous image which is difficult to challenge. 
The result is that iL Plant Autonomy shop steward~ in the plant 
give little thought to using inter-plant comparisons. vfuile in 
Parent Autocracy the combine is formally recognised at group level 
and at least partly under the influence of management. 
Second, both of these styles assume extrc~e and totally opposite 
management and bargaining structures. This seems to have two benef~ts. 
These styles enjoy the benefits of this extreme formal structure. 
In one style this gives p8,ri ty of t8rms and conditions 7 while in the 
other demands for parity are virtually eliminated. 
A second benefit is that externFl.l structures appear to be more 
easily justified by reference to external determinants. It appears 
that management can only have adopted these extreme positi0TIS 
because of powerful forces which ace not easily resisted. The structures 
have a degree of inevitability about them. Managers are able to p0in~ 
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to highly visible ar.Ld strong determinants in order to legitimate 
their act ions. 
In Barent Autocracy reference is made to the high level of 
integration of production leading to group level bargai:ling. vfr..ile 
in Plant Autonomy the independence of plants is justified in terms 
of the highly diversified product range. 
Management will argue that 'we have no option but to act in 
this way for these reasons , 'A h ••••• s as been noted previously 
management are: not completely powerless in this situation. At certain 
times for example when setting up the organisation, or after a rn~rger~ 
management may have control over some of these influences. Factors 
such as the influence of technology undoubtedly have a big impact 
in the short run. The characteristics of the technology employed 
can place severe constraints on the ability of management to make 
decisions. However in the long run management dces have some choice 
in the t~~e of technology it employs. 
Finally both of these styles have clearly identified, but 
completely contrasting philosophies of m~~agement. It is the strength 
and consistency of these philosophies rather than their details which 
are important for the legitimacy of management. 
This philosophy may have been built up over time~ or emanate 
from one central figure such as the Managing Director. The result lS 
that a continuous source of legi+,imacy is provided. Sadler (1906:16) 
has noted the significance of an identifiable style for individual 
managers, but the same lesson can be applied here •. He notes that 
'leaders who are seen as having distin~t and identifiable styles of 
leadership are more effective in promoting confidence and satisfaction, 
whatever style they adopt, tr.:.a.n ~hose who do not .have a distinctive 
style'. A clear and identifiable style is essential fo~ effective 
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control, while the actual content of this style may be c~condary. 
In both of the styles analysed above two characteristics are 
present. First management authority is seen as legitimate because 
of the strong ba.ses present. Second inter-plant activity is either 
high and controlled by management or virtual~y non-existent. 
-:This high level of legitimacy and consequent control over inter-
plant activity has one further benefit. Both cases are able to 
indulge in occasional actions which completely contradict their 
established positions. Their legitimacy is so strong that it can 
survive these exceptions. 
For example in Parent Autocracy there is bargaining l~ the plant 
despite formal negotiations taking place at group level. This 
bareaining does not detract from the importance of group negotiations, 
and in fact may allow it to be maintained. Similarly in Plant Autonomy 
there are occasional examples of a high degree of central control. 
Yet these events do not threaten th8 overall legitimacy of the autonomy 
of each plant. 
Instances such as these quoted tend, in these styles, to be treated 
as 'exceptions which prove the rule'. The re~~lt is that there is a 
high degree of potential flexibility in these styles which is not 
manifest, but latent. In order to achieve this flexibility mana.gement 
must first establish the legitimacy of various levels of management in 
the eyes of the workforce. 
These two styles do not simply a.dopt a compromise between two 
extremes. In fact by assuming one of these extreme positions they 
are able to establish the legitimacy of managerial author~ty. Ha~nng 
established this legitimacy both s~yles can occasionally adopt a number 
of conflicting positions which are unlikely to be challenged. It is 
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possible therefore that ty adopting extreme positions these stYles 
.. 
may possess a greater degree of flexibility than those styies whi:::h 
deliberately seek a compromise position. 
3 Low Degree of Effective Control 
The two remaining styles can be compared in a similar fashion. 
First both Group Co-ordination and Di ,,-isional Co-ordination 
exhibit a· considerable lack of harmony of control systems within 
their organisations. Their controls and structures are not aligned. 
For example in ,Divisional Co-ordination there are financial, 
Personnel and Industrial Relations control systems at Divisional 
level, while production and collective bargaining control systems 
are largely plant based. Similarly in Group Co-ordination 
Production, financial, Personnel and Industrial Relations controls 
are at Group level, while Collective Bargaining is pl~~t based. 
The result in both styles is a high degree of confusion and 
ambiguity about the effective level of control. Shop stelvards J.n 
the plant may suspect that if many controls emanate from group level, 
Collective Bargaining may also be controlled from there, no matter 
what the formal structure. might be. The shop ste~vards may doubt 
the legitimacy of management because of a lack of a clear cut or 
sharp image of the authority of various levels of management. Shop 
stewards are 7irtually encouraged to question the authority of plant 
management in bargaining because of the doubt and confusion that exists. 
Although management may continually stress the autonomy of each plant, 
many of their actions not directly concerneu with Industrial Relations 
may undermine this. 
Union inter-plant activity aimed at challenging m~~agement's 
position takes place but is limitdd. The main constraint appears 
to be the divides that exist between the plants. Often these may be 
a consequence of the plant bargaining structure. Those plants with 
high earnings may want to maintain their differentials. 
Second, neither of these styles occupies an extreme structural 
position. Both seem to have deliberately aimed for a compromise 
position, a middle way approach along the structural continuum. Two 
consequences are apparent. 
These styles do not benefit from the advantages of having a 
structurally extreme position. Rather than achieving the advantages 
of the positions they combine, they seem to encounter the difficulties 
and drawbacks of both. For example they have n(;i ther total cont rol 
over inter-plant activity, nor have they eliminated the existe~ce 
of such activity. 
These compromise positions seem to be more difficult to justify 
in terms of external determinants. It appears that either there are 
no strong pressures, or that these pressures have cancelled thL~selves 
out. The result being the middle way position that the tvlO styles occupy. 
Management do not seem able to introduce the element of inevitability 
that surrounds the structures and actions in the two preceeding styles. 
Finally neither of the styles has a dominant and easily identified 
management philosophy. There i~ no consistent means sf justifying 
management actions and decisions. This only adds to the confusion 
and doubt in these styles, rather than helping toeli~inate the~ as 
previously. 
Shop stewards in the plant may doubt every action ~hat management 
take, and will be suspicio~s of the interference of mar~gemsn~ from 
out side the plant. Confusion is therefore the estab:U.shed nor:n. 
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At present the ability of the unlons to pursue the~~ doubts is 
limited. However these limits are not the result of management control, 
as in the previous styles, but a result of the unions own divisions. 
Inter-plant activity could potentially be at a high level, because 
of management's unwillingness or inability to control this activity. 
Managerial control of inter-plant activity l3 not ~he result of their 
own actions so much as the inability of the unions to organise 
effectively. However this is a delicate balance. If an issue arlses 
which unites rather than divides the plants management policy will be 
undone. Such a~ issue would allow the contacts already existing to 
be more fully developed. 
The comparisons made above are briefly summarised by ~able 7. 
This outlines the characteristics of the bases of legitimacy In each 
style. 
Put simply it is evi~cnt that a two way classific~tion exists. 
Those styles having a high degree of legitimacy can be differentiated 
from those which do not. In these 8xamples w.-:ion ability to engage 
in inter-plant activity is also limited by a number of obstacles. 
It is possible that in other cases these obstacles will not exist. 
Also this activity may not be controlled by ~anagement. This would 
result in a high degree of uncontrolled inter-plant activity. Some~ 
thing which does not yet exist in the two cases quoted with low 
effective control. 
This examination explains one p;:!,radox only to reveal another. It 
appears that the styles with a greater degree of legit~macy are those 
which adopt controls which are consistel:..tly extreme and barked by an 
identifiable mana~rial philosophy. Once established, this legitimacy 
then allows management an unlikely degree of flexibility. This 
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flexibility is likely to be greater than that existing in styles 
which deliberately seek or compromise position. In these styles the 
lack of legitimacy leads to a continual questi0ning' of actions 
and hence severely limitc~ flexibility. 
The paradox is now clear: in order to achieve flexibility 
management must fi:rst adopt an extreme and lnflexible position. Only 
in this way can the legitimacy needed to exercise flexibility be 
" .. -.!.,' ,: 
generated. 
4 Conclusion 
The apparent paradox revealed earlier can now be explained. 
Effective control by management of inter-plant union activity is not 
solely dependent upon the characterictics of the style of management 
e.g. the resources devoted to Industrial Relations. Rather control is 
dependent upon the legitimacy accorded to management by the workforce 
and the obstacles to inter-plant activity. 
For example the control achieved in Parent Autocracy was not 
simply a consequence of the resources devoted to Industrial Relations. 
More important was the legitimacy of management from the workforce's 
perspective, and the obstacles to unio'n inter-plant activity outsid.e 
management control. Similarly in Plant Autonomy despite devoting 
very limited resources tc Industrial Relations effective control was 
achieved by managerial legitiillacy and obstacles to inter-plant 
activity. 
It is necessary therefore to examine in detail tIle bases of 
legitimacy and the nature of obstacles to inter-plant activity before 
tho effectiveness of a particular style can t~ explained. 
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CHAPTER TEN : IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to put this study in its context by 
considering SO~8 of t~e implications of the research. This involves 
... -
recalling some of the introductory comments made in the first ci'"\~pter 
and re-evaluating them in the light of tha findings. 
Although this study has examined some of the main types of large 
multi-plant engineering organisations it has had a relatively nar~ow 
focus for two reasons. First, it is necessary to pinpoint a specific 
subject to provide an argument with some direction and consistency. 
Second, resources of time we~e very limited and prev~nted really 
extensive f~eldwork. 
For these reasons this thesis has looked 2,t specific examples of 
management's attempts to control Industrial Relations. From these 
cases a number of tentative concepts and hypotheses have been 
generated. 
It is now possible however to drawfout some of the wider 
implications of this study. This is carried out in two ways. First 
by considering the present day consequence of the findings for 
manageme,nt, unions and the reform of Industrial Relations. Second, 
putting the study in its theoretical context by discussing some of 
the possible future areas of research emana1iing from this thesis. 
Broadening the study in this way will throw light on possible develop-
ments in Industrial Relations. For example evidence within the study 
can make a contribution to the debate developing over the grm·rth of 
b ,. 1 single employer argalnlng. 
1 see Brown & Terry (1978) 
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By way of introduction the principal findings of the research 
relevant to this discussion are recalled. 
Chapter Three argued that the level of bargaining cannot be looked 
at in isolation from the other dimensions of bargaining structure. 
This study has hO~Tever concentrated upon the bargaining level , with 
relatively little attention given to these other dimensions. Fu~ure 
research could take another of these dimensions, eg bargaining illlit or 
scope and subject it to the same kind of scrutiny. It may be useful 
to examine' the relationship between bargaining scope and shop steward 
activity in the plant. Alternatively the connection between 
bargaining ~it and various situational determinants could be considered. 
The ne'xt stage of the thesis argued that it is unnecessarily narrow 
to·conc6ntrate on the relationship between bargaining structure and 
union behavioux'. Bargaining structure, it was sug~sted, should be 
placed within the context of the control process operated by management. 
This revealed not only support for the growth of single employer 
bargaining but also pointed to the greater involvement of maPAgement 
in Industrial Relations. Further studies could consider v,-hether such 
developments were taking place in other kinds of multi-plant 
organisations. 
Finally Chapter Nine ·argued that a number of ideal types of styles 
of managing Industrial Relations could be recognised. These had 
varying degrees of control over inter-plant union activity depending 
, 
in part upon the legitimacy of managerial authority. Future researd: 
could attempt to develop additional ideal types or modify those put 
forward .. 
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1 Management 
The evidence from the case studies reinforces the previously noted 
trend towards single employer bargaining, at least on pay. 1 This is 
bargaining which is eithe,r explicitly independent or independent in 
practice of the National Agreement. However relatively little is 
known about the changes which are taking place within single employer 
bargaining. 
Brown and Terry (1978:131) suggest that there are a number of 
'forces 'wnich may be serving to push firms towards a more centralised 
or group level of bargaining'. This suggestion tends to conflict 
slightly with the existing evidence. Daniel (1976:28) notes that it 
is the plant that is the most important level of formal bargaining. 
Evidence arid analysis from this thesis can playa useful role In 
reconciling these two pieces of evidence. One approach is to look 
at the potentially conflicting pressures faced by management. 
On the basis of the evidence presented here and other research 
management in multi-plant organisations may be faced by a series of 
possibly conflicting pressures. McCarthy and Ellis (1973:4) refer 
to this as: the challenge from without and the challenge from within. 
Briefly·the first of these encourages decisions to be made centrally, 
while the latter suggests plant autonomy. 
There are both 'non-IR' and Industrial pressures for greater 
central control. 
/' 
Under the former heading two predominant pressures can be noted. 
First the increasing cost of capital demands some form of central 
1 On issues 8.side from pay, eg premia payments 
week the National Agreement is still important. 
dispute in the Engineering Industry. 
and length of working 
Witness the recent 
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control over finance and the allocation of investment fWlds. The 
pooling of resources allows them to be distributed with a group wide 
perspective in mind. Second economies' of scale encourage specialisation 
of production of particul~~ components in each plant. These plants 
are ~hen integrated and centrally co-ordinated. 
A number of Industrial Relations influences may lead to greater 
centralisation, some have been mentioned by Brown and Terry (1978:131). 
First the economies associated with group wide pension schemes and 
the need for consistency of treatment often result in this issue being 
settled at group level. Second managerial unionism tends to result In 
group level bargaining because of the group level co-ordination of 
these employees which previously existed. Third the cost of inter-
plant comparison or 'leap--::rogging' may cause management tv dispense 
with plant bargaining. This is particularly the case where they feel 
that combine committee activity is week. Finally there is the need 
for central monitoring of plant Industrial Relations b8cause of 
gov(;rnment i:;'lcomes policy. Brown and Terry see such pressures as 
only 'straws in the wind', however Ghis research sheds more light on 
these trends. 
A series of pressures suggest that there should be a greater 
decentralisation of management oontrol. 
Plant level bargaining has become very well established in the 
Engineering Industry, partly becaUSe of the previsions of the 
Nat ional Agreement. Over time management and shop steTpTards have 
become accustomeQ to exercising a go~d deal of autonomy in their own 
. " /' 
plant. 
Plant management prefer plant bargaining because it gives them 
the freedom to run their plants in the way they see fit, and enables 
the speedy resolution of disputes. They ~ay strongly resist any 
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attempt by group management to restrict this freedom in any way~ 
Shop steward power is very closely tied to the plant. It is 
there that members' interests lie, and also whe~e they have achieved 
a high level of involveme4~ in plar.t bargaining. Any attempt to 
reduye steward bargaining activity in the plant, eg by moving to 
group level bargaining, would be very strongly resisted. This 1S 
of course unless some subztitute activity, such as involvement in day-
•... 
" -
to-day decision making was possible. 
It appears therefore that manaeement are faced with a series of 
potentially conflicting pressures. On the one hand there are reasons 
for centralising control, while on the other there are serious obstacles 
to reducing the existing degree of plant autonomy. 
It should be stressed that much of the above is based upon the 
case study analysis. The CIR (1974:55-8) provides a more detailed 
checklist of the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the various 
positions. Any attempt to investigate the validity of these hypotheses 
would reqUire further research. This might usefully be carried out in 
companies having a fewer number of pla!ris, or where differing technology 
and pattern of growth may provide quite different pressures. This 
would include non-engineering manufacturing concerns. 
If the bargaining level is taken on the sole criterion for the 
natu~e of management control then tnere appears to be little support 
for the Brown and Terry hypothesis. Apart from Ford which has always 
bargained centrally, the remaining c~ses bargained at plant level. 
/ 
In Tubes and Rolls there was formal plant bargaining, while in GEC 
this was informal. 
However it has been argued that the level of bargaining cannot 
be isolated from the other dimensions of bargaining structure. When 
295 
these are considered there lS some support for the Brown and Terry 
suggestions. 
In all four Gases pensions were settled at group level mainly 
because of the financial benefits. In some cases, eg Rolls, 
certain ~its of employees bargained at group level, for instancs 
nurses, while most other employees had plarn agreements. In other 
cases, eg Tubes, certain issues for instance staff holiday entitlement 
was settled at divisional level. 
Therefore it is misleading to characterise bargaining structure 
simply by referring to the level of bargaining. For this level can 
vary depending on the issue or unit of employees in question. T~is 
is particularly ~ell shown in Ford. Despite having formal group level 
bargai~ing, informal negotiations took place in the ·plant over issues 
. 
such as manning and time speeds. In all cases when the bargaining 
structure as a whole is examined it is fbund that there are a number 
of levels of bargaining. 
A second point stressed In the preceding analysis is that 
bargaining structure must be placed within the context of other control 
systems within the organisation. 
As noted previously all four cases had central control over 
finance "and investment. Both Ford and Rolls had a highly integrated 
system of production. 
Industrial Relations and Personnel control systems of some 
kind were exercis2d from group or divisional level in all the cases. 
In three of the cases control systems such as these were used 
alongside the existing structure of plant level bargaining. It 
appears that mancgement have recognised that for various reasons 
explored in greGter depth below, some form of plant bargainine is 
inevitable. Yet this does not prevent the centralisation of 'non-IR' 
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control systems and the use of group or divisional Personnel and 
IR Control systems. Management are therefore responding to the 
pressures of greater central control, yet they are not necessarily 
changing the level of bargaining. Central control and plant ba-rgaining 
can exist side by side. 
The case studies provide a number of reasons why this si tuat ion 
may emerge. Plant bargaining may continue to exist f0t' the follm-ling 
reasons. First the case of Rolls. Consideration was given to changing 
from plant to .group level bargaining. Hov.Iever the main obstacle here 
was· the cost of the inevitable process of levelling up which would 
take place if pay in all plants was equalised. An internal company 
document estimated this at some £18m. Additionally shop stewards in 
the plants at the top of the earnings league would fight hard to 
maintain their position. 
A aecond example is provided by Tubes. The group had put 
forward an image of plant autonomy in their corporate &Jvertising. 
Any move away from plant level bargaining would be In conflict with 
this image. Hence plant bargaining was maintained for public r€lations 
reasons. 
Finally there is the case of GEC. Here the diversity of products 
and the genuine plant autonomy would make it ver,y difficult to 
~ntroduce group level bargaining. The differences in·plant history 
and management style which had been allowed to develop effectively 
prevent integration. 
The attachment to plant bargaining for th8 reasons given abo1.r e 
has not prevented Rolls and Tubes from.exercising either group 
or divisional control over Industrial Relations. 
Despite having different bargaining structures the four cases are 
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moving towards common ground. This is hardly surprising bearing ln 
mind the fact that these four groups are ln the same industry and are 
influenced by similar pressures. In effect this results in some form 
of central control with or without plant lev~l bargaining. Also there 
will be some kind of bargaining at plant level, whether formally or 
informally. In responding to the challenges from within and without 
organisations previously having very different structures are now 
becoming more alike. This has alrea~y been noted by one observer • 
. 
'The contrast between the structures of Industrial Relations in BL 
and Ford so marked ten years ago, is now much less sharp' (Clegg 
1919:103). 
One possible extension of the research would be to make comparlsons 
with non-manufacturing concerns for evidence of similar trends. ~here 
are of course many different kinds of multi-plant organisations. Almost 
any large organisation is likely to have a number of plants, whethpr 
they are depots, departments, offices or shops. Some of the concepts 
developed here could be applied to some of these organisations, eg. 
the Civil Service or ~otels and Catering. A comparison between Ford 
and practices in local authorities or Nationalised industries would 
be of very great interest. 
Two of the cases, Rolls and Tubes, seem to have deliberately 
adopted this compromise or middle way position. This has been termed 
'organisational federalism' (Handy 1979:207). Under this system each 
'federal state' is independent for most matters and is encouraged to 
preserve its autonomy. However on certain matters where consisteLcy 
is desirable the centre makes the dC0ision which the 'states' have 
to abide by. U~der this system the centre is dominated by pla~2~ing 
.and co-ordinati~g the states. The essential point is that 'those 
L'jO 
who execute policy must I::)t be exactly the same as those W~lO 
legislate policy'. Planning and policy making Should take place 
centrally, while the plants are wholly responsible for carrying out 
these plans. 
However as has been shown this strategy of organisational 
federalism is not without its dangers. The overt incongruency of 
control systems which is inherent In this structure may generat~ 
inter-plant union activity. This lS particularly the case where 
this lack of harmony of control systems causes doubt to be thrown 
on managerial legitimacy, e.g. as in Tubes and Rolls. Management 
in these two cases hold a very delicate balance between group control 
and plant autonomy. This was highly unstable because of the ad hoc 
nature of the controls used. The main reason why management was able 
to maintain this position was because of union inability to organise 
effectively between plants. However if an issue arises which unites 
rather than divides the plants this balance could easily be upset. 
Thus the initial attractiveness of the compromise position 
may later be r8duced if managerial legitimacy is challenged as a 
result. Deliberately seeking this compromise seems to lead to 
union inter-plant activity. However similar results to the formal 
compromise position can be obtained if informal controls are used. 
These w~ll not challenge an established managerial legitimacy. 
To conclude it is evident that management in multi-plant 
organisations are faced by conflicting pressures. Management:s 
response to these pressures can be seen once the focus of analysis 
is expanded away from the level of bargaining alone. It has been 
shown that there is gre~ter centralisation of control alongside 
plant level bargaining. This finding provides support for the work 
of ooth Brown and Terry and Daniel. 
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Although two of the cases have been shown to be le~s successful 
at following this compromise than they might have been, all four cases 
display a relatively sophisticated attitude towards Industrial 
Relations. This is probably because of the long history of dealing 
with trade unions. 1 An interesting comparison could be drawn 
between these cases, and other cases having ~ far less sophisticated 
Indu8trial Relations policy. This might require research in much 
smaller organisations, or those having a different history of union 
representation. It would be interesting to see if the same principles 
existed in these other examples. 2 On the other hand it appears 
that North American companies pay much greater attention to Industrial 
Relations. Useful comparison could be drawn on the sophistication 
of Industrial Relations policy. However the very differer-t social 
legal and political backgrounds would demand an inter-country 
comparison in addition. 
2 Trade Unions 
Perhaps the greatest problem to be confronted by trade unions 
concerns how they are going to react to the e~ergence of single 
employer bargaining and the development of centralised management 
control. The consequences for unions can be examined in three stages. 
As previously noted all 
sing:e employer bargaining. 
four cases provide good examples 01 
3 . ,. t Other available evidence lna.lca es 
that this is part of a more general trend. The most jmmediate 
1 Th~s may also be because of the largely negative role ,l~yed by 
the National Agreement, a fact which is apparent only after lnter-
country comparison see Clegg (1976); Sis~on ~nd Jacks~n (1978) 
2 See Slichter Healy and Livernash (1960); Chamberlaln (1967) 
3 See Daniel (1976); Warwick survey (1979) 
300 
implication for unions is the chan~d level of bargaining. Trade 
unions must acknowledge that the extremes of multi-employer and 
shop floor bargaining are no longer of major i~portance. The most 
important level of pay bai'gaining, in the manufacturing sector at 
least, is either at plant or group level. A realisation of the 
significance of these changes will require alteratlons in the internal 
organisation of unions, ~nd their attitudes towards combines. 
Present internal organisation of the majority of unlons was 
formed at a time of strong national agreements. This gave a great 
deal of formal power to national officials. In most cases the unions 
have reacted slowly to the emergence of shop stewards.in the workplace. 
Only in the last twenty years or so have they been adequately 
recognised. The ur~lons have therefore reacted to informal plant 
bargaining as a supplement to national agreements, however in the 
main they have yet to react adequately to the development of single 
employer bargaining. 
There are one or two exceptions to the above generalisations. 
A number of white collar unions, eg ASTMS and TASS seem better 
equipped to deal with single employer bargaining than their manual 
counterparts. For example some llnions have divisional officers who 
negotiate solely with the plants of one group in a geographical area. 
Information flows also seem to be much better in these ~~ions. The 
result often is that white collar and unionised management bargaining 
takes place at group rather than plant level. This lb a consequence 
of two factors. First the different attitude taken by the officials 
of these unions towar~s group level bargaining. Unlike the manual 
unions inter-plant contacts and group bargaining is ac"tively encouraged 
by the union. Second there is the legacy of how manager8 were treated 
in the past. If they were seen as a 1ivisioLal or group resource 
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then this is likely to provide a ready made bargaining llni t after 
. . t. 1 
unl0nlsa 10n. Once these managers have realised that it is the 
group or division which exercises effective cOll~rol they will not be 
satisfied with bargaining at any other level. The unionisation of 
white collar aLQ ~anagerial employees may force groups to change their 
bargaining structur'e. (Ramsay 1971:44). It i.s for this reason that 
evidence indicates that white collar bargaining tends to take place at 
group level, while manual bargaining is usually at plant Ie vel. 
Because of these differences between manual and white collar 
behavi~ur a comparison between the two would be of great interest. 
For eAample research could be conducted into the reasons why group 
bargaining in white collar unions is officially encouraged, v-Thile it 
is openly discouraged in manual unions. Support for inter-plant 
contacts in manual unions, such as i·~ is, comes largely from the 
'grass roots' and convenors. 
If the manual unions are to react to single employer bargaining 
then profound changes in unLon government will be required. Greater 
attention will have to be paid to individual employers rather than to 
federations of employers. In the long run this may involve the 
dismantling of the present geographical basis of internal organisations. 
Branches may have to become based on the workplace organisation in 
all cases rather than just some. Full time officers may have to 
devote their time to a rtlatively small number of groups and negotiate 
with them over a long period. Such changes at the moment seem very 
unlikely. 
If manual unions were to recognlse the significance of single 
employer bargaining there would still be a number of protlems to be 
faced. In particular the choice ~etween plant and group level 
1 ThiE is very much t~le case in Rolls and rrubes 
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bargaining may be crucial. Whi~e plant level bargaining maximises 
shop steward power it may allow disparities between plants ~o be 
maintained. Grovp bargaining may spread gains throughout plants, but 
may result in a loss of steward autonomy • 
. Information regarding the pros and cons of such a choice is very 
limited at the moment. 1 Further research into cases where single 
employer bargaining is the norm e.g. Nationalised Industries, Civil 
Service and local authorities, would provide much useful comparative 
material. 
Second, it has been shown that not only have there been changes 
in the level of bargaining, but management control has become 
increasingly centralised. The way in which trade unions are going 
to react to this must also be considered. 
Perhaps the most obvious course of action would be to 'play 
manageffi~nt at its own game'. That is to bargain at plant level, but 
to maintain a degree of central control or co-ordination. This would 
allow steward autonomy tobe maintained, whi:e disparities between 
plants could gradually be eliminated. Such a strategy would involve 
a far greater degree of inter-plant co-ordination than exists at the 
moment, or seems likely in the future. A number of problems confront 
the strengthening of combines. 
Shop steward influence rarely extends far beyond the plant. 
Inter-plant activity may be very difficult to justify for employees 
who see thAir interests'as essentially plant based. Often there are 
many divisions between plants in the same groups. These may be based 
upon earnings, or upon personality clashes between convenors. 
Further research iilto the setting up and operation of combines 
would be useful in this cont3xt. Future studies could look at the 
actual nature of the contacts that exist between plants, e.g. to 
1 Only the CIR (1974:55-8) provides any useful information 
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what extent they are depelldentun a few individuals such as 
Convenors. 1 
Another interesting area is the official trade union hostility 
to c'Jmbine act i vi ty. The reasons for this and impact of it could 
usefully be studied. In most cases the rationale for this attitude 
is that such committees pose a challenge to the authority of national 
officers. However it is possible to draw a parallel between present 
, 
opposition to Combine Committees and previous opposition to Joint 
Shop Steward Committees. 
Although initially opposed by the unions the latter gradual~y 
. came to be accepted. It is possible that a similar change of at~itude 
may take place with combirL0 committees. One danger must be noted 
here. If combines are officially recognised there is the risy-
of the members becoming separate from the shop floor. The result 
may be the development of rank and file factions as seen in the 
Ford case. 
A final area of interest concerns the ability of l~ions to 
challenge the authority of management. It has been established 
that this ability is particularly restricted in Ford and GEG where 
the control systems are internally congruent. However in Rolls and 
Tubes there ar~ obstacles to be overcome. Employee attitudes within 
these cases tended to be a confused ~ixture of parochialism and 
suspicions about central management involvement. Even in the cases 
'wher~ group or divisio~l'interference is evert it is very difficult 
for unions to organise effectively between plants. In particular 
emplo~rees in one plant may be reluct~nt to take strike action in 
support of their colleagues in ro1other plant. The shop stewards or 
convenors may be in favour of such action but the other employees 
1 Following work of Lerner and Bes'coby (1963); Beynon and 
Wainwright (1979); Friedman (1975) 
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may not. The limitation on union activity is in the end dependent 
upon where employees see thei~ interests as lying, once this has 
been established on the plant this may be very difficult to alter. 
An investigation into the reasons behind employee attitlldes towards 
inter-plant activity would be of great interest. A series of case 
studies using interviews may reveal some of the reasons for the 
parochial and inward looking attitades. This would shed some light 
on the ideological as well as material obstacles to challenging 
managerial aut~ority. 
3 Reform of Industrial Relations 
The Donovan Report's approach to reforming Industrial Relations 
was based upon changes in bargaining structure and management 
structure. In particular changes in bargaining level c::.:n.d form were 
urged. Formal agreements should be negotiated at either plant or 
company level. Additionally management structure should be altered 
by strengthening the role of the Personnel Department and giving 
greater attention to Industrial Relations generally. 
However, evidence from this and other research suggests that 
changes in management and bargaining s~ructure alone may be inadequate. 
The reasons for this inadequacy and some suggestions for possibl '':; 
reform are considered below. Plant and group industrial relations 
will be examined in turn to assess the possible reforrrs. 
An article by Terry1 has suggested that it may not be possible 
to simply 'formalise the informal' as Donovan had suggested. It is 
1 Terry (1977) 
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likely that either new informal practices will grow up follmving a 
formal plant agreement, or the informal practices will never 
disappear. 
This was shown ln a number of plants studied. In one of the 
Tubes plants formal bargaining took place at plant level, but covered 
a number of 'business areas'. Although covered by the same agreement 
there was a great deal of variation in the customs and practices 
which developed in each plant. The Personnel depa~ment played a 
relatively minor role and allowed departTJental stewards and management 
a great deal of autonomy. Formal plant bargaining had a very limited 
impact on day-to-day Industrial Relations. 
In another Tubes plant formalising plant bargaining had a 
different consequence. Many routine Industrial Relations matters vJere 
taken out of the hands of the departments, and raised to the level of 
the plant. Theyachieved the desired ~evel of consistency yet meant 
that senior management had to become involved in many mundane issues. 
Thus formalising plant bargalning may fail to eliminate custom 
and practice or will unnecessarily limit juuior management autonomy. 
Expanding the Personnel Department wi thln the plant may take a 
number of forms. 
In Ford the Personnel Department had taken over many of tha 
responsibilities of foremen and supervisors. Although this achieved 
a high degree of consistency, the authority of junior management was 
seriously weakened. In Tubes the size of the Personnel Department 
,,,-' 
had been ~xpanded and its formal authority increased. However this 
appears to have been because of a need to cope with the en:arged 
administrative burden resulting from changes in labour law. Personnel 
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still occupied an isolated and specialised role having little control 
over d~y-to-day Industrial Relations. In Rolls a combination of these 
two schemes was used. Personnel Officers were attached to line managers 
in their departments. It was their duty to a1vise and help on routine 
matters. Yet at the same time these Personnel Officers were responsible 
to the central Personnel Department. 
Again it is evident that making structural changes gives no 
guarantee that what takes place in practice will alter. It is like 
. 
re-drawing the lines on an organisation chart and hoping people's 
behaviour will change. In many instances people will act differently 
only if for some reason they feel they have to. Simply changing 
structures may not provide sufficient reason. 
Perhaps the central problem to be studied here concerns the 
relationship between line and Personnel management. The seemingly 
intractable problem here is that no matter what formal structural 
changes are made very little changes in practice. Line management 
continue to seek the autonomy they feel is needed to solve their 
problems and reach their targets, even though this may result in 
inconsistency in Industrial Relations practice. While Personnel seek 
a more long ·TIh~ and consistent view across the whole of the plant. 
One possible solutior- to this problem may lie simply in ths 
physical location of the Personnel Department. As long as Personnel 
is geographically isolated from line management, such R clash of 
interests is likely. But if junior members of Personnel could work 
alongside line managers co-cperation may be improved. This charge 
would not remove the difference of interest, but may give a better' 
chance of solving problems. 
Two lines of research would follow from these points. 
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Research could concentrate on the role of management in the plant. 
Several aspects could be studied here. First the formal and informal 
relationships that exist between the various specialist management 
departments. Attention could be focussed on the relatic~ship be~ween 
line and personnel management and the responsibilities that each group 
should have. Second future research could examine the links that plant 
management have with divisional or group management. T~e strengths of 
th~ external links as compared to the internal links could be studied. 
The relative weight of these two would gi ve' .. an indication of level 
from'which effective control within ~he organisation emanates. For 
example emphasis on the external limes suggests more centralised 
control (Brown 1973:159-63). 
A second area of potential study looks gene~ally at the attitudes 
taken by management towards Industrial Relations. Why is it that in 
many instances Industrial Relations is given a very low priority anrl 
1S derived from 'non-IR' decisions. Some of the reasonb for attitudes 
of this kind could be studied (Legge 1978) as well as an assessment 
of the impact of these non-IR control systems on Industrial Relations. 
Formalising plant bargaining can lead to several problems vlhen 
looking at group Industrial Relations as a whole. This is particularly 
a problem when combined with other contemporary developments in ~ulti­
plant organisations. 
Evidence available from the cases studied suggest3 that mul~i­
plant organisations are faced by a series of pressures which result not 
only in an increase in size, but also with greeter centralisation 0f 
control. This evidence is of course by.no means conclusive &~d 
needs to be supplemented by more information either from studies such 
as this, or by multi-variate 2nalysis of the type undertaken by Deaton 
and Beaumont (1979). 
308 
Given the avail!3.ble information it has been shown that these 
changes have encouraged 1lllion inter-plant activity. Formalising plant 
bargaining while centralising management control not only makes inter-
plant comparisons easier but actually encourages them. For as Sisson 
and Jackson (1978:30) have noted: 'employers in the UK can no longer 
camoflage the results of negotiations with shop stewards under the 
guise of wage drift: in those case~ where a single employsr agreement 
has in effect replaced the multi~employer agreement the rate of pay 
is plain for al~ to see.' 
In an attempt to regulate the resulting inter-plant union activity 
management employ a series of ad hOG control systems. As has been 
shown above these include provision of central services; co-ordination 
of bargaining; and involvement in plant disputes. Again these centrol 
systems apply only to the cases studied. Different organisations may 
reveal detail differences, yet displaying the same principle. A 
series of short case studies or questionnaires could be used to 
investigate arLd classify these controls further. 
These controls were necessary because of the union challe~~es 
to managerial authority. Simply changing management and bargaining 
structures will not automatically improve managerial legitimacy. 
This will change only when the bases of legitimacy are understood. 
Two areas of research may be followed here. First one ~'lhich uses the 
same criterion of effectiveness of control (inter-plant activity) and 
looks in greater detail at the process of rationalisin~: manageI!}i~'~1.t 
action eg by reference by external determinants. Second by changing 
the criterion for effectiveness eg to control over intra-plant 
union activity_ 
One possible reform for group Industrial Relations has Deen put 
forward by the eIR (1977). This involves adopting framework agreements 
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of the kind seen in Europe. This,involves deliberately liQ~ing the 
various levels of bargaining by stipulating which issues s:J.ould be 
bargained over at particular levels. This would certainly present 
an interesting avenue of inquiry. However to be carried out properly 
it would requlre a serie$ of European comparis~ns. 
On the basis of evidence available at present two sets of 
problems exist here. First it appears that present multi- employer 
agreements are not strong enough to form the basis for such frame-
work agreements. This would require management to strengthen 
group level bargaining to provide the basis. This lS unlikely 
because it may encourage inter-plant union activity. For as has 
been shown bargaining formally at a number of different levels may 
create an incongruency of control systems. This in 'turn may lead 
shop stewards to question the legitimacy of plant management 
authori~y. In turn this may result in shop stewands attempting to 
bargain over certain issues at the level they, rather than management 
desire. 
Second framework agreements would require a far greater degree 
of management attention to Industrial Relations than seems likely 
at the moment. Legge (1978) has noted that for a variety of reasons 
Personnel issues are likely to have a very low priority. In practice 
this means that Industrial Relations implications are not considered 
when either general policy or specific decisions are being made. 
Again it is evident that changes in management and bargaining 
structure by themselves are likely to prove inadequate for refor~ing 
Industrial Relations. Ii' management are to take a more responsibJ ~ 
approach towards Industrial Relations this will not be achieved by 
structur~l chanb~s alone. What is required is a change in the 
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management attitude toward8 Industrial Relations. This will involve 
a recognition of the significance of union perceptions of tlw legitimacy 
of managerial authurity. As Terry (1977:78) notes the changes most 
readily accepted by employees were those they had a part in making. 
Reform in Industrial Relations must be perceived as legitimate by 
both sides and pence t~ke place by consent. 
McCarthy and Ellis (1973:4) suggest that 'management by agr~ementf 
may be the basis for such changes. This ~'!ould 'involve negotiations 
over every issue that was of concern to employees, although the authors 
are at pain~ to point out that this would involve no loss of manag:ment 
authority. Such a change would provide further evidence for the ~~ch 
quoted paradox of Allan Flanders. For he stated that 'management can 
only regain control by sharing it'. Such a development v.Tould appear 
to be unlikeJ-y at present, perhaps only because of what Har..rkins (1971: 202) 
calls the 'ideological conservatism' on the part of management. 
This study has of necessity been based upon a liuli ted amount of 
information and.~as employed a. narrow focus. However this has not 
prevented the development of a number of tentative concepts ~~d 
hypotheses, as well as presenting a good deal of empirical data. If 
this study has done nothing more than stimulate the much needed future 
research in this area, then at least one purpose will have been served. 
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